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The subject of this thesis is the provision of shelter for refugees and displaced persons in a 
war-tom, developed nation with a cold climate. It aims to develop a set of working 
recommendations that can be utilised by implementing agencies in the field to provide 
improved shelter response. The reconunendations are not provided to be universally 
applicable or as a definitive document, but as a 'stepping stone' on the path towards 
improved shelter response in similar situations, such as the current crisis in the Caucasus 
countries. The rcconm1cndations are a practical application of the academic evaluation of 
shelter contained within this thesis. This research was carried out using literature reviews, 
periods of field study and constant peer review. It was driven by the following question: 
Hmv can emergency shelter be provided in a way that supports the innate 
coping mechanisms of refugees from, and persons displaced by intrastate war 
in a developed nation, whilst addressing the social, political and economic 
constraints and concerns of the humanitarian community, the host community 
and the host government? 
This research question directed the evaluation and analysis of a complete range of shelter 
solutions in use in the Republic of Croatia. A framework of issues surrounding shelter 
provision in war was developed from the review of the literature covering firstly, 
humanitarian action in natural disasters and refugee situations and secondly, wars. The 
framework is divided into two central discourses which were identified from the literature: 
• Vulnerability and capacity 
• Integration 
The framework of issues was used to conduct a comprehensive and critical evaluation of a 
range of shelter types from camps to private accommodations within Croatia. Through 
evaluating the shelter in an holistic manner, from the perspectives of the user, the provider 
and the facilitator, enabling and disabling policies and practices were identified. Through 
the subsequent agglomeration of good practice and enabling interventions, a set of working 
rccommendations have been developed that advocatc the concept of shelter as a mechanism 
for supporting innate capacity and promoting long term recovery and development. 
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A common understanding of the usage of key words and phrases is essential to all 
reviewing the following thesis. To develop a platform of shared understanding, the 
subsequent definitions are supplied: 
displaced person is any person who owmg to well·founded fear of being 
persecuted has fled their home but has remained within the borders of the country 
of their nationality 
house is any structure within which people dwell 
home is the place felt to be the habitual dwelling place of a family with all the 
consequent emotional associations 
humanitarian community covers all those involved in the proVISIon of 
humanitarian aid and includes: bilateral and multilateral donors, international non­
governmental organisations (NGOs), international governmental organisations 
(IGOs), foreign military forces, national (host) government, national NGOs and 
national military forces. 
international community includes only those 'non-nationals' providing 
humanitarian aid: bilateral and multilateral donors, IGOs, international NGOs and 
foreign military forces. 
refugee is any person who owing to well·founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, is outside the country of 
their nationality 
shelter is the superstructure of different shape, size, type and material erected to 
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CHAPTER ONE: PRELUDE 

1.1 THE RESEARCH DEFINED 

The subject of this thesis is the provision of shelter for refugees and displaced 
persons in a war-torn, developed nation with a cold climate. An initial examination 
of the subject and related fields suggests three primary reasons for the study. 
• 	 Current praxis for organised shelter is both debilitating and detrimental to the 
long term recovery and development of the refugees and displaced persons it 
accommodates. 
Fifty years after World War Two, the humanitarian community is no longer 
solely operational in developing nations with tropical or semi-tropical climates, 
but has found itself acting once again in developed nations with cold climates. 
• 	 There is a paucity of research on shelter for refugees from, and persons 
displaced by war. The resulting lack of understanding of the extreme 
environment of war creates complexity for the humanitarian community acting 
within it. 
1.1.1 Current Praxis for Organised Shelter 
The author believes, that it is of crucial importance to see shelter as more than a 
technical issue concerned only with materials, dimensions, densities and ease of 
construction. The provision of shelter is not purely a technical problem, but one 
that is intrinsically linked with social issues. Shelter needs to be understood as an 
enabling intervention rather than merely four walls and a roof; as a means of 
supporting the innate capacities of refugees and displaced persons and maintaining 
them as productive social beings during their time in exile. As Anderson (1993) 
powerfully remarks; 
"Emergencies are not technical problems. They are human problems 
that involve physical, social, political and psychological realities. Purely 
technical approaches that focus on tonnage, transport, caloric content, 
and financial accountability to donors will never effectively reduce 
human vulnerability to future emergencies." (Anderson, 1993) 
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The paucity of research and literature illustrates the lack of understanding of the 
extreme debilitating effects of inappropriate emergency shelter on the capacities 
and long term recovery of refugees and displaced persons. Comparing the amount 
of shelter specific literature with that covering issues of mental and physical health, 
education, gender, rights and nutrition among communities of refugees and 
displaced persons, the lack of understanding of the social and psychological 
importance of shelter can be seen. Many studies address issues of health and 
capacities of refugees and displaced persons in camps and settlements and yet 
negate the impact of the built environment on the health and welfare of the 
inhabitants CAppe, 1984; Black, 1994; Cahill, 1993; Callamard, 1994; Chambers, 
1986; Chimni, 1994; Christensen, 1982, 1987, 1990; Hansen, 1982, 1990; Harrell­
Bond, 1986, 1990; Harrell-Bond, et ai, 1992; Kibreab, 1993; Klein, 1994; Long, 
1993; Macrae & Zwi, 1994; Rogge, 1987a; 1987b; Schoenmeier, 1987; UNHCR, 
1993; Weiss & Minear, 1993; Wilson, 1992). It seems that the planning and design 
of refugee shelter, camps and settlements are not perceived to be of importance to 
the wider community. Indeed, it was not until 1993 that the UNHCR deemed the 
subject to be of sufficient importance to require its own specific conference 
(UNHCR, 1993a). 
This thesis begins to address the paucity of data on shelter for refugees and 
displaced persons, in the belief that only through evaluation of current praxis is it 
possible to develop structures and guidelines for action that will promote shelter as 
an intervention for supporting innate coping mechanisms. To develop policies and 
programmes for improved shelter provision, it is essential to have a comprehensive 
and holistic picture of the positive and negative effects of current praxis for shelter 
on refugees and displaced persons. Shelter must be viewed as a dynamic social and 
psychological intervention in an extreme political and economic climate, as well as 
a physical object, in order to fully understand its effects on refugees, displaced 
persons and hosts. It is only when viewed from this wider perspective, that it is 
possible to advance recommendations for improved policy and provision. The 
changing arena of operations for the humanitarian community make such an 
analysis even more relevant and timely. 
1.1.2 The Changing Arena: War Revisited 
Although the humanitarian community began its activities as a result of the Second 
World War fifty years ago, there has since been little direct intervention into 
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community has primarily dealt with refugees from war, rather than violating 
sovereignty and intervening in countries at war, to assist internally displaced 
persons. Consequently, following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
proliferation of wars throughout the world, the humanitarian community now finds 
itself acting in an environment for which it possesses no institutional memory. It has 
become a player in many conflicts. 
The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, symbolised a period of change for many 
communist countries; a period that has been marked by increased nationalistic 
concerns and has defined a shift in the cultural and climatic context of the 
humanitarian community's field of action. Intrastate wars in the former USSR and 
the former Yugoslavia are both testament to the changes taking place in the North. 
Where agencies once dealt mainly with disasters in the South, in 'developing' 
nations such as India, Bangladesh and the countries of Africa; they are now 
working in radically different environments such as Chechnya, Georgia, 
Uzbekistan, Armenia, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Croatia. Crises in cold countries 
cost more money, require more fuel, have higher food requirements and are more 
demanding in terms of shelter than those in tropical or semi-tropical locations. It is 
not feasible to offer a tent or piece of plastic sheeting to a refugee or displaced 
person trying to survive winter conditions of snow, frost, rain and temperatures of 
minus 20°C. In addition to the pressures on the humanitarian community caused by 
their new field of action, the rapid onslaught of disasters and war crises and the 
speed with which one crisis is replaced by another, leave little time for agencies to 
evaluate and monitor the projects that they have implemented. Additionally, the 
rapid turn over of staff means that even the lessons that could be learnt from short 
term monitoring are never disseminated or passed on to those following behind. 
The result of these changes is that the humanitarian community is trying to provide 
relief shelter from the disadvantageous position of inexperience and inability to 
learn from current experiences. In racing from one crisis to the next, mistakes 
remain unidentified and repeated until they become engrained as standard practice. 
Thus, shelter policies that are debilitating and detrimental to longer term recovery 
proliferate. 
The importance of the 'relief to development continuum', or how relief effects long 
term recovery, has become a much discussed issue among donors and aid agencies 
in recent times. The squeeze on development expenditure has encouraged the 
4 Chapter One: Prelude 
international community to endeavour to make their relief provIsIon more 
developmental. In academic circles, the importance of relief that positively affects 
long term development after natural disasters has been acknowledged for thirteen 
years (Cuny, 1983), but there has been little research into the effects of relief 
shelter on refugees and displaced persons in war. 
This thesis advocates that the environment of war makes the primacy of 
developmental relief even more crucial. The widespread devastation of the social, 
physical and economic structures that war causes, necessitates the mass efforts of a 
nation's population to reconstruct. Without investing in and maintaining the 
productive status of the population during the years of exile and displacement, 
post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction will be adversely effected. It is 
important, therefore, that the relief provision to refugees and displaced persons 
maintains their productive capacities and invests in their status as capable social 
beings in order to facilitate both individual, and hence nation-wide, post-war 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. To retain the innate capacities of refugees and 
displaced persons, the provision of shelter must act as an enabling mechanism and 
should facilitate the access of its inhabitants to the support of existing social and 
economic systems. 
The findings of this research begin to address the lack of evaluation and 
institutional experience of war by analysing a range of current shelter practices. 
Through analysis and subsequent agglomeration of good practice, experience in the 
field can be utilised to inform improved policy and praxis. 
1.1.3 The Paucity of Literature 
Although organised accommodation III camps and settlements has been, and 
continues to be, the primary response by the international community to refugee 
crises, the literature researching the effects of inhabiting such accommodation is 
sporadic and ill-defined. Cuny's overview paper on the state of the art of camp 
planning (Cuny, 1977) which was reiterated and expanded upon both in his later 
work (Cuny, 1983), and the UNHCR handbook for emergencies (UNHCR, 1982), 
was one of the first that attempted to address the subject of organised 
accommodation in an holistic way. The paper examines physical, social, health and 
administrative factors through analysis of a range of camps and settlements. Cuny 
tried to emphasise that shelter planning is a crucial part of 'caring for' refugees and 
should not just be left to chance but determined from the outset ofa crisis. 
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More recent studies that specifically target shelter are those of EI-Masri's 
investigation of West Beirut (EI-Masri, 1989), Jabr's brief study of the West Bank 
(Jabr, 1989) and Zetter's analysis of housing for Greek refugees in Cyprus (Zetter, 
1987). These studies start to move away from camps and settlements and focus on 
alternative shelter types such as the occupation of existing buildings, squatting on 
vacant land and permanent provision by host governments. These few cases aside, 
most data concerning shelter for refugees remains in unpublished field reports or 
with the implementing field officer. Such reports tend to be of a highly technical, 
pragmatic nature and focus on densities and co stlbenefit ratios rather than 
addressing shelter in an holistic manner. 
1.2 THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS AND THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the light of these three areas of concern, this research was carried out in order to 
provide an answer to the foHowing question: 
How can emergency shelter be provided in a way that supports the 
innate coping mechanisms of refugees from, and persons displaced by 
intrastate war in a developed nation, whilst addressing the social, 
political and economic constraints and concerns of the humanitarian 
community, the host community and the host government? 
This research question drove the evaluation and analysis of the complete range of 
shelter solutions in use in the Republic of Croatia. By conducting a comprehensive 
and critical evaluation of a range of shelter types from camps to private 
accommodations, an understanding of good and bad practice was developed. 
Through evaluating the shelter in an holistic manner, from the perspectives of the 
user (refugees and displaced persons) , the provider (donors, aid agencies and host 
government) and the facilitator (host community), enabling and disabling policies 
and practices have been identified. Through the subsequent agglomeration of good 
practice and enabling interventions, a set of working recommendations has been 
developed that advocate the concept of shelter as a mechanism for supporting 
innate capacity and promoting long term recovery and development. 
Thus this research set out to achieve the following: 
1.2.1 Aim 
To advance a set of working recommendations for improved shelter response for 
refugees from, and persons displaced by, intrastate war in a developed, cold climate 
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environment. While not attempting to be universally applicable, the 
recommendations are meant to provide transferable guidelines to the provision of 
shelter in other similar situations, such as the current conflicts in the Transcaucasus 
regIOn. 
1.2.2 Objectives 
i. To establish a theoretical understanding of the field of shelter provision for 
refugees and the survivors of natural disaster, through examining the current 
literature and addressing the issues of: 
• 	 the root causes of disasters and crises perceived within the broader context of 
society 
• 	 the concept of vulnerability both as an a priori and an imposed condition 
• 	 the potential of the innate capacities of refugees and the survivors of natural 
disaster 
• 	 the integration of incomers and hosts and the potentials for conflict 
11. To investigate the field of humanitarian action in war, through examining the 
current literature and addressing the issues of: 
• 	 the situation of permanent emergency that develops in war 
• 	 the nature of the relief to development continuum 
• 	 the expanded categories of vulnerability in a war situation and the systematic 
destruction of capacities and coping mechanisms 
• 	 the potential for integration of incomers and hosts 
• 	 peace building and conflict reduction 
iii. To develop a framework of issues surrounding shelter provision in war that 
could be significant in improving provision. 
iv. To evaluate a range of existing shelter projects in the Republic of Croatia using 
the framework developed from the literature review and carry out this evaluation 
from the perspective of the inhabitants, the providers and the hosts. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
The lack of information on the methodology to be utilised when conducting 
research into shelter provision in war, meant that the author had to develop a 
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composite framework from the fields of development studies and the built 
environment in order to conduct the research. A variety of methods were used to 
accomplish the research process and validate the findings: 
• Literature review 
• Field work 
• Peer group review 
i. Throughout the past three years a comprehensive study of relevant literature has 
been conducted by the author. The review has been performed in order to develop 
an understanding of previous related work, to direct the research and to maintain 
an up-to-date understanding of developments in the field. 
ii. Data for the study was collected during two periods of field study; one of two 
months in the Summer of 1994 and one of three weeks in the winter conditions of 
January and February 1995. The data collection techniques utilised during these 
periods of study are comprehensively outlined in Chapter Four. It is worth stressing 
however, that the conditions governing data collection in war meant that the 
methods were reliant on the author adopting a flexible, reflexive and innovative 
approach. 
iii. The paucity of information specific to the research question necessitated the 
close monitoring of the research progression and process. This monitoring was 
achieved through consultation with experts in the field; presentation of papers 
documenting the research findings at conferences and workshops; submission of 
papers, with invitations to comment, to both refereed and non-refereed academic 
and trade literature and presentation and discussion of the research findings at a 
specifically convened and directed workshop. Through this constant process of 
peer review the research maintained an acceptable and appropriate direction, pace 
and structure 1. 
1.4 STRUCTURE 
The thesis is arranged into two main sections, the first of which comprises Chapters 
Two to Four and presents an overview and evaluation of current praxis and an 
outline of the methodology utilised and developed for the study. The second 
1 A full list of the papers and conference presentations of the author is presented in the preface to 
this thesis. 
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section contains Chapters Five to Eight and details the specific findings of the 
research in Croatia concluding with the recommendations and proposals for future 
work. 
The thesis begins by presenting a cross cultural perspective of humanitarian relief in 
Chapter Two. Through evaluation of post-natural disaster and refugee experiences 
the chapter introduces two central discourses that are identified from the literature: 
• Vulnerability and Capacity 
• Integration 
Each of these concepts is explored with reference to past experiences of natural 
disasters and refugee crises through the discussion of issues of root causes of 
disasters, cultural sensitivity of provision, timing of provision, needs assessment, 
media involvement and agendas and motivations behind the actions of the 
international community. The chapter introduces the central concept of imposed 
vulnerability. 
Acknowledged differences between natural disasters and war make it essential that 
the discourse is expanded to include the nature of the humanitarian community's 
actions today. Thus Chapter Three, explores humanitarian relief in war and 
develops the framework of understanding of the issues underpinning the two 
central themes of vulnerability and capacity, and integration, through examination 
of current practice. The chapter explains the importance of the relief to 
development continuum and introduces issues of accountability and conflict 
reduction as essential threads within the vulnerability and capacity, and integration 
discourses. 
Chapter Four documents the research methodology adopted for the study and 
illustrates the importance of maintaining a flexible, reflexive and innovative 
approach to data collection in war. The chapter is a contribution to a much needed 
discussion on the subject of data collection in war and attempts to begin to address 
the paucity of literature on the subject. The chapter further discusses the 
importance of dissemination of findings for peer review and scrutiny throughout the 
research project through attendance and presentations at workshops and 
conferences and authorship of papers in refereed journals. 
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Section Two begins with the introduction to the field data in Chapter Five, where 
the build up to the war in Yugoslavia is described to present an understanding of 
the political and ethnic pressures governing action in Croatia. The chapter includes 
a brief, quantitative, demographic presentation of the refugees and displaced 
persons and outlines and describes the range of shelter types in use throughout the 
Republic of Croatia. 
The two subsequent chapters present the findings of the field study in Croatia and 
expand upon and develop the discourses on vulnerability and capacity, and 
integration initiated in Chapters Two and Three. Chapter Six develops the concept 
of imposed vulnerability and repression of innate coping strategies. Chapter Seven 
tackles the issues surrounding integration in a country engaged in an ethnic 
intrastate war. 
The thesis is concluded in Chapter Eight with the derived set of working 
recommendations for improved shelter provision and reflections upon the findings 
of the research. The recommendations, which are proposed for use by 
implementing agencies, are not definitive but offer a first step in an ongoing process 
of evaluation which poses future research potentials. 
SECTION ONE 

AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PRAXIS 

;: 
CHAPTER TwO: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES OF 
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
2.1.1 The Changing Climate: War Revisited 
The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolised to the World the end of the 
Cold War and the beginning of a new era of peace. It is now apparent that that 
optimism was misplaced. Indeed: 
"It seems that the great fall of the Berlin Wall has been overshadowed 
by the erection of many other dividing walls." (Barakat and Cockburn, 
1991, p3) 
While a tenuous peace has come to South Africa and Ethiopia, the proxy wars of 
the USA and USSR are still being enacted in Afghanistan and Mozambique. In 
Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda and Somalia, new and fierce conflicts have broken out 
(Barakat & Hoffmann, 1995; Macrae & Zwi, 1994). Today, in a situation far from 
an era of peace, there are over thirty outright wars being waged in the world (not 
including major skirmishes) (Barakat & Hoffmann, 1995). 
The new conflicts present a marked shift from interstate conflict to internal, 
intrastate conflict (Barakat & Hoffmann, 1995), a shift that constructs civilians 
and not military personnel as the prime victims. In World War Two, 52 per cent of 
casualties were civilian, in today's wars they represent 90 per cent of the casualty 
list. The massive social, political, environnlental and economic devastation of these 
internal conflicts causes extensive population displacement. The numbers of 
refugees and internally displaced people have grown from 2.5 million refugees in 
1970 to 18.9 million refugees and 24 million internally displaced persons in 1992 
(UNHCR, 1993; US Committee for Refugees, 1993). Today, the number of 
refugees and displaced persons is approaching fifty million (UNHCR, 1995). 
During the Cold War, there was little concern for the sanctity of human life 
without prior consideration of the political and strategic importance of the country 
involved. Superpowers made judgements calibrated by the perceived importance of 
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the country concerned (Macrae & Zwi, 1994; Weiss & Minear, 1993). 
Humanitarian relief was not given according to need but reliant on the allegiances 
of the affected country's government. An illustration of such a reliance was the 
ousting of American-backed Emperor Haile Selassie by a communist take-over in 
Ethiopia in 1974. The change resulted in the superpowers adjusting their economic 
and military aid provision accordingly; America withdrew and Russia stepped in 
(Weiss & Minear, 1993). Another example was the famine that swept Ethiopia in 
1983-85 which was ignored by the Reagan administration for a considerable time 
as the USA perceived Ethiopia to be Russia's responsibility. 
The international community of the post-Cold War era now views conflicts no 
more serious than those that existed prior to 1989, as " ... threats to international 
peace and security" (Weiss & Minear, 1993). The United Nations Security Council 
perceived the mass flight of the Kurds following the defeat of Iraq, as just such a 
threat. They acted against the sovereignty of Iraq and authorised military 
intervention to guarantee the humanitarian community access to the Kurds 
(Tomasevski, 1994). Until this point, the Security Council had concerned itself 
only with matters of international security. The resolution of 5th April 1991 
created the precedent for the international community to intervene against 
sovereignty in matters of human rights and humanitarian affairs. The reason for the 
unprecedented step doubtless lay in the fact that it was the international community 
that assisted in the victimisation of the Kurds through the imposition of sanctions 
on Iraq. Thus the Kurdish population were subject to a double embargo by both 
the Iraqis and the American-led international community (Tomasevski, 1994). With 
no designated entity responsible for Kurdish human rights, the international 
community was obliged to fulfil humanitarian needs. Since this action, the use of 
military forces has become a common place mechanism of 'securing' humanitarian 
intervention. Indeed, the 'buzz words' of the nineties are 'humanitarian 
intervention' and 'complex emergencies' . 
The increasing scale of both international humanitarian and military intervention in 
war, or 'complex emergencies', is creating new pressures on the relief and 
development agencies. There is, therefore, a critical need for an increased 
understanding of the nature of relief provision in war. Agencies have to address the 
possibility that not only can relief provision negatively affect reconstruction and 
development, but also that in the highly politicised atmosphere of war, their aid 
provision can increase ethnic rifts and act to raise levels of conflict. These factors 
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make it necessary for agencies and donors to address and understand the changes 
in their roles and deal with the root causes of complex emergencies. 
The past twenty years have seen many investigations of the character of 'natural' 
disasters and the provision of relief to refugees (Taylor, 1976; Kieffer, 1977; 
Davis, 1978; Christensen, 1982; Cuny, 1983; Harrell-Bond, 1986 and 1990; 
Rogge, 1987; Zetter, 1987; Jabr, 1989; Hansen, 1990; Aysan & Davis, 1992; 
Harrell-Bond, et al., 1992; Wilson, 1992; Black, 1994; de Waal, 1994). All have 
been ultimately aimed at reducing the level of suffering that these disasters cause 
and improving response. The new era of 'complex emergencies' presents the 
humanitarian community with an unfamiliar and complicated problem to solve and 
validates further research into good and bad practice. 
Complex emergencies are defined by the wide variety of hazard agents that 
generate them. They are characteristic of nations with growing economic insecurity 
and social vulnerability (Duffield, 1994b) and are most often accompanied by 
warfare. They are highly politicised and often cross international boundaries; an 
overwhelmingly political atmosphere that makes it difficult for agencies and donors 
to act within them. It is this complexity of action for the humanitarian community 
that inspired the designation of 'complex emergency'. In trying to deal with such 
emergencies in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and the Former-Yugoslavia, the 
humanitarian community has exposed many faults and limitations in its structures, 
mandates and practices. Its 'humanitarian' actions and military interventions have 
increased rather than reduced the problems and have, in certain cases, assisted the 
predatory forces in vanquishing the weaker 1. 
The end of the Cold War and the consequent reduction in superpower rivalry, has 
reduced the forces that previously held multi-ethnic nations together (Cuny, 1993). 
Many ethnic minorities have realised that they now have an opportunity to seek 
independence and identity. One by-product of the rise in ethnonationalism is an 
increasing intolerance of different races and cultures; an intolerance that is 
frequently focused upon refugees and migrant workers. The result has been a 
gradual closing of the doors on refugees and migrants and a consequent reduction 
in resettlement possibilities. 
1 For example, in Bosnia the creation of safe havens by the U.N. in Srebrenica and Zepa 
ultimately assisted in the process of ethnic cleansing by the Serbian forces. 
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The outcome of such policies is increased pressure to deal with potential refugees 
in their country of origin through, for example, the creation of safe havens. 
Consequently, aid agencies find themselves working more and more frequently 
with internally displaced populations in countries that are still affected by conflict 
and war, such operations are now the biggest challenge facing the international aid 
community (Cuny, 1993). 
In this post-Cold War era, the chance exists to improve and restructure the 
humanitarian community and alter the way that donors, international organisations, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and agencies act (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). 
To take full advantage of the opportunity, it is necessary to examine both past and 
current performances, identify good and bad practice and subsequently develop 
improved responses. Without an institutional memory of aid provision in conflict, 
agencies and donors can only rely on lessons learnt from their experience of 
provision of aid in 'natural' disasters and refugee crises. Similarly, in this thesis, in 
order to develop a framework for the analysis of relief provision in war, the 
provision of relief in natural disasters and refugee crises will be examined first. 
Some of the general lessons from these fields are indeed valid when they are 
viewed from a perspective which comprehends the root causes of complex 
emergencies. The validity of this approach lies in the 'unnaturalness' of 'natural' 
disasters; the continuity of the institutions providing assistance in natural disasters, 
refugee crises and war and the importance of relief provision in all situations 
linking to sustainable development. 
In the past there has always been a distinction drawn between 'manmade' (war, 
technical disasters) and 'natural' (flood, famine, earthquake) disasters. A 
distinction that inferred an absence of human involvement in the cause of a natural 
disaster. This chapter will show that a natural disaster is very much the product of 
human choices, actions and decisions and that the roots of 'natural' disasters share 
the same human arena as those of manmade disasters such as war. 
Although the political, economic, social and physical destruction of war is more far 
reaching and devastating than that of 'natural' disaster, it does seem that there are 
basic concepts that can be distilled from the experience of providing relief in 
natural disasters and refugee crises and applied to an examination of relief 
prOVISIon m war. 
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2.1.2 Structure of the Chapter 

This thesis identifies two basic themes within the literature. These are: 

Vulnerability and capacity 
Integration 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first identifies the roots of these 
two central discourses in the literature through discussion of the models of disaster 
and recovery. The second and third sections concern the importance of 
understanding vulnerability and capacity, and integration, in the field of 
humanitarian action. These discourses will be presented under the following 
headings, which have been identified as the primary categories through the analysis 
of the literature: 
i. Vulnerability and capacity 
• Vulnerability 
• Capacity 
• Needs assessment 
• Cultural applicability 
• Timing of provision 
• Media 
ii. Integration 
• Integration and assimilation 
• Host-incomer conflict 
2.2 MODELS OF DISASTER AND RECOVERY 
To understand good and bad practice in relief, it is first necessary to understand 
how the cycle of disaster and recovery is perceived and what creates a disaster or 
crises. 
2.2.1 The Linear Model 
In the early days of disaster relief there was a perception that a disaster caused a 
limited suspension of 'normal' activities and that with adequate relief, life and 
development would soon continue again as previously (Fig 2.1). 
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FiR 2.1. The linear model ojdisaster and recovery (source: the author) 
A disaster happened, be it 'natural' or 'manmade', it caused destruction and 
suffering which attracted emergency relief to alleviate the suffering. The relief 
addressed the immediate suffering, the country, town or village reconstructed itself 
and life returned to how it was before the disaster occurred. Development was 
believed to be a constant process, interrupted for a limited time, by disaster. 
It soon became apparent that the disaster affected communities did not, in fact, 
recover and that very often a similar disaster would occur again in the same 
location. A new understanding of disaster was developed that began to 
acknowledge that this linear model was simplistic and misconceived. A newer 
model proposed that disasters and recovery from them was in fact, a cyclical 
process. 
2.2.2 The Cyclical Model 
Rehabilitation 
Fig. 2.2. The cyclical model ojdisaster and recovery (source: the author) 
This later model acknowledged that the process of disaster and recovery appeared 
to be a cyclical one and that disaster would often strike again following 
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reconstruction. Concurrent with this model, practitioners and academics tried to 
analyse why disaster continued to strike in the same place and destroy the same 
groups. 
2.2.3 Pressure and Release Model 
In the late Seventies, a connection was made that began to offer an explanation for 
the repeated occurrence of disasters. It was represented by the pressure and release 
model, which linked hazards to vulnerabilities (Fig 2.3). 
DISASTER 
Fig 2.3. Pressure and Release Model (source: the aUlhor,jrom Davis, 1978) 
It was proposed that disaster occurred at the interface of a hazard and a vulnerable 
community. Thus the occurrence of a natural hazard on its own did not create a 
disaster; an earthquake in an uninhabited desert was not a disaster. However, 
when that same earthquake struck a vulnerable community then disaster was likely 
to occur. 
The amalgamation of the pressure and release model and the cyclical modelled to 
the proposition that if disaster primarily occurs where there is vulnerability, then it 
must be possible to intervene to reduce vulnerability and therefore reduce the scale 
of the disaster. This concept offered an explanation for repeated disaster in the 
same place: the relief provided before had never addressed the root cause of the 
problem, namely vulnerability. It had only dealt with the physical manifestation of 
suffering following the disaster. Consequently the risk of a disaster re-occurring 
had never been reduced. 
This concept of vulnerability led to a major change in the way that relief and 
development were viewed. Returning to the cyclical model, it can now be seen that 
there are stages in the process where it is possible to intervene to reduce the level 
of disaster. There is potential for both preparedness and mitigation phases (Fig 
2.4). 
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Fig 2.4. Preparedness and mitigation in the disaster and recovery model (source: 
the author, from the work ofDavis, 1995) 
At a basic level, therefore, it is possible to say that one reason for an earthquake 
becoming a disaster is that it strikes a poor community which is unable to build 
strong houses2. The disaster occurs as a consequence of houses falling down and 
lives and livelihoods being lost. So, at a simple level, if aid agencies provided the 
money and technology to enable the community to rebuild their houses in an 
earthquake resistant manner, then this mitigatory measure would reduce the level 
of disaster should the earthquake strike again. Combine this with a disaster 
preparedness plan that anticipates shelter needs and the levels and standards of 
shelter required to withstand earthquakes, and the overall vulnerability of the 
community is considerably reduced. This concept has led to many development 
projects that aim to increase the capacity of communities to resist hazard and 
reduce their vulnerability. 
2.2.4 The Spiral Model 
Most recent developments address the reduction in the level of disaster through 
decreasing vulnerability (Fig 2.5). The concept of vulnerability and, more 
importantly, capacity is of crucial importance to the way agencies and donors 
should supply relief in an emergency situation (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; 
Blaikie, et at., 1994; Cuny, 1983; Templar, 1994). 
2 It is acknowledged that this simple depiction does not account for other factors that affect 
vulnerability. Issues of physical location and strength and magnitude of the hazard will be 
discussed further on in this chapter. 
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Reconstruction 
Fig 2.5. ,Spiral model ofdisaster and recovery (based on the model presented in 
Barakat and Davis, 1995; further developed in discussions in Dubrovnik, 1995, 
between Barakat, Ellis, Hakonsen, SkOtte and Kojakovic) (source: the author) 
Only by addressing these areas is it possible to reduce the level of disasters and the 
consequent suffering that they bring. The reduction of vulnerability and correlating 
support of intrinsic capacity is one of the two pivotal themes of this thesis. 
2.3 VULNERABILITY AND CAPACITY 
2.3.1 Vulnerability 
Disasters need to be perceived within the broader context of society and not as 
purely geophysical phenomena. In order to provide appropriate relief and 
development it is essential to understand the root causes of disasters. Without this 
knowledge, well meaning and philanthropically intended assistance can cause long 
term harm (Anderson, 1993; Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Cuny, 1983). 
As has been previously stated, there is no such thing as a 'natural' disaster. 
Accepting that disaster occurs at the interface of a hazard and a vulnerable 
community; it follows that a natural hazard such as an earthquake or flood could 
generate a disaster only if it comes into contact with a community made vulnerable 
through human-made social, economic and political environments. 
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Vulnerability is the: 
" ... extent to which a community, structure, service or geographic area 
is likely to be damaged or disrupted by the impact of a particular 
disaster hazard, on account of their nature, construction and proximity 
to hazardous terrain or a disaster-prone area." (Coburn, et al. 1994, 
p67) 
Although the definition indicates the importance of minimising vulnerability to 
reduce the level of disaster, it does not indicate that there are root causes of 
vulnerability that need to be addressed. Vulnerability is linked to socio-economic 
position (Anderson, 1993; Blaikie, et at., 1994) and it is usually, though not 
exclusively the case, that those most affected by hazard are those of low socio­
economic position: a classification that includes delineation of class, ethnicity, 
gender, age and disability. The concept of vulnerability affects not only the degree 
to which hazard causes loss or damage, but also has implications for recovery: high 
vulnerability is linked with a long or permanent recovery situation. The lengthy 
recovery period also increases vulnerability to the next hazard, thus inducing a 
downward spiral in which recovery becomes less and less possible and vulnerability 
increases (Blaikie, et at., 1994). 
This spiral is known as the ratchet effect (Chambers, 1983) and has been witnessed 
in many disasters. For example, in 1993, the Maharashtra earthquake had serious 
detrimental effects on the affected communities' capacity for recovery 
(Parasuraman, 1995). The hazard hit already vulnerable communities and through 
its effects further increased their vulnerability to the next hazard. The rural poor 
inhabiting the villages affected by the earthquake, lost family members and tools 
and equipment as well as their homes. Following the disaster, it was noted that 
there was a serious decrease in the numbers of children attending school. 
Investigation showed that this was due to the shortage of manpower following 
deaths in the earthquake and the continuing need of the families to farm their land 
in order to survive. Together, " ... the two factors make it necessary for many boys 
and girls ... attending school to drop out in order to satisfY the labour needs of their 
households" (Parasuraman, 1995). The smaller family size, the reduction in 
education levels and consequent restricted access to higher waged employment 
increased the family's future vulnerability to hazard. In the same earthquake it was 
observed that those farmers and artisans who had lost their tools in the earthquake, 
also had a slow recovery for money could not be made to replace tools when the 
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money-making tools were lost. Lack of money leads to marginality and marginality 
increases vulnerability to future hazards. 
2.3.2 Root Causes 
Poverty is often cited as the principle root cause of vulnerability (Anderson, 1993; 
Aysan & Davis, 1992; Davis, 1978). The increase in the number of disasters in the 
past years is not seen to be a result of increased numbers of hazards, but due to 
rapid population growth, hyper urbanisation and consequent unequal access to 
resources and marginalisation (IFRC, 1993). 
As can be seen from the example of the Maharashtra earthquake, the poor are the 
prime sufferers in disaster: simply because an existence that is marginal in good 
times is swiftly and easily overwhelmed by disaster 3. Money buys the privilege of a 
home located far away from hazard spots and the luxury of hazard resistant 
technology (Blaikie, et aI., 1994); it purchases insurance to replace lost 
possessions and transport to escape a disaster area. Conversely, poverty pushes 
people to live on the edge; to inhabit flood plains or the sides of volcanoes as the 
soil is fertile and supports existence; it forces people to dwell in slums on the 
periphery of conurbations to have cheap and ready access to any employment and 
it reduces access to the materials and technology required to make hazard resistant 
homes (Anderson, 1993; Blaikie, et al., 1994; Davis, 1978). Poverty comes from 
lack of access to resources; either the physical resources of land, water supply, 
etc. or the social resources such as education, training and political representation. 
Degg's account (1993) of the 1992 Cairo Earthquake shows how the rapid 
urbanisation of Cairo had put more people at risk from "...the extremes of the 
natural environment". He demonstrates how the earthquake exposed the failure of 
Egypt's social, economic and legislative systems to deal with the underlying 
problems that rapid population growth had caused (Degg, 1993). Those most 
affected were the inhabitants of slum dwellings in the inner city and the residents of 
illegally extended high-rise blocks in the suburbs. Outside the city, the rural poor 
living in the fertile plain of the Nile, where they gained the advantage of increased 
crop yields, were badly hit by the amplified and prolonged shock waves. 80 per 
cent of the villages' housing stock was destroyed. Thus the earthquake did most 
3 The poor are not the exclusive sufferers in disaster. It will be shown later in the text that the 
rich are not always protected, and importantly, in war, the rich are often more \1Jlnerable 
precisely because of their wealth (Slim, 1995). 
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damage to the urban and rural poor: those marginal groups living on the edge due 
to the restrictions of poverty 4. 
However, it should also be borne in mind that poor communities with a high 
degree of social organisation and cohesion can withstand and recover from disaster 
very well (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989). The strength of social coping 
mechanisms outweighs the vulnerability brought by poverty. 
Understanding this concept of root causes of vulnerability and applying it to the 
pressure and release model cited previously, a new picture can be formed that 
illustrates a progression of vulnerability (Blaikie, et aI., 1994). Root causes lead to 
dynamic pressures which spawn unsafe conditions and result in disaster when 
compounded by hazard (Fig 2.6). 
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Fig 2.6. Pressure and release model showing incremental build up ofpressures 
(source: Blaikie, et al., 1994, p22) 
Understanding this chain of vulnerability and its effect on the magnitude of 
disasters gives some framework from within which to analyse good and bad 
practice in relief provision. In order to be effective, aid needs to address the root 
causes of problems and not merely deal with the physical manifestation of the 
disasters themselves. The recent events in Somalia provide a perfect example of 
how relief provision only dealt with the results, not the causes of the problem. 
4 However, an example such as the Kobe earthquake of 17 January 1995 shows that disasters can 
strike rich and poor alike. Here greater wealth did not correspond to better constructed housing or 
location far away from the hazard zone (Hayashi & Kawata, 1995). Greater country wealth 
however, has contributed to swift and efficient relief and recovery operations. 
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In December 1992, the Security Council of the United Nations stressed the 
" ... urgent need for the quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole 
country" and thus ordered military intervention to establish an environment for the 
safe delivery of humanitarian aid within Somalia (Tomasevski, 1994). However, de 
Waal (1994) shows that this aid provision only addressed the need of the 
population for food to prevent starvation, it did nothing to address the underlying 
causes of the famine itself which were: forcible land alienation in 1988; breakdown 
of social services (veterinary provision and bore holes) and intensification of rural 
insurrection in 1989-90. This cycle led to increasing impoverishment of the 
population and culminated in fighting following the overthrow of the Barre 
government in 1991. Fighting led to displacement, which in tum provoked more 
conflict and a mass exodus into Kenya and Ethiopia. By 1992, death due to 
starvation was considerably reduced, but disease spread rapidly through both the 
refugees and the remaining resident popUlation (de Waal, 1994). The UN 
intervention in December was based on a false understanding of the situation as it 
existed on the ground. It came as a response to claims that two million Somalis 
faced death by starvation, although by this time the main cause of death was 
disease, death through starvation had been controlled since July. Media portrayal 
of the situation came in 1992, with little or no coverage prior to that. The media 
simplified the solutions to the crisis as foreign food to stop starvation and foreign 
military to stop the fighting (de Waal, 1994). With the exception of the JeRC, 
agencies acted too late and without a basic understanding of the underlying roots 
of the starvation and thus targeted only the visible result with food aid. It was one 
of the worst displays of the international humanitarian community in action to date 
(Macrae & Zwi, 1994). 
In many disasters, the root causes can be traced back over a number of years. The 
war in Angola from 1975-91 had its roots in the colonial activity of the Portuguese 
in the 1940s (Macrae & Zwi, 1994); the Mexico city earthquake disaster of 1985 
had its base in the many years of limited access to resources experienced by tenants 
in the inner city historical core (Blaikie, et aI., 1994). 
The concept of vulnerability and its root causes in disasters is a crucial determinant 
in the way that relief agencies and donors should respond. If it is understood that it 
is social, political and economic vulnerability that leads to disasters then relief 
provision can start to address those vulnerabilities in order to successfully minimise 
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future disasters. As all disasters have a human core, they can all be minimised 
through cognitive human action. 
To address vulnerability, it is also important that agencIes realise that the 
communities they aim to assist are not homogenous and therefore will not all 
display the same level of vulnerability. For example, in a refugee camp it could be 
said that all the refugees are vulnerable, as indeed they are: they are politically 
vulnerable. Within that strata, however, there are further embedded vulnerabilities 
such as age or gender. For instance, in Wilson's study of Mozambican refugees it 
was found that the agency policy of giving food as the main item of relief did little 
to meet the food needs of the elderly, as in order to obtain non-food items such as 
firewood that they could not collect themselves they had to barter their own food 
ration (Wilson, 1992). Thus the provision did not address the particular 
vulnerabilities of the elderly population. 
This issue of compounded vulnerability is investigated to a limited extent within the 
refugee literature. Black (Black, 1994) makes an important distinction betvleen 
vulnerability as seen as an a priori condition of certain groups and vulnerability 
which is imposed by the conditions in which individuals may find themselves. In 
refugee terms, this distinction would manifest itself as the difference between the 
political, social and economic vulnerability that led to a certain group becoming 
refugees in the first place and the vulnerability of that group to future hazard as 
imposed by the manner in which aid is provided in camps once they had become 
refugees. 
Expanding this argument it can be seen that this notion of vulnerability, and 
conterminously, capacity, has implications on the concept of dependency syndrome 
as outlined in many texts on refugee crises. There is a large body of literature that 
promotes the view that humanitarian assistance encourages dependency among 
refugee and displaced person populations (Black, 1994; Harrell-Bond, 1986, 1990, 
1993; Harrell-Bond, et ai., 1992; Zetter & Baker, 1995). Harrell-Bond, in her 
seminal work Imposing Aid (1986), suggests that dependency among refugees is 
increased through the refugee regimes that usurp the decision-making and 
organisational capacity of refugee individuals and communities. Thus, when 
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refugees are denied the autonomy to make their own decisions, their dependency 
on outside assistance increases 5. 
For example, the UNHCR emergency handbook states that " ...the establishment of 
refugee camps must be only a last resort", (UNHCR, 1982) and yet refugee camps 
are consistently the characteristic way in which forced migrant populations are 
organised and administered (Harrell-Bond, et ai., 1992). The establishment of such 
camps and the labelling of forced migrants as 'refugee' reinforces vulnerability of 
the groups through the consequent view of the wider society towards that group 
(Zetter, 1987). Camps are promoted by the 'hand-out' mentality in which it is 
perceived that the refugee's every need must be provided for by the humanitarian 
community. This mentality gives rise to the predominant view among agencies and 
donors that " ... prolonged reliance on hand-outs fosters a 'dependency mentality' 
among refugees" (Kibreab, 1993). A mentality that is characterised by laziness, a 
killing of refugees' aptitude for work, creativity and initiative and an unwillingness 
to invest energy in self-sufficiency. 
Dependency implies a lack of ability to be, or to become, self-sufficient even in the 
presence of enabling interventions. However, in much of the literature there is 
little recognition of the importance of these enabling interventions. There is a 
consensus that when refugees are not working, it is because they no longer possess 
a will to work, or that when refugees are accepting handouts of food, it is because 
they can no longer provide their own food needs. However, it seems that there 
could be an important link between capacities, access and dependency - in order 
to avoid exhibiting signs of dependency, refugees need not only the capacity to 
perform an action, but also, access to the requisite resources. For example, in the 
natural disaster literature, capacity was seen as the combination of physical and 
non-physical entities such as access to land, plus the skill to know how to farm it 
(Anderson & Woodrow, 1989). Refugees also need the combination of physical 
and non-physical entities: access to physical resources as well as existing skills, 
social structures, etc .. The author believes, in line with Kibreab (1993), that it is 
the lack of access to resources, promoted by the current relief model, that is the 
pnme reason for the perceived appearance of dependency syndrome among 
refugees: 
5 This concept will be further discussed within the presentation of the findings from the field in 
Chapter Six. 
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".. .if the contextual environment is unfavourable, the goal of self­
sufficiency can remain remote and unattainable no matter how 
committed the refugees might be to the principles of independence and 
self-sufficiency" (Kibreab, 1993, p332) 
In order to avoid constructing long term dependent communities therefore, it is 
important to allow refugees access to resources and thus enable them to remain 
active: 
" ... psychological studies of disaster VlctUDS have shown that it is 
important that they be involved in meaningful activities as soon after 
they have experienced trauma as possible, since participation aids in the 
psychological rebuilding process." (Von Buchwald, 1994, p234) 
In addition to addressing the root causes of vulnerability, it is therefore, equally 
important that agencies also acknowledge the existence of capacities within the 
communities that they assist. For it is by building on, and supporting these 
capacities, or coping mechanisms, that relief provision is ensured to be 
developmental (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989) and future resistance to disaster is 
increased. Ignoring them or overriding them, increases vulnerability and leaves 
communities worse off than previously (Anderson, 1993). 
2.3.3 Capacity 
Capacities can be divided into two areas - the physical, which includes items such 
as land, tools, seeds, money, building materials and the non physical, which covers 
the areas of education, skills, family and community structures, etc. (Anderson, 
1993). The combination of physical and non-physical resources gives the degree of 
capacity to cope with disaster. For example, following the Chittagong cyclone in 
Bangladesh in 1991, it was noted that : 
" ... shelter...was an area where victims were often able to undertake 
almost immediate action. People set about collecting building debris 
and reconstructing shelters for themselves. Many moved into public 
buildings such as schools or factories until their homes could be rebuilt" 
(Hodgson & Whaites, 1992, p5) 
The community utilised their inherent knowledge of shelter construction together 
with the available physical materials, to address their own emergency needs 
without outside assistance. Their capacity to cope was high. 
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In many cases, it has been seen that agencies and donors have curtailed the coping 
mechanisms of the communities experiencing disaster through unthinking actions 
(Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Cuny, 1983; Kieffer, 1977; Taylor, 1976; 
Winchester, 1992). Winchester, 1992, describes how the Andhra Pradesh cyclone 
of 1977 disrupted the pattern of normal farming activity and should have given 
ample opportunity for the farmers, who had already constructed their OWn 
emergency shelters, to rebuild their cyclone-damaged homes. However, " ... many 
villages (about 80 per cent ... ) had been promised pucca concrete houses" and they 
" ... preferred to remain in their flimsy temporary bamboo and thatch sheds and wait 
for the free gift of a concrete house, which they regarded as status symbols" 
(Winchester, 1992). 
Harrell-Bond (1992), reports on the situation of Mozambican refugees who were 
settled in Swaziland by the chiefs along the border and assigned host families to 
live with. In return for land, the refugees provided the hosts with labour, a 
symbiotic and mutually agreed relationship which lasted for four years. Then the 
UNHCR introduced a food distribution system for the refugees, who reciprocated 
the hospitality of their hosts by sharing the new donated food ration. By 1990, 
UNHCR decided that the programme was not functioning for two reasons. Firstly, 
they had no concept of how many refugees there were in Swaziland (despite the 
fact that the chiefs had a very accurate knowledge of the resident refugees) and 
secondly, they 'suspected' that refugees were sharing food with hosts. Refugees 
were told that if they wished to continue to receive food they must move into 
camps; a decision that completely ignored the highly successful system that was 
already in existence and had been set up to fulfil the needs of refugees and hosts by 
the refugees and hosts. The UNHCR intervention destroyed a well organised and 
functional exchange relationship that had developed naturally. 
Evidence suggests that agencies believe the innate coping mechanisms displayed in 
the above example are lost by refugees when disaster strikes: 
" ... very often refugees lose not only their material assets (tools, animals 
etc.) but also the organisation of their whole socio-economic 
foundation, which collapses..." (Diegues, quoted in Kibreab, 1993, 
p333) 
While it is true that refugees lose the majority of their physical assets through 
flight, it is unrealistic to suggest that the non-physical innate assets such as culture 
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and tradition disappear or are lost (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Kibreab, 1993). These are 
the very tools that can be kept and maintained and used to survive. Many studies 
have shown the extreme level of coping mechanisms that refugees still retain in 
spite of the trauma of flight and loss (Christensen, 1987; Hansen, 1990; Harrell­
Bond, 1986; Kibreab, 1993; Turton & Turton, 1984; Zetter, 1987). Indeed, the 
fact that they have become refugees and survived to travel across a border 
indicates the retention of coping mechanisms and abilities. 
The pattern of supporting existing coping mechanisms extends beyond the realms 
of the individual or family, to religious groups, local authorities, indigenous NGOs 
and government. Support of, and action through, these indigenous and recognised 
agencies can make relief assistance more appropriately targeted and its positive 
effects more sustainable by the target group (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989). 
Anderson and Woodrow (1989), outline the situation in 1980, when Kampuchean 
refugees crossed the border into Thailand. Existing Thai NGOs saw that they 
shared elements of culture and society with the refugees and could therefore offer a 
lot to the relief programme that the European and North American NGOs could 
not. The UNHCR constantly refused to allow them to become involved, however, 
a smaller NGO saw the opportunities for collaboration and started to work with 
one Thai organisation, a result that led to the relief operation maintaining 
development opportunities. 
A second examination of Degg's account of the Cairo earthquake (1993), shows 
the efficiency of the Society of Muslim Brothers within Cairo at supplying 
emergency aid: 
"In the first week the Muslim Brothers had erected tents, emblazoned 
with the slogan 'Islam is the solution', to provide shelter for homeless 
families. They prepared hot meals and collected and distributed 
donations." (Degg, 1993, p235) 
The Muslim Brothers, and groups like them, are the main source of social and 
welfare assistance in Egypt. They are a local and indigenous group providing 
appropriate, accurately targeted aid in an efficient and organised manner. An 
organisation that the international humanitarian community should have supported 
and utilised to channel aid into the area. 
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Following the earthquake in Kobe, Japan in January 1995, emergency needs, such 
as search and rescue, were automatically performed first by the disaster victims 
themselves, those people who were on the site immediately, and secondly by very 
competent Japanese search and rescue teams (Hayashi & Kawata, 1995). The 
Japanese government categorically stated to the international community that while 
it was grateful for all the goodwill coming from overseas, it did not require any 
external search and rescue teams. Unfortunately certain countries ignored the 
comments of the Japanese government and sent search and rescue teams anyway. 
The teams did not arrive until the majority of sites had already been searched by 
the disaster victims and the Japanese teams, and they were consequently of little 
use. The most they managed to achieve was to place a huge burden on the 
Japanese, for the team that arrived could speak no Japanese and had no translators 
with them, they had no independent transport and thus required logistical 
assistance, they also required accommodation and food, all at a time when the 
government had to handle the aftermath of a major earthquake (DHA, 1995). Their 
actions did little to assist the Japanese and show the necessity of supporting 
existing mechanisms within a society and not trying to override them. If the 
systems exist in country, then agencies should target their assistance through them 
and not endeavour to duplicate actions that are already being undertaken. 
Unthinking actions such as these reduce the innate coping mechanisms of 
communities, not only in the short term or immediate aftermath of the disaster, but 
can also have serious long term effects. Sixteen years after the Peruvian earthquake 
of 1970, it was noted that local families still maintained a 'handout' mentality, 
assuming that all agencies were there purely to make large donations of physical 
goods and money (Blaikie, et al., 1994). This attitude, fostered initially by the 
actions of agencies who responded to the disaster in the Seventies, made it nearly 
impossible to initiate any development projects twenty years later. 
Activities and programmes that build on existing capacities and reduce future 
vulnerabilities require the incoming agency to have a thorough knowledge of the 
situation on the ground. Without an awareness of existing mechanisms and social 
groupings and support mechanisms, it is impossible to judge whether or not a 
Jroject will adversely affect long term development. Such knowledge requires 
lccurate needs assessment or a collaboration between the international community 
md organisations that already exist on the ground. 
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2.3.4 Needs Assessment: Addressing Real not Perceived Needs 
As has been indicated above, there are many cases of relief activity undermining 
local activities and adversely affecting long tenn development through 
inappropriate aid interventions. Rectifying this fault either requires accurate needs 
assessment or collaborative relief responses through existing indigenous 
organisations. This second option often appears to be the most effective, as it 
actively builds capacity and therefore sustainability (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; 
Cuny, 1983). Many agencies reject the first option, accurate needs assessment, 
stating that it takes too much time and that relief response is required immediately. 
There is an element of truth in the statement, it has been said often that if 
emergency relief does not reach the scene within twenty four hours, then it is 
wasted and useless as the first requirements are met by the affected population 
themselves (Davis, 1978; Revel, 1993). This does not mean however, that agencies 
should not conduct a needs assessment and should race to get in to the disaster 
area within twenty four hours. On the contrary, in the light of the damage that the 
unthinking application of relief can do, it is important that agencies do not address 
emergency situations with purely physical perceptions of what is required. For: 
" ... if humanitarian assistance does nothing to prevent future 
humanitarian emergencies, can it truly be said to be humanitarian?" 
(Anderson, 1993, p23) 
Instead agencies must endeavour to understand the social, political and 
psychological realities through accurate assessment. 
All projects and programmes have a period of needs assessment built into them. 
However, the way in which this needs assessment is carried out creates problems. 
Accurate needs assessment requires specific skills and training; it needs to be quick 
and yet reliable. 
The most accurate and swiftest way to gather information about real needs on the 
ground is to operate through a local counterpart that is already cognisant of the 
social, cultural and political environments and understands the dynamics of 
community structures. Alternatively, if agencies have a long established base 
already operating in the area, then channelling funds through them for relief 
operations can be equally effective. 
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It must also be understood that needs assessment is not something that should only 
be done in the initial stage of the disaster phase. It should be a continual process in 
order to ensure that humanitarian aid and assistance remains accurately targeted. 
Recipients' needs change radically as the process of recovery proceeds and 
programmes must match these changes. The socio-cultural, economic and political 
characteristics of vulnerability have widely differing recovery periods which need 
to be recognised in order for the necessary interventions to be made at the 
appropriate times (Blaikie, et aI., 1994). 
Evaluation of needs must also recognise the heterogeneity of communities and 
groups. Variations of cast, class, gender, age, religion and disability, among the 
target group, give rise to variations in vulnerability. These variations affect the 
degree to which hazards impact upon individuals, the time taken to rehabilitate and 
the ability to recover completely from disaster. Needs assessment must therefore 
take into account the varying needs of different groups and individuals and address 
them accordingly. 
Accurate needs assessment is vital if programmes and projects are gomg to 
respond sensitively to existing socio-cultural, economic and political environments. 
The importance of providing aid that is culturally appropriate has been seen over 
the past fifty years of relief provision. 
Kibreab's (1993), description of refugee camps in Somalia shows the importance 
of agencies possessing a high degree of cultural understanding. Needs assessment 
must be carried out by someone who is aware of the socio-cultural background of 
the target group: 
" ... agencies placed reliance on expatriates who did not understand the 
society or culture. Consequently they failed to recognise local refugee 
initiatives or traditional structures and concluded that the 'disaster' had 
broken down such structures and nothing remained. For them it became 
necessary to bring in western concepts and structures without being 
aware that these might be alien to those that already existed." (Kibreab, 
1993, p 333.) 
Without a base level of understanding it is impossible to ascertain accurately the 
real needs of communities, or to recognise their innate capacities to assist 
themselves. Thus, traditional coping mechanisms are undermined and future 
development is prejudiced. 
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It is also likely that if projects and policies are not based in real needs then the level 
of response from the target group will be very small. However, where the target 
group actively participates in designing the programme, then it is more likely to 
fulfil real needs and be more culturally and socially appropriate and useful to the 
survivors of disaster. 
2.3.5 Cultural Sensitivity 
Providing relief that is culturally acceptable to the host community is of crucial 
importance if aid is to support, rather than supplant, the innate capacities of the 
survivors of disasters and crises. Yet, stories abound within the international 
humanitarian community of inappropriate food, medicines and shelter being 
provided in relief situations. The author's personal experience in the post-Yugoslav 
countries has been of one American agency suggesting a 'hog roast' within a 
Muslim refugee camp in Croatia as a way of bringing the community together, and 
one visit to a coconut-filled warehouse in Bosnia, where the author spent 
considerable time explaining what a coconut was; how to remove the flesh and 
milk from the shell and husk and what to do with the flesh once it had been 
removed. 
Within the field of shelter, inappropriate and culturally insensitive relief provision 
seems to be endemic. There is little recognition of the need for shelter to be 
culturally applicable and based in traditional living patterns of the affected 
community. There is a common myth that the survivors of disasters are helpless 
victims unable to function for themselves and grateful for any assistance the 
international community offers, no matter how inappropriate (Davis, 1978). In 
reality however, without a basis in existing culture and society, shelter will remain 
uninhabited and under used; a testament to the inappropriateness of the response. 
Agencies, donors and manufacturers need to understand the importance of the 
house within cultures and societies. Rapoport, outlined the significance of housing 
as far back as 1969: 
"The house is an institution not just a structure, created for a complex 
set of purposes. Because building a house is a cultural phenomenon, its 
form and organisation are greatly influenced by the cultural milieu to 
which it belongs" (Rapoport, 1969, p46) 
Houses are formed and structured in response to the geo-physical environment 
interfacing with social and cultural determinants. They are a product not just of the 
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actors of the moment of their inception, but also of the collaboration of many 
people over many generations. It is important to note that the main determinants of 
housing form are not the physical ones but the social and cultural ones: 
" ... many examples from almost all areas of the world can be adduced to 
show that dwellings and settlements are not the result of physical 
forces, particularly since the form often changes in areas where physical 
aspects have not changed" (Rapoport, 1969, p42) 
The importance of dwellings being a product of society and culture is largely 
ignored by agencies and donors, who appear to believe that the survivors of a 
disaster situation will be grateful for any form of physical shelter that can be found. 
Over the years this belief has manifested itself through: 
• 	 The hemispherical foam dome of the Bayer company which was sent to Turkey 
in 1969, Peru in 1970 and Nicaragua in 1973 (Cotton, 1974) 
• 	 Professor Benjamin's specialised parachute house of 1974 (Benjamin, 1974) 
which converted into a rigid shell as it fell to the ground from the relief plane 
• 	 The Winfield Prefabricated Polyester Shelter of 1970 which required a team of 
" ... 54 trained men, twenty to thirty volunteers, a specially designed caravan and 
limited prefabricated components ... " to erect (Winfield, 1970) 
• 	 Oxfam's hexagonal foam houses of 1974 which appeared in Pakistan 
• 	 Howland's "Bubble" of 1978 
• 	 Future Systems' design for an air deliverable, technologically beautiful shelter 
of 1985, which received considerable coverage within the architectural glossy 
magazines but no use in the field (Fig 2.7) 
• 	 The UNHCR (1993) shelter and environment workshop convened in 1993 in 
Geneva, where numerous manufacturers displayed their many varied 
'universally applicable' shelter types (Figs 2.8 and 2.9) 
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Fig 2. 7. Future Systems' emergency shelter (-'!Duree: Pawley, 1994, p8I ) 
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Fig 2. 8. Cardboard house display'ed at the Geneva Workr;/1op (source: the author) 
Fig 2.9. Conport 's steel emergency shelter displayed at Geneva Workr;hop 
(source: the author) 
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This list is representative of a minute fraction of the thousands of designs that have 
hit the market over the years. The UNHCR is constantly besieged by designers and 
manufacturers showing their new and improved designs (W. Neumann, Physical 
and Technical Support Section, UNHCR, private communication, 1993). The 
maj ority are characterised by high costs and low occupancy rates if and when they 
are utilised in the field. 
The continued attempts by manufacturers and designers to produce universally 
applicable emergency shelter 'solutions' for use in disasters, have little basis in the 
real needs of survivors of disaster and more basis in the agendas of the relief 
agencies and donors who supply humanitarian aid 6. Such solutions do not address 
the longer term needs of survivors; they do not support local markets; nor do they 
give work to the local labour force; nor endeavour to empower communities. They 
do however support donor countries' economies, provide work in the donor 
nations and visibly promote the work of the aid agencies in the media 7. 
Barakat's analysis of, what were seen by the Yemeni government, as emergency 
housing projects following the 1982 Dhamar earthquake, highlights schemes that 
were not based in existing cultural and social structures: 
" ... The actual people concerned were never consulted on their 
requirements or expected to participate at any stage of the 
reconstruction. No effort was made to study, register or understand 
their traditional life styles, building types, technologies and materials. 
The damage assessment teams collected only statistical data on the 
number of houses destroyed, number of occupants and number of 
storeys of each house, etc .." (Barakat, 1993, p282) 
The resulting projects showed that only 1,727 of the 2,646 new houses were 
occupied and that house forms bore" ... no relation" to the traditional house type or 
acknowledged the traditional construction materials or the traditional usage of 
space within the house. This 'emergency' programme was actually realised some 
three to five years after the earthquake (some settlements were still not complete in 
1991) and the houses did not correspond to the " ... socio-cultural and economic 
reality" . 
6 The 1993 workshop held by the UNHCR in Geneva to discuss improved shelter response and 

environment for refugees was attended by twenty manufacturers from fifteen different countries 

all endeavouring to tout their products. 

7 This will be discussed in section 2.3.7. 
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As a result of this study, Barakat draws the conclusion that accurate needs 
assessment is vital: needs assessment that is carried out with an understanding of 
the local " ... socio-cultural, economic and physical conditions" (Barakat, 1993). 
2.3.6 Timing of Provision 
The images of human suffering that are portrayed subsequent to any disaster 
induce a philanthropic response to help. Unfortunately, it is inevitably a 'knee jerk 
response' that has little basis in understanding the capacities of the 'victims' 
themselves or the existing community support structures that will enable survival in 
the short term. There is a need for agencies and donors to understand the phases of 
disaster and recovery and realise that there is an appropriate place for their 
intervention which may not always be in the immediate emergency period. 
The earlier discussions in this chapter of the cyclical and spiral models of disaster 
introduced the concepts of reliet: rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. 
These are the phases into which the aftermath of disaster is divided, they are by no 
means distinct or discrete phases: they overlap and m some cases can occur 
simultaneously in different areas of the disaster site. 
Definitions of these terms can assist in understanding current practice III aid 
policies and also point towards areas where improvements can be made in terms of 
the timeliness of assistance. 
Relief is the: 
" ... provision on a humanitarian basis of material aid and emergency 
medical care necessary to save and preserve human lives and enable 
families to meet their basic needs for shelter, clothing, water and food 
(including the means to prepare food)" (Aysan & Davis, 1993, p47) 
As will be seen in following chapters, the emphasis on the preservation of lives 
rather than livelihoods has serious repercussions on what is provided and how. For 
the purposes of the present discussion, it is important to see that the relief phase is 
concerned only with the basic needs for preservation of life and day-to-day 
survival. 
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Following this phase, comes the recovery phase, which covers rehabilitation and 
reconstruction 8. This is the period during which actions are taken to enable 
victims to resume normal lives and their means of livelihood. It covers restoration 
of infrastructure, services and the economy in a manner "... appropriate to long 
term needs and development objectives" (Aysan & Davis, 1993). In disaster terms, 
reconstruction implies built-in improvements; so following an earthquake, houses 
would be reconstructed to resist future earthquake damage, thus increasing the 
capacities of the inhabitants and reducing their vulnerability. 
An understanding of the definitions of these phases combined with analysis of past 
disaster interventions, shows that international humanitarian aid is not always 
required in the immediate relief phase. It is most often the case that the immediate 
basic needs of the affected population are met by the 'victims' themselves or 
through the elasticity of existing resources (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Cuny, 
1983; Davis, 1978). In shelter terms, people will construct a makeshift shelter from 
any materials they can find, or shelter with relatives or take refuge in a public 
building such as a school or church. This innate human response for self-protection 
and survival will cover immediate needs and negates the assumption of agencies 
that there is no time to plan their intervention or take stock of the situation on the 
ground before acting (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Cuny, 1983; Davis, 1978). 
The most useful immediate action that an agency can take is to channel funds 
through organisations and agencies in the affected country to provide for the real 
needs of the affected communities (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989). 
Agencies who are determined to drop the ubiquitous short term, flat packed, 
prefabricated, 'emergency shelter' into an area will adversely affect the recovery 
phase, (Cuny, 1983; Davis, 1978; UNDRO, 1982). The shelter will arrive after the 
immediate basic needs have been met by the survivors of the disaster - it is 
therefore, no longer an emergency item but by default a rehabilitation item, a 
difference which has three main consequences. Firstly, such an item is likely to 
remain uninhabited as emergency needs have already been met. Secondly, as a 
rehabilitation item it will need to last longer than an emergency shelter, which it 
will fail to do as emergency shelters are not designed to be inhabited longer than a 
few weeks and are unsuitable for longer term accommodation. Thirdly, as a 
recovery item, it will do nothing to assist in the restoration of infrastructure or 
8 It will be shown in Chapter Three that these phases differ significantly in war, where conditions 
of penn anent emergency alter the relief phase and subsequent recovery patterns. 
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economy or services and therefore will add nothing to the local economy or labour 
force, will not assist in the construction of new improved shelter and will not 
address the reconstruction of the means of livelihood. 
Agencies must therefore be aware of the appropriate time for their intervention and 
act accordingly. Failure to do so, risks time and money and more importantly, 
adversely affects the long-term development of the country they are endeavouring 
to assist. 
2.3.7 Media Pressures on Intervention 
One theory for late, culturally insensitive and inappropriate action from the 
humanitarian community is that the media adversely affect intervention. The media 
are rarely on the scene prior to the development of graphic pictures of suffering, 
and yet the broadcasting of such images can pressurise the humanitarian 
community to act. Forced to act, the international community will amve 
unprepared to do anything other than administer a palliative to the visible 
symptoms of underlying crisis. 
For today's world of television a news story has to be visual to get air time; reports 
of crisis and disaster situations are full of vibrant images of the starving, wounded, 
dead and dying (Girardet, 1993). Such reportage does indeed incite international 
interest and the subsequent pressure can motivate action from the humanitarian or 
military community. News reports in 1994 of little Irma from Sarajevo and John 
Major's bewildering reaction to them, show that media coverage can have a 
powerful effect on government policy and action. It has been reported that US 
policy is made by CNN (Barakat, 1995). As Girardet, (1993) said of the 
intervention in Somalia: 
"It is unlikely that the United States would have risked military 
intervention for purely humanitarian reasons in the Horn of Africa had 
there not been broad public sympathy for the Somalis' plight, much of 
it prompted by saturation media coverage" (Girardet, 1993, p 40) 
It is true that public pressure can push governments to act, an article by a 
UNHCRJUNICEF representative reports that: 
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"People in their own homes watch history while it is in the 
making ... they can pressurise governments into action, they can help 
stop the suffering, they can actually change the course of history. And 
they do." (Foa, 1995, p33) 
But how dangerous is such pressure when it originates from an uninformed and 
sometimes misinformed public? Time worn images of famine or war do not convey 
reality. They lead to an assumption by the international public that all problems can 
be solved through the wholesale provision of food and medicine. There is no 
realisation of the fundamental or root cause of the disaster and consequently the 
aid demanded and provided is inappropriate. For example, the crisis in Somalia 
grew principally from acrid clan divisions and subsequent street fighting, shelling 
and food shortages in 1991. At this stage famine had not gripped the country, 
however, by the time the media became interested and showed the situation to the 
world in 1992, the crisis was portrayed as one of people in desperate need of food. 
There was no effort to explain the root causes of the disaster; the public was left 
with the impression that " ...food could save Somalia." (Girardet, 1993). There was 
equally no indication that the vast convoys of unprotected food aid that were sent 
would likely increase the conflict and consequent suffering of those seen starving 
on the television. 
It was unlikely that media interest in portraying the growing tensions in 1991, 
would have led to earlier involvement by the United Nations through public 
pressure. However, it would have given background understanding of the situation 
to all those pushing nutritional solutions to what was essentially a political problem 
of inter-clan conflict. The Operation Restore Hope that was eventually launched by 
the United States may have saved a few lives. However, it also allowed the 
international community to side step its responsibilities through focusing on a 
manifestation of one symptom ofthe disease and not the disease itself. 
With more agencies and NGOs operating in war situations the images shown and 
the reporting of the real issues are likely to become even more blurred. If relief 
agencies wish to remain operating in a country, it is unwise to antagonise the 
parties in power by uncovering political realities. Reporting of the Ethiopia crisis 
was a prime example of agencies playing down the reality in order to remain in the 
country. A situation that was characterised by violence, enforced population 
clearance, aid abuses and political manipulation was portrayed by the media, reliant 
on agency reports, as a 'natural' disaster of famine and drought. Such a 
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misrepresentation of the facts contributed to many potentially preventable deaths 
(Girardet, 1993). It led to inappropriate and misdirected aid which inevitably 
adversely affected subsequent recovery and development. 
It is a valid point that it is difficult for an agency based in the centre of a war to 
publicly lay blame on any side, or to openly display partiality, and still remain in the 
country to carry out work. This again leads to an issue of the timeliness of 
reporting and consequent action. If situations were reported as they arose, the 
increased early awareness of potential problem areas could lead to timely action to 
divert emergencies. If the clan tensions had been reported from Somalia as they 
happened, rather than after they had blown into all out war, then actions could 
have been taken in 1991 to try and avert the conflict and deaths (de Waal, 1994). 
As far back as 1978, Davis wrote of the commonly perceived myths of disaster 
relief (Davis, 1978). One such myth was that the survivors of disaster are helpless 
victims, unable to survive without the good will of the international community. 
Unfortunately, it is a myth that is still upheld and promoted by the media: it does 
nothing to encourage accurate disaster relief or true understanding of what is 
needed in disaster-torn countries. Reporting focuses on 'victims' lying in the ruins 
of buildings and international search and rescue teams, who are shown to be doing 
all the work as the host nation stands by wringing its hands. There is no portrayal 
ofthe fact that the primary search and rescue needs are usually met by the 'victims' 
themselves, mobilising to search for friends and relatives. Such biased reporting 
merely serves to encourage nations in the belief that they must send their own relief 
and rescue teams to deal with all crises. As reported earlier in this chapter, such an 
attitude in Kobe, cost the Japanese government a large amount of time and effort in 
translating for, transporting, accommodating and feeding teams that they had 
already explicitly stated they did not need. 
In the context of war, the coverage provided by the international media is greatly 
influential not only over what type of aid and relief gets sent and when, but also to 
whom the relief is offered. Media reporting is rarely, if ever, free from bias and this 
can have serious effects on the support offered to opposing sides in conflict. As a 
consequence of biased reporting and relief provision, the level of conflict will be 
increased and 'humanitarian action' will ultimately promote rather than reduce 
suffering 9. 
9 This will be discussed further in Chapters Three and Seven. 
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The symbiotic nature of the humanitarian community and the media is understood, 
each needs the other to raise finance for continued action. However, agencies need 
to be trained to utilise the media to promote informed commentary on the realities 
of disaster and war if the aid provided as a consequence is going to be truly useful. 
At present, agencies implement big and visible projects to show the fund-donating 
public how effectively their money is being used (Duffield, 1994). Donors too 
favour the visible over the discrete, images of fields of emergency shelters or planes 
being filled with relief goods illustrate to the voting public that the government is 
fulfilling its responsibilities (Borton, 1993). In shelter terms particularly, the highly 
visible is seldom the most appropriate solution. Camps of prefabricated shelter 
units or blue plastic tents sporting the UNHCR logo, may visibly prove activity 
from donors, but do not show the consequent long-term harm of such schemes on 
the recovery and rehabilitation of the affected communities. 
2.4 INTEGRATION 
2.4.1 Integration 
Integration is the second pivotal theme of this thesis, as identified from the 
literature. Harrell-Bond (1990) defines integration as: 
" ... something which occurs when host and refugee communities are 
able to co-exist, sharing the same resources (economic and social) with 
no greater mutual conf1ict than that which exists within the host 
community" (Harrell-Bond, 1990, p 124) 
The definition is simple and, as she states, does not stand up to detailed analysis, 
especially in situations such as Bosnia where the host community is already living 
within the arena of war. However, as a starting point it is a valid definition. 
Based on the points raised so far in this chapter, it is evident that in order for relief 
to have long-term, sustainable, positive effects on development and reconstruction, 
it needs to support indigenous coping mechanisms. It has been seen that refugees 
and the survivors of disasters are not the incapable and helpless beings that they are 
often portrayed as, but are capable and self reliant in the presence of enabling 
interventions. The sum of their physical and non-physical capacities enables them 
to survive and cope. This implies both an a priori and an organised access to 
social, economic and physical resources. In many situations the refugee coping 
strategies are affected by rules and regulations that deny their interaction with hosts 
(Wilson, 1992). If refugees are to maintain their innate capacities, the humanitarian 
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community must be more committed to improving the access of refugees to the 
existing physical and social structures of the host, than it has demonstrated itself to 
be in the past (Wilson, 1992). 
For refugees, access to such resources requires that the host government operates 
policies that promote integration of incomers and hosts, a requirement that meets 
with difficulties. It means that refugees should be given access to the same 
employment opportunities, educational and health benefits as the host. However, in 
countries which are struggling to maintain such benefits for their own citizens, 
allowing refugees access to such facilities is seldom straight forward. 
For example, Chimni's (1994) examination of the situation in India shows that 
employment opportunities are rarely granted to refugees. Refugees from Tibet, 
taking refuge in India, were issued with certificates of identity which theoretically 
made them able to apply for work. However, a lack of Indian citizenship meant 
that most employment opportunities were still closed to them. Refugees from East 
Pakistan in Bangladesh were categorically refused the right to work. The state they 
took refuge in already had an unemployment level of 2.5 million and the state 
believed that providing refugees with opportunities of employment would lead to 
" ... social and economic tensions within th[ e] country" (Chimni, 1994). However, 
the refugees did often get involved in informal, economic activity as their labour 
was offered at cheaper rates than that of the host population and was thus more 
acceptable to host landlords. This activity created tensions with the host labourers 
(Chimni, 1994). 
The implementation of integration policies by the host government is usually the 
result of a range of factors such as the scale of the influx of forced migrants, the 
economic situation of the host country and the health and welfare status of the 
population of the host country. In an interesting comparative study, Smawfield 
(1993), notes the differences of treatment received by Mozambican refugees by 
neighbouring countries. The Zambian government made it clear that refugees could 
stay if they wished whereas the Malawian government stated that it was never a 
possibility for the refugees to stay pennanently. The relative scales of the influx on 
both countries and the levels of existing provision of resources to nationals dictated 
the response of both governments and therefore their policies on integration for the 
refugees. In Zambia, where the influx represented only a small percentage increase, 
refugees were fully integrated, in Malawi where the influx was greater and existing 
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resources tighter, refugees were assisted but never integrated. In education terms 
they attended separate schools and were taught the Mozambican curriculum, 
whereas those in Zambia attended the same schools as the hosts and were taught 
on the Zambian curriculum. 
The desire to see refugees integrated with hosts does not imply that refugees 
should be completely assimilated into the host community and lose their cultural 
identity. For refugees who have lost many physical assets, the maintenance of their 
non-tangible qualities of culture and tradition is very important. Therefore, 
integration merely implies that refugees are given access to existing resources so 
that their own capacities and coping mechanisms are supported. 
2.4.2 Host - Incomer Conflict 
Refugee law is still based on the 1951 United Nations Convention, which was set 
up after the Second World War to outline actions in the event of population 
movements from East to West. The convention was formed to meet the 
requirements of refugees moving from the East to developed countries with high 
resource levels. It concerned individual rather than mass movements of populations 
and laid the onus for responsibility on the country of asylum (HRH, El Hassan Bin 
Talal, 1993). 
Today's reality is far removed from this circumstance and yet the law remains the 
same. Refugee crises are now characterised by mass movements, hundreds of 
thousands of individuals crossing borders simultaneously. Frequently, the host 
country becomes the place of asylum by virtue of its proximity rather than an 
intrinsic ability to provide assistance. Environmental and economic impoverishment 
mean that receiving countries can be swiftly overburdened by an influx of refugees. 
When refugees are entering an environment where the hosts are already competing 
for scarce resources, the provision of aid and relief assistance becomes a very 
sensitive issue. 
At present, mandates suggest that relief assistance is given only to refugees or 
displaced persons. The host community do not get consideration or help even 
though their level of suffering may be on a par with that of the incoming 
community. As Harrell-Bond remarks: 
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" ... [a] project that discriminates among members of a poor community 
is likely to create antagonisms, the results are more serious in cases 
where the beneficiaries are strangers with no local rights." (Harrell­
Bond, 1990, p 127) 
Where the local population is living on the margins of survival, any programmes 
that favour incoming refugees with resources and facilities over the host population 
are likely to create conflict and increase tensions (Chambers, 1986). Competition 
for those resources that exist such as timber, water or firewood becomes intense. 
In areas of Africa, where regions are already environmentally depleted, the arrival 
of thousands of refugees gathering timber and brushwood for shelter construction 
and fuel, causes severe tensions with the local community and can result in 
refugees scavenging for wood after dark to reduce the possibility of attack 
(Chambers, 1986). 
Construction of health or educational facilities that are aimed solely at benefiting 
refugees increases rifts between the incoming and host communities in areas where 
the hosts' access to such facilities is negligible. In order to deal with these 
imbalances in provision, the UNHCR has adopted the principle of local parity: a 
principle which dictates that refugees reach no higher level than the host population 
through relief assistance. The principle does not answer the problem that develops 
in areas where the hosts' standard ofliving is below the subsistence level. In these 
situations 'parity' would suggest that if the local population were starving then 
refugees also should starve. A more acceptable solution, where the host population 
is worse off than the refugees, is to include them in the relief programme. Failure to 
do so is likely to result in " ... the impoverishment of the poorest inhabitants of the 
host areas" (Callamard, 1994). 
Difficulties are increased in areas where refugees are ensconced in camps rather 
than self-settled. Here, the impact of refugees is much more intrusive on the host 
population, as vast numbers of refugees concentrated in one area will swamp local 
job markets and place uneven demands on resources such as water, food, fuel and 
timber. The resultant increased competition for resources leads to conflict between 
hosts and incoming groups. As Wilson (1992) outlines: 
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"Great concentrations of refugees relative to local populations swamp 
local socio-economic capacities, and create a new and much more 
limited type of economy. This is one reason why refugees in camps and 
settlements have generally found it so difficult to become self­
sufficient" (Wilson, 1992, p229) 
In war situations, the level of provision for refugees becomes even more delicate, 
as over provision for incoming refugees and refugee-centric approaches to relief 
serve only to increase existing ethnic rifts between populations. Reinforcement of 
such ethnic rifts encourages conflict and while conflict exists, reconstruction and 
development are not viable. Agencies must therefore be aware of the potential for 
their aid provision to increase conflict and govern their actions accordingly. 
It should also be noted, however, that while competition for the same scarce 
resources can create conflict, there are also many examples of healthy symbiotic 
relationships developing between the hosts and incoming migrants. Christensen, 
(1982), notes that refugees in Somalia developed barter relationships with the host 
community that were of mutual benefit to both communities: 
" ... The food exchange has a social impact... It prevents refugee camps 
from becoming segregated areas. It prevents antagonism between 
highly subsidised non-food-producing groups and less, or non­
subsidised-food-producing poor groups residing in the same localities." 
(Christensen, 1982, p27) 
Callamard (1994), remarks on Chamber's comments that Thai hosts have benefited 
economically from Laotian refugee camps, as witnessed by the illicit markets set up 
at the camp gates. She also outlines the effects of Mozambican refugees in camps 
on the local Malawian hosts: 
" ... the camp under study came to play the much needed role of a 
vibrant market-place which fulfilled local market needs while providing 
business opportunities where there used to be few. Moreover, the 
refugees' income-generating activities, centred around the trade of the 
assistance programme, have allowed for some cash accumulation within 
the camp and resulted in an increased commoditization of exchanges at 
the local level" (Cal1amard, 1994, p41) 
Such mutually beneficial relationships point to the validity and value of socially 
integrating refugees into the host population. This is not to suggest that refugees 
should be encouraged to abandon their culture and heritage and become as one 
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with the host community, nor that they should be abandoned by the international 
system and left to sink or swim in a free-market situation. Rather that they should 
be allowed access to those resources that are required to maintain their 
productivity and livelihoods in a way that maintains their independence. 
For, as Wilson notes, (1992), at present, refugees suffer: 
" ... the worst kind of institutionalization: one which both restrains their 
ability to meet their own needs, and yet is itself starved of adequate 
resources to meet their needs and too politically emasculated to secure 
their rights." (Wilson, 1992, p232) 
2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has broadly examined a range of issues, identified from the literature, 
essential to the understanding of the provision of relief in natural disasters and 
refugee crises in order to develop a framework of issues to analyse performance in 
war. This analysis has identified two main themes that run through the literature 
covering natural disasters and refugee crises: 
• Vulnerability and capacity 
• Integration 
These central themes form the basis for both the following chapter's examination 
of humanitarian provision in war and for the analysis of the shelter programmes and 
policies in the Republic ofCroatia presented in Section Two. Of critical importance 
to the following analysis is the concept of imposed vulnerability, which was 
introduced in this chapter and will form a core of subsequent analysis in Chapter 
Six. This central premise has been outlined primarily in the work of Black (1994); 
within the discourses on dependency theory in the work of Harrell-Bond and 
Kibreab (Harrell-Bond, 1986, 1990, 1993; Kibreab, 1993) and mooted within the 
work of Zetter on access and labelling (Zetter, 1987). 
The extreme climate of war makes it more crucial that agencies' actions and 
operations are appropriate and sensitive. The necessity to understand and address 
social, cultural and political root causes in order to promote peace and ultimate 
reconstruction and development is paramount. Thus it is essential that agencies can 
identify and address the human element in relief programmes so that they can build 
on capacities, reduce vulnerabilities where possible and avoid imposing higher 
levels ofvulnerability on the target group through their actions. 
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The next chapter examines the provision of humanitarian relief in war situations. It 
extends the discourse concerning the central themes of vulnerability and capacity 
and integration to the context ofwar, persecution and violence. 
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Chapter Two introduced the two central themes identified within the literature on 
natural disasters and refugee crises: 
• Vulnerability and capacity 
• Integration 
This chapter builds upon these two discourses by analysing the literature covering 
the practice of humanitarian relief in war. It begins by discussing the character of 
war and outlining the parameters for action that conflict defines. With the 
proliferation of wars world-wide and the increasing level of action by the 
humanitarian community within them, it is necessary to understand how the 
environment of war affects the possible programmes and actions of relief agencies. 
This chapter moves to understand the effects that war and violence have on the 
central themes of vulnerability and capacity, and integration. Thus, following an 
introduction to the arena of war, the two central discourses will be discussed 
within the framework of their component parts: 
1. 	 Vulnerability in the environment of war 
• 	 Vulnerability as constructed by wealth; political affiliation; ethnicity and 
gender 
ii. Capacity in the environment of war 
• 	 Coping mechanisms 
• 	 Relief to Development Continuum 
• 	 Changes in the humanitarian community 
• 	 Accountability 
iii. 	Integration 
• Conflict reduction and peace building 
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3.1.1 War Revisited: The Complex Arena for the Humanitarian Community 
In the last ten years, the international community has coined the term 'complex 
emergency' to cover the events of the Horn of Africa and the Transcaucasus 
regions. It states that such emergencies are 'complex' because they are 
characterised by "...war, political instability and the collapse of state institutions ... " 
(DHA, 1995a). The author believes, in line with Duffield (1994b), that the term is 
actually a misnomer and is utilised to evade pinpointing the crux of the problem: 
ultimately the situations defined as complex emergencies are wars and internal 
conflicts. 
The term was first utilised during conflict in Mozambique in the 1980' s, to play 
down the political element of the problem and allow the UN to conduct 
negotiations between RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) and the 
government (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). The term 'complex emergency' is not a 
description of the situation as it would appear to those citizens directly involved in 
it; to civilians on the ground they are in the midst of war, not complexity. The label 
'complex emergency' was derived by the international community for the 
international conununity and describes the complexity that is induced by their own 
actions within a war. As Duffield states: 
"If one were to give a definition of complex emergencies, it would be 
that they relate to the emergence of protracted political crises in the 
now economic and strategically marginal areas of the global 
economy .... Complex emergencies also encapsulate the problematic 
intervention by North America and West Europe." (Duffield, 
1994b, p9, emphasis added) 
The new arena for the international community is war, either within weak, or 
'failed' states, where the political powers have been seen to collapse and cease to 
function, as in Angola; or in strong states where the political structure is still 
vibrant as in the F ormer-Yugoslavia (Duffield, 1994b). 
These wars, within which the humanitarian community is now acting cause a level 
of devastation unlike that of any natural disaster. War lays waste to infrastructure 
and communication links; systems of government and social support; the natural 
and the built environment; markets and commercial networks; social structures and 
support mechanisms; human skills and country knowledge base and educational 
opportunities for generations of children and teenagers. It throws thousands of 
citizens to the edge of abject poverty and leaves a legacy of social and economic 
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destruction for decades to follow. So, while natural disaster may destroy the 
physical and built environment, it does not as war does, directly destroy the social 
and political structures that underpin a nation and would assist in recovery. This 
total devastation of all mechanisms makes recovery from war a slow and difficult 
process. It means that agencies who chose to supply relief in wartime, must 
operate with immense care and awareness in order to avoid further damaging 
coping mechanisms and increasing the level of suffering and destruction. 
Since the international community first intervened against a nation's sovereignty in 
Iraq in 1991, NGOs, agencies and donors have been berated for continuing to 
make inappropriate and damaging interventions. Many critics believe that the 
reasons for the humanitarian community's poor performance are based in a crucial 
lack of understanding of the circumstances and characteristics of war (Adams & 
Bradbury, 1994; Barakat, etai., 1995; de Waal, 1994; Duffield, 1994b; Macrae & 
Zwi, 1994; Slim, 1995a; Templar, 1994). 
One indicator that the actions of the international community are misdirected, may 
be the response of the 'beneficiaries' to the relief workers of today. In the hostile 
atmosphere of current crises, relief workers seem to have lost their previous innate 
immunity to attack. Over the last three years more aid workers have met their 
deaths through working in 'complex emergencies' than in the whole of the 
previous decade (Duffield, 1994b). Some have been accidentally caught up in the 
cross fire, others deliberately targeted and some have died as the result of attacks 
on the humanitarian community. The war-torn environments that these agencies 
are working in, depleted of resources through conflict, construct aid workers as 
targets of appropriation and violence (Duffield, 1994b; Weiss & Minear, 1993). 
Some of the new NGOs have been born into this environment of danger and 
violence, for others, the experience is radically different to their usual sphere of 
action and consequently highly dangerous. Both new and old require a higher and 
more acute understanding of operation in war in order to both protect themselves 
and make their actions effective and appropriate. 
3.1.2 Permanent Emergency 
In natural disaster there is a desire to promote rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
The government, nation and international community endeavour to assist in all 
phases of relief and recovery. In war, where there are situations of contested 
governance, factions will try to prevent the rehabilitation and recovery of certain 
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sections of the population. Aid will be diverted or stopped and convoys attacked to 
prevent delivery to certain areas or to re-apportion supplies to opposing warring 
factions (DHA, 1995a; Duffield, 1994b; IFRC, 1993). 
The relatively clear stages of recovery from natural disaster illustrated in Chapter 
Two are noticeably absent in war. There are no clearly defined stages of relief, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. War situations are increasingly of long duration, 
especially when it is in the interests of the powerful to prolong the process (IFRC, 
1993; Macrae & Zwi, 1994; Weiss & Minear, 1993). As Adams and Bradbury 
state: 
"Treating conflicts and the complex emergencies they generate as short 
tenn problems, fails to appreciate the nature of the current wars which 
have proved to be durable, more pervasive in their destruction of 
people, communities, and infrastructure than 'natural' disasters." 
(Adams & Bradbury, 1994) 
This attribute of internal conflict means that agencies can find themselves acting in 
a period of 'pennanent emergency' developed and encouraged to support the 
powerful (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Duffield, 1994b). The state of permanent 
emergency means that the international community finds itself responding with 
military, humanitarian and developmental relief at the same time. This blurs the 
traditional, though inappropriate, divisions that existed between relief and 
development 1 (Stiefel, 1994). In situations of war, unpredictability and crisis are 
the nonnal environment within which agencies have to act. Programming 
therefore, needs to be open to constant re-interpretation. Implementation of a 
tightly planned relief and development package will lead to loss of time and funds 
as situations suddenly change (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). 
3.1.3 Root Causes 
As in natural disasters, wars have underlying root causes that can be addressed to 
diffuse tension and prevent conflict. El Bushra's (1994) model illustrates conflict as 
a process and outlines the areas where intervention is possible to prevent outright 
war (Fig 3.1). 
1 The contrived divisions between relief and development will be discussed further on in this 
chapter. 
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Even after war has begun, the dynamics and environment change as the conflict 
progresses. This mutating path needs constant and flexible monitoring and 
assessment if aid agencies are going to respond to it effectively and appropriately 
to reduce the tensions between incomers and hosts and lower the level of conflict. 
For instance, war in the former Yugoslavia began as a result of deepening 
economic crisis and consequent fragmentation in the 1970s. The economic gap 
between the republics widened and grew, leaving Slovenia and Croatia with 
increasing prosperity and Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia­
Hercegovina lagging behind (Magas, 1993). 
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Fig 3.1. The process ofC01?f!ict (EI Bushra, 1994) 
The circles represent critical thresholds - " ... moments when a situation is poised to move 
either in a positive or negative direction, and is susceptible to influence" (Adams and Bradbury, 
1994, p 27). It is at these points that intervention is possible to prevent war or the resurgence of 
war. 
Section One: An Overview of Current Praxis 
Chapter Three: Humanitarian Relief in War 54 
This war then, was initiated as a result of economic imbalance. However, over the 
past five years it has changed and developed a revengeful character based on 
personal vendettas and individual ethnic tensions. This has been reinforced by 
war-time elections that have returned parties to power who " ... actively seek to 
define citizenship on ethnic terms." (Duffield, 1994b). 
3.1.4 Support for Remaining Capacities 
It is necessary to address war as a separate area to 'natural' disasters and refugee 
crises not just because of its extreme political and social context, but also because 
the damage caused by war is the most extensive and far reaching of all disasters. 
The vast extent of the damage requires the mass efforts of a nation's population to 
reconstruct. In order for any war torn nation to recover therefore, there is a need 
to build upon a surviving indigenous base of human and material resources. 
Reconstruction can only proceed if it is based on surviving networks and facilities. 
As stated in the York Charter for Reconstruction after War: 
The use of local resources, both human and material, is essential for an 
exhausted post-war economy to recover." (Barakat & Cockburn, 1991, 
p 23) 
This means that it is vitally important that any relief action during war supports 
whatever coping mechanisms remain functional and encourages new support 
structures to grow and form. Any international agency going into a war zone 
unaware of the specific and specialised need to support such structures will do 
irretrievable harm. 
In addition, therefore, to understanding the issues discussed in Chapter Two, 
agencies acting in war must also be aware of the new imposed parameters of 
operating in a conflict zone. They must be aware of the potential for their actions 
to increase the level of conflict or existing tensions (Barakat, et a!., 1994). They 
must broaden their understanding of the concept of vulnerability to the new 
parameters of war. They must be aware of the value of negotiation skills, conflict 
resolution and propaganda analysis. As Slim (1995) suggests, today's crises 
require a " ... fundamental reappraisal ofthe relief worker's essential identity". 
This chapter will, therefore, proceed to examine the actions of the humanitarian 
community in war and conflict. It is not a review of shelter specific experiences, 
indeed the literature specifically covering the provision of emergency shelter in 
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war is sparse and ill defined 2. Most relevant papers concentrate either purely on 
the actions of the humanitarian community or the provision of food aid in war, 
none look directly at emergency shelter provision for refugees and displaced 
persons in war. However, these same papers do contain many relevant and parallel 
lessons that need to be understood in order to evaluate the provision of shelter in 
the Republic of Croatia and develop guidelines for improvement. The following 
discussion outlines some of the crucial difficulties of operating within war, in order 
to further develop the central themes of vulnerability and capacity and integration 
that underpin the analysis of provision of shelter for refugees and displaced persons 
within war. 
3.2 VULNERABILITY IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF WAR 
In natural disasters it was seen that the poor were the most vulnerable to hazards. 
In war, vulnerability is not solely the province of the poor, but can also have its 
roots in wealth, politics, ethnicity and gender. The primary difficulty is that while in 
natural disaster the suffering of the survivors is 'unintended'; in war, the civilian 
population is the deliberate target of aggression and acts of violence. Famine, 
migration, injury and death are not accidental but are the sought after results of 
victimisation from warring factions (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). This means that 
entire groups or factions can suddenly become vulnerable purely by political or 
ethnic association, their wealth or gender. 
3.2.1 Vulnerability Constructed by Wealth 
Unlike natural disasters, in war it is often the rich who become vulnerable on 
account of their wealth (Duffield, 1994b). The persecution of the Dinka in 
Southern Sudan in the Eighties illustrated this very clearly. In Sudan's second civil 
war the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), drew support from many groups 
in the South, primarily from the Dinka who had been excluded from participation 
in government since the 1970s (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). In 1983 the central 
government was faced with increasing problems, greater tribal activity by the 
Baggara of the West and the SPLA of the South, in addition to increasing demands 
from the international community for payment of debts (Keen, 1994). Oil newly 
discovered in the South, which could have alleviated the government's problems, 
2 As stated in the Prelude to this thesis, there is a paucity of literature on shelter for refugees 
from, and persons displaced by, war. There is, however, a growing body of literature covering 
reconstruction following war, which of necessity, stresses the importance of relief and 
rehabilitation policies during war (for example, Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Templar, 1994; 
Duffield, 1994a; Barakat & Cockburn, 1991, Barakat, et aI., 1994). 
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was being controlled by the SPLA. Therefore the central government encouraged 
the Baggara to conduct raids on the rich Dinka of the south, stealing the cattle and 
selling them to the North of Sudan and operating a scorched earth policy (Keen, 
1994). By 1988, the famine that hit Sudan and primarily the Dinka, caused deaths 
at one of the highest ever recorded rates in the world (Keen, 1994). Cattle raiding 
meant that the Dinka lost their means of survival in difficult times. They could not 
draw on the traditional coping mechanism of reciprocal assistance within their 
community as those who had no cattle had nothing to reciprocate with. Their 
natural wealth made them vulnerable to attack and as a result of the attacks, they 
could no longer resist adverse conditions and fell victim to the famine that was 
covering the country. 
3.2.2 Vulnerability Constructed by Political Affiliation 
In war, the primary vulnerable groups can be created by political affiliation (Slim, 
1995). For instance, as well as being constructed by wealth, the attacks on the 
Dinka had a political basis. The root of their vulnerability was their initial lack of 
political legitimacy (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). As Keen notes in his paper of 
1994, 
" ... it was precisely the assets controlled by the southern Sudanese 
groups (notably the Dinka) - for example, their land, livestock, and 
newly discovered oil - which exposed them, in the context of 
extreme political powerlessness, to exploitative processes that 
created and constituted famine." (Keen, 1994, p121, emphasis added) 
The persecution of the Dinka was part of a long term process of "political 
delegitimisation" (Duffield, 1994b). Political vulnerability was also the root of 
suffering of the Banto, Rahanweyne and Reer Xamr in Somalia as well as the 
Tutsi, Twa and Hutu moderates in Rwanda (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). 
Political vulnerability encompasses entire social strata and is no respecter of age, 
social position or degree of wealth. The characteristic of war is that long term 
political tensions can explode to make entire cross sections of society vulnerable 
almost overnight (Slim, 1995). 
3.2.3 Vulnerability Constructed by Ethnicity 
In war, ethnicity is also a strong determinant of vulnerability. As with political 
vulnerability, members of an entire ethnic line can become vulnerable to 
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persecution over night (Duffield, 1994b). The case of the Iraqi Kurds is a prime 
example of the speed at which vulnerability can manifest. In just two weeks at the 
beginning of April 1991, the refugee population in Iran ballooned from 50,000 to 
560,000. It was the " ... fastest refugee movement in the forty year history of 
UNHCR" (De Almaida E Silva, 1991). 
Ethnic vulnerability is exemplified by activities within the former-Yugoslavia. In 
Bosnia, 'ethnic cleansing' has resulted in an estimated 1.1 million refugees who 
have fled the country, 800,000 internally displaced persons and hundreds of 
thousands dead and missing (US. Committee for Refugees, 1993). Indeed, the 
UNHCR documents that it currently assists 2,740,000 ethnically vulnerable 
refugees, displaced persons and other beneficiaries within Bosnia-Hercegovina 
alone (UNHCR, 1994a). 
3.2.4 Vulnerability Constructed by Gender 
Intrastate war in particular constructs women as a highly vulnerable group and thus 
they require the cognisant protection of the international community. War can 
create a new role for many women as household heads or breadwinners which can 
increase their own and their family's vulnerability to attack (Adams & Bradbury, 
1994; Nguyen-Lazarus, 1995). Men maybe targeted for killing or conscripted, 
which leaves women as the household heads. In the change of role that war can 
bring, women often must take over tasks previously performed by the men. 
Women therefore have to undertake jobs such as foraging for fuel and firewood 
which increases their vulnerability to injury from land mines and attack. 
Additionally, the threat ofviolence towards women leads to a reduced mobility and 
this can have extreme cumulative effects on the family where women have become 
the main providers offood and shelter (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). 
War also creates an environment of high vulnerability to attack, rape and 
persecution (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Nguyen-Lazarus, 1995) and consequently 
women's major vulnerability lies in the threat of sexual attack. Rape and violence 
towards women now appear to be part of the arsenal of the soldier in combat 
(Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Nguyen-Lazarus, 1995; Slim, 1995). This new weapon 
means that agencies need to be aware of the consequent different requirements of 
women for psychological, medical and material assistance (Adams & Bradbury, 
1994). Despite establishing guidelines for protection of women in 1985, to date 
the UNHCR has failed to implement them and enforce the condemnation of 
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atrocities against women in Bosnia, Somalia, Mozambique or Rwanda (Elmadmad, 
1996). Consequently both the women and their families continue to be a highly 
vulnerable section of the population. 
3.2.5 Implications 
In the same way as vulnerability to natural disaster can be identified and addressed 
to reduce the level of suffering in subsequent disasters, it should also be possible to 
address vulnerability to war and conflict, diffusing tensions before they ignite into 
aU out war. As Boutros-Ghali states in his agenda for peace: 
"The most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease 
tensions before they result in conflict - or, if conflict breaks out, to 
act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes. . .. Given the 
economic and social roots of many potential conflicts, the information 
needed by the United Nations now must encompass economic and 
social trends as well as political developments that may lead to 
dangerous tensions" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p 13) 
The humanitarian community also needs to address the new structure of their 
target groups. Whereas natural disasters produce survivors mainly from the rural 
or urban poor, the broader categories of vulnerability to the hazard of war, mean 
that the humanitarian community finds itself assisting a wide cross section of the 
affected population. New understanding is required to work with the diverse range 
of skills and capabilities from the upper class urban professional to the rural 
peasant farmer. 
Action in war, also requires agencies to understand and support the affected 
population's own coping mechanisms. This process is more complex in war than in 
natural disasters, as opposing factions will deliberately target and destroy 
community's mechanisms for coping. 
3.3 CAPACITY IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF WAR 
3.3. 1 Coping Mechanisms 
In war, coping mechanisms can be broken down by systematic violence. This 
approach was utilised, for example, by the Baggara against the Dinka in Sudan and 
ultimately resulted in the Dinka succumbing to famine. The acknowledged 
mechanisms for individuals to resist famine are firstly, dependence on traditional 
food stuffs; secondly, sale of key assets and finally non-market strategies such as 
gathering wild food and berries (Blaikie, et al., 1994; Keen, 1994). In Sudan, there 
Section One: An Overview of Current Praxis 
Chapter Three: Humanitarian Relief in War 59 
were four key processes which ensured that the Dinka would be unable to operate 
any of these coping mechanisms to resist famine. Firstly, raiding left the 
communities without the cattle and grain stores that they traditionally relied on for 
food. Secondly, the Dinka sold what assets they had in order to buy grain. 
However, grain prices rose sharply as a result of intimidation and collusion and 
thus it was impossible for the Dinka to purchase enough food for adequate 
nutrition. Thirdly, non-market strategies were curtailed by the opposing military 
forces restricting Dinka movement. Finally, the relief aid that was delivered was 
blocked by political groups and failed to reach the Dinka (Keen, 1994). These 
combined actions meant that the traditional and innate coping mechanisms of the 
group were systematically destroyed by opposing factions, thereby increasing the 
Dinka's risk of succumbing to disaster and death. 
In Bosnia-Hercegovina, the coping mechanisms employed by the urban 
households, are seen as being very similar to those coping strategies utilised during 
famine. Curtis, (1995) compares the coping strategies of Bosnian Muslims with 
those of famine affected communities and finds that, excluding the pre-crisis stage 
and the nutritional effects on children 3, the response to coping with war has 
followed a similar path to that of coping with famine. As access to resources 
became restricted for Bosnian Muslims, food, fuel, water and electricity were 
harder to attain. Restrictions on movement combined with political sanctions 
meant that many Muslims lost their jobs and their income. Many households 
therefore, engaged in selling their assets in order to survive - commodities such 
as televisions, carpets, videos and furniture, were sold for low prices in the market 
place to raise income (Curtis, 1995). This income still did not provide access to 
food however, as most stall holders refused to serve Muslims and policed the 
operation by checking identity cards before serving customers (Curtis, 1995). 
For those living in East Mostar, essential services such as electricity and water 
were also cut off by opposing forces. Although water could still be obtained in 
theory from the Neretva river, in practice, sniper activity meant that this coping 
mechanism was also curtailed. As a final resort, many sought to leave the areas 
where they were in danger and take refuge in safe areas. However, even distress 
migration was beyond the means of many, as the Croats and Serbs charged high 
3 Curtis found that many of the Bosnian refugees had been surprised by the sudden onsct of the 
war and were not prepared in any way for flight or war time survival. It was also noted that while 
in Africa during a famine situation children will often miss meals, in Bosnia parents and 
grandparents would go without their meals in favour of the children. 
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prices for the essential relevant papers. These costs pushed the possibility of flight 
out of the reach of families who had already sold their assets to buy food and 
warmth (Curtis, 1995). Thus, continuing conflict and aggression towards a 
particularly vulnerable ethnic group served to curtail their coping mechanisms. 
This systematic destruction of coping mechanisms is a characteristic of the violence 
of internal war and conflict and needs to be understood and addressed by the 
humanitarian community acting in war. Failure to support coping mechanisms 
encourages dependency and promotes a state of permanent emergency (Duffield, 
1994b, Adams & Bradbury, 1994). 
3.3.2 Relief or Development? A Community in Crisis 
The pressures of acting in war, and the new parameters that such involvement 
brings, are not the only changes for the international community. Coupled with the 
change in the arena of involvement are changes in the humanitarian community's 
structure. Increasingly it is NGOs, with their lack of governmental affiliation, who 
provide the safety net in times of crisis (Duffield, 1994b). More often, the support 
they give is on a reduced budget and yet the money is expected to do more and 
solve greater, longer, crises than ever before. Such changes to the system of 
humanitarian aid have led to new concerns and increasing debate over many 
aspects of the structure of the humanitarian community. The political concerns and 
funding policies of the donors are the prime factors determining what aid is given, 
how and to whom. In order to improve current praxis in relief programmes, it is 
necessary to investigate the motivations and concerns of donors and the responses 
of the humanitarian community. 
In the past there has always been a clear, and misdirected, distinction between 
relief and development fuelled by the modernist paradigm. Development was seen 
as a normative process ofprogression from poverty and vulnerability to wealth and 
security (Duffield, 1994a). Crisis and relief were seen as distinct and separate 
programmes of action that interrupted the development process. This division is 
exemplified by the structure of agencies and organisations that contain both a relief 
department and a development department. This artificial division has increased the 
damage done to affected communities, nations and states by emergency relief 
programmes in past disasters (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Cuny, 1983). 
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As was seen in Chapter Two, relief aid is defined as those items necessary to 
" ... save and preserve human lives" (Templar, 1994). It is this emphasis on the 
saving of lives to the exclusion of livelihoods that causes so many problems 
currently in the many states of permanent emergency that exist around the world. 
If affected communities are constantly provided with emergency assistance that 
only endeavours to save lives, then a dependence on the external assistance will 
inevitably develop through curtailment of innate coping mechanisms. (Barakat, et 
al., 1995; Templar, 1994). Relief aid must focus on the preservation of livelihoods 
as well as lives if it is to become developmental (Ellis, 1995a). Without an 
emphasis on maintaining individual's abilities and means of survival, self­
rehabilitation and self-reconstruction become impossible and longer term social 
welfare assistance becomes necessaty (Ellis & Barakat, 1996a). 
The humanitarian community must move beyond the modernist concept of 
development assistance, which dictates that development is only temporarily 
interrupted by crisis and relief - a paradigm that even regards conflict as a 
transitory set back (Barakat, et al., 1995; Duffield, 1994a). Relief is part of 
development, it is a 'developmentalist concept' (Duffield, 1994a); the two should 
not be seen as separate processes that occur independently of each other. The 
pernicious nature of war and the manner in which it is manifest, mean that 
development cannot continue as if nothing had happened. The total destruction of 
social, political, economic and environmental mechanisms requires massive inputs 
of human skills and resources, as well as economic inputs, to rebuild, reconstruct 
and consequently develop (Barakat & Cockburn, 1991). If the skill base of the war 
torn nation is to be in a position to rebuild and reconstruct after war, then its 
capacities need to be maintained during the years of emergency. This means that 
relief must focus on the maintenance of livelihoods as well as saving lives (Ellis & 
Barakat, 1996a; Ellis, 1995a). 
3.3.3 Changes in the Humanitarian Community 
The competition for funds between the two separated areas of relief and 
development has always been intense, however, recent developments in the 
international system have meant that funds available for development projects are 
steadily dropping (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Borton, 1993; Stiefel, 1994; 
Templar, 1994). 
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Total overseas development assistance peaked during the late Eighties at US$53 
billion and has been static ever since, with a swift increase in the recipient 
population, this static figure represents a per capita reduction (Duffield, 1994b). 
While development assistance has decreased, the emergency relief budget has risen 
dramatically. In 1982-83 the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) 
spent 2-3 per cent of its overall aid budget on emergency relief, by 1992 that figure 
stood at over 10 per cent (Templar, 1994). The European Union spent 15 per cent 
of its total aid budget on emergencies in 1986, by 1991 this had risen to 21 per 
cent (Borton, 1993) (Fig 3.2). 
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Fig 3.2. Global disaster relief as a proportion ofglobal overseas development 
assistance (Source: DI~ffield, 1994a, p39) 
These reductions on development spending in favour of relief assistance, have led 
to agencies and donors concerning themselves with the 'relief to development 
continuum' (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Stiefel, 1994; Templar, 1994). Through 
providing relief that positively affects long tenn development it is hoped that the 
money provided for relief will compensate for the lack of development funding 
available. This has powerful effects on the way that agencies are able to act, for the 
aim is that relief projects be made developmental. 
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This new trend away from development and towards relief is of great concern. 
While it is beneficial that agencies are finally being encouraged to make their relief 
projects have positive long term effects, it is alarming that this is being done at the 
expense of development. Since the 1950s it has been argued that development 
funds are insufficient, and yet, instead of being increased, they are being replaced 
by relief funding. This means that countries such as Somalia and Rwanda that have 
been devastated by war; countries whose social, economic and administrative 
structures have been destroyed, are not offered the injection of increased assistance 
they need to rebuild. Instead they receive a " ... drip-feed of basic survival 
commodities" (Duffield, 1994b) from the safety net of NGOs still working in the 
country. 
Not only is the development funding being taken over by relief, it is also important 
to note that the relief assistance that is provided rarely meets the level required. 
Although more agencies are involved in more crises all over the world, the reality 
is that resources rarely meet the demands upon them. In 1993, this lack of funding 
was evidenced by the UN's attempts to raise funds for twenty six 'complex 
emergencies', on average they received only 57 per cent of the amount they 
requested (Duffield, 1994b). 
To further complicate the issue, it is becoming increasingly obvious that donors 
will only respond to appeals to aid countries that are not of strategic importance to 
them, when there is public and media pressure to do so. As Keen noted of the 
famine in Sudan (1994), 
"Widespread press coverage of famine mortality in the autumn of 1988 
significantly changed the balance of risks for the donors. As Peter 
Cutler has argued in relation to donors' shifting response to famine in 
Ethiopia in particular, the advent ofwidespread publicity on the famine 
meant it was now more risky to do nothing than to take vigorous 
action. Bryan Wannop ... said: 
'The press blew the whistle [on the famine]. If it hadn't been for this 
international public exposure, nothing would have happened ... '" 
(Keen, 1994, p120) 
Inevitably this attitude, developed since the end of the Cold War, means donors 
will only act when the suffering, starvation or mass migration have reached 
colossal proportions; when emergencies become loud, headline catching and 
demand attention (Weiss and Minear, 1993). This means that it is impossible to 
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then address the root causes of the problem - the only course of action is to 
provide the vast trucks of nutritional and material aid, with all the implications of 
increasing the level of the conflict and of ensuring the survival of the victims only 
to go back into war again. 
The lack of interest in 'quiet' crises was exemplified by Somalia in 1992. The 
world was horrified to learn that half a million children under the age of five had 
died in that year in the war in Somalia and pushed the international donors to help; 
however, nothing was done to assist the 13 million children that died during the 
same period through poverty. Yet, based on the discussion in Chapter Two on 
addressing the root causes of disaster, it is evident that money spent on preventing 
disaster is far more effective than that spent after a disaster. As Weiss (Weiss & 
Minear, 1993) states, the: 
" ... aberration is particularly unsettling because every dollar expended 
in silent emergencies is an estimated ten to twenty times more effective 
than in loud ones." (Weiss & Minear, 1993, p7) 
The international strategic importance of the disaster affected country is also 
reflected in the levels of relief assistance given when disaster does strike. For 
example, the post-Yugoslav countries receive US$140 per beneficiary compared 
with Angola's US$58 and Sudan's US$18 (Duffield, 1994b). If donor nations have 
a vested interest in the affected country then the relief payments subsequently rise 
- the geographical proximity of the Former-Yugoslavia to the UK, Germany, 
France, etc., and its perceived potential as a consumer of goods and products, 
doubtless accounts for the intense donor interest and the money invested III 
retaining potential refugees within the borders of the post-Yugoslav countries. 
Thus it would appear that there is an accumulation of difficulties for the 
humanitarian community: 
• 	 A reduction in spending on development 
• 	 A replacement of development assistance by relief projects 
• 	 An under funding of relief projects 
• 	 A reluctance by donors to respond to situations prior to their becoming major 
cnses 
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These difficulties are compounded by an increase in the numbers of inexperienced 
humanitarian practitioners in war. The number of NGOs has grown rapidly over 
the past ten years. They have added to the multiplicity of problems outlined above 
through unknowing and inappropriate action. 
3.3.4 Contract Culture 
The humanitarian situation at present reflects an institutionalisation of short term 
relief assistance and a reduction of agencies who operate long term development 
projects. This stems from an increase in competitive tendencies that arose in the 
1980s between NGOs. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the international 
community would not violate the sovereignty of another country and therefore 
could only provide relief and assistance if invited to by a recognised host 
government. The Biafran War of 1970 set a precedent for the politically 'neutral' 
NGOs to operate in countries without the authorisation of the State (Adams & 
Bradbury, 1994). As the NGOs were in-country, it was easy for the donor 
governments to channel money through them into the affected country. During the 
Cold War, therefore, one way for donors to get relief funds into conflict bound 
countries was through the NGOs or the ICRC. Both types of organisation 
maintained that they were neutral and could thus operate in cross-border or cross­
line programmes. However, the ICRC constructed neutrality as a need for 
agreement to its presence from all warring factions, thus, it frequently found itself 
delayed in gaining access to the affected country (Borton, 1993). The NGOs 
constructed neutrality as eschewment of politics and external monitoring of 
operations. Thus with a 'less rigid' attitude towards neutrality, they became the 
main channel for donors' funds (Fig 3.3). 
1976 1982-83 1990 
Governments 95.2% 12.3% 5.9% 
UN agencies 0.15% 24.3% 10.5% 
ICRC/Red Cross 4.4% 20.1% 16.2% 
NGOs 0.0% 39.7% 37.0% 
Ee commission and others 0.25% 3.4% 30.4%* 
Fig 3.3. European Community emergency aid disbursement by agency type 
(c~'ource Borton, 1993, p192, emphasis added) 
* This high figure is attributable to the action taken by the Be and the 10M in 1990 during the 
Gulf War Repatriation exercise 
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This trend continued during the Eighties, when weakened state structures in Africa 
meant that donors increasingly relied on NGOs as a channel for funds (Borton, 
1993). "Changing donor policy meant that previously illicit cross-border operations 
gained de facto recognition at the expense of nation-state sovereignty." (Duffield, 
1994a). Thus NGOs have become of increasing importance in humanitarian relief 
not through a higher operational knowledge or greater level of expertise but, 
through a willingness to act independently of the situation they are in. 
Such a system, where governments and donors channel money through NGOs, 
leads to increasing competitiveness among the NGOs. In order to survive they 
must tender and bid for available funds from the donors. It is questionable whether 
this competition engendered by the contract culture leads to good practice in relief 
situations. The practice of competing for bids leads to uncertainty as to whom 
exactly the client of the NGOs is: the recipients or the donors? 
3.3.5 Accountability 
The international aid business is one of the biggest un-regulated markets in the 
world. There are no standards by which NGOs, agencies or donors are judged~ 
there is no professional body that governs their working practice and yet their 
decisions affect millions of lives all over the world and their expenditure runs into 
billions of dollars (Walker, 1995). 
The new contract culture described above, suggests that accountability is weighted 
to the donor-agency relationship and not the agency-beneficiary tie. Agencies who 
are careful with donors' funds and provide maximum visible assistance for the least 
money spent will undoubtedly receive further contracts from that donor. This, in 
tum, suggests that those agencies who have the donors' interests at heart will 
receive more commissions than those whose concerns lie with the survivors of war 
or disaster (Walker, 1995). This issue of accountability has huge cumulative effects 
on the types of projects that are implemented and the way in which they are valued 
and judged to be successful. If the international community truly wants to make its 
relief projects developmental and supportive of innate capacities, for whatever 
motivation, then the issue of accountability is of crucial importance (Ellis & 
Barakat, 1996). 
Chambers English Dictionary defines accountability as being" ... liable to account; 
responsible; explicable", and goes on to outline "account" in terms ofboth a moral 
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responsibility and financial, numerical procedures. This suggests therefore, that 
agencies should be accountable both in human and moral terms to those they assist, 
as well as being able to track numbers of goods transported and delivered and unit 
costs. At present, there is a palpable lack of moral and humanitarian accountability 
and a surfeit of costlbenefit analysis (Ellis & Barakat, 1996; Harrell-Bond, et ai., 
1992). 
As soon as the international community assumes the right to interfere in a situation 
there are a range of questions that need to be answered. For the donors, questions 
of immediate concern are: How many people are involved? What are their material 
needs to survive? How can we transport those needs to the affected area? Who 
will distribute them and police the distribution when the items arrive? In other 
words, the donors' main preoccupation seems to lie with counting things; both 
people and material goods 4. 
Where such counting becomes an obsession, agencies can actually disrupt intrinsic 
coping mechanisms of communities. Harrell-Bond's report (1992) of the situation 
among Mozambican refugees in Swaziland, who were moved from their self­
settled and self-sustaining areas within the host community into camps because the 
UNHCR had no concept of the number of refugees in the area and could not 
control the food distribution, is a case in point. 
The author contends that there are also substantive questions that should form in 
the first stages of a crisis over psychological, social and cultural needs of the 
affected population and the host population and the rights, abilities and capacities 
ofboth the affected and the host population. These are the questions that in reality 
rarely get asked or considered. A 1992 paper covering the way relief is allocated to 
refugees (Harrell-Bond, et aI., 1992), introduces the idea of donors perceiving 
their actions as giving gifts, but giving only to those deemed deserving or worthy 
- those who are totally destitute or starving. This pre-condition required for the 
receipt of aid fosters the view that any gift will be gratefully received. As the paper 
states: 
4 During discussion with a member of UNWHO, the author discovered that one view of the 
initial reaction of donors is as follows: 
"How many refugees are there?", "x." 
"OK, with each camp taking Y number of refugees, that makes X divided by Y number of camps 
at $Z each - here's the cheque to cover it." 
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"Does the giver bear any responsibility for the appropriateness or 
adequacy of the gift? In the context of giving food to starving human 
beings it is generally assumed that any food will do." (Harrell-Bond, et 
aI., 1992, p207) 
It is understood that agencies will wish to keep track of expenditure and the goods 
distributed and try to ascertain the numbers of people they have assisted. This 
thesis does not contest that 'counting' is necessary, however, what it does not 
countenance is counting to the exclusion of moral obligation and the detriment of 
humanitarian perspective. Agencies should do both and therefore they must be 
accountable to both the donors and the target community. 
The apparent lack of trust and faith that agencies have in recipient communities 
ensures that agencies are unwilling to be accountable to them. The lack of trust 
stems from experience of affected populations that might exaggerate their needs or 
artificially increase the numbers in the family to get more aid or steal goods and 
food from storage areas. The situation is one of Catch 22, as agencies who set up 
systems to guard against theft because they do not trust recipients, convey the 
message to the recipients that they are not to be trusted. This transforms recipients 
into individuals whose survival tactics are to exaggerate need, trick donors and 
find alternative means of gaining aid (Anderson, 1993). As Harrell-Bond states: 
" ... this is not some' peculiar moral deficiency of refugees, but 
represents a normal response to an impersonal system to which they 
feel no obligation." (Harrell-Bond, et al., 1992, p 211). 
Thus, for example, when a member of the family dies, to prevent rations being cut 
refugees will seek ways to conceal the death from representatives of aid agencies. 
A lack of accountability to the recipients, ensures that aid is provided on a numbers 
assisted for the lowest cost basis. A basis which negates innate coping mechanisms 
and does nothing to build capacity within the affected population. Such a policy 
encourages dependency on external assistance which neither promotes 
development nor reduces vulnerability to future war or hazard. 
3.4 INTEGRATION 
It was shown in Chapter Two that integration is something which occurs when 
host communities and refugees can co-exist, sharing the same resources with no 
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greater mutual conflict than exists in the host community (Harrell-Bond, 1990). In 
a war situation, the practice of integrating refugees with hosts so that they can co­
exist without increasing the level of conflict that exists between the groups, is 
highly sensitive. Agency actions that are construed as partisan or preferential can 
increase and spread the tension and violence of the war. There are therefore two 
options open to the humanitarian community providing relief in war. They can 
ensure that their actions are non partisan and encourage the understanding and 
peaceful integration of incomers and hosts. The alternative policy is to segregate 
and marginalise the incoming refugees and displaced persons and so avoid any 
possible confrontation by removing the contact that the incomers have with the 
host community. This latter option allows the refugees and displaced persons no 
access to existing resources and therefore no opportunity to utilise their own 
capacities and coping mechanisms. As stated in Chapter Two, it is important that 
refugees and displaced persons are given access to the resources and social 
systems that promote the maintenance of independence and productivity. Thus, it 
would appear that the integration of incomers with hosts, rather than the 
segregation of incomers from hosts, is the desired objective. Is such integration 
possible in a war situation where fear and suspicion are high and all are competing 
for scarce resources? 
3.4.1 Conflict Reduction and Peace Building 
As was stated earlier in this chapter, contlicts are becoming longer. As this is the 
case, it follows that one of the actions of humanitarian intervention should be to 
endeavour to reduce the length of the conflict and not prolong it. Development 
cannot occur without minimal peace (Anderson, 1993; Barakat, et al., 1994). 
Peace is an essential precondition for reconstruction and development, as such, 
relief projects that aim to be developmental, should encourage the establishment of 
peace as well as physical and social capacity (Ellis & Barakat, 1996). 
There seems to be an assumption that contlict can only be resolved at the 
international or state level, which has led to responses that focus on the 
strengthening of international or regional institutions (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). 
It is possible for relief interventions to reduce tensions in war at a national level. 
For instance, the ICRe organised the provision of a blanket distribution of food in 
Somalia. They ensured that the food came into the conflict zone from multiple 
entry points and was distributed with the Somalis having extensive and close 
involvement. The equitable and unbiased distribution reduced looting and conflicts 
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over scarce food supplies and did not increase the inter-group tensions or rivalry 
(Adams & Bradbury, 1994). However, other examples show that operations at the 
national level are not effective. For example, imposed attempts to control the 
fighting through outside military intervention have a poor track record. The 'safe 
areas' created in Bosnia are an obvious case in point: for two years they essentially 
froze the conflict and offered little future for those who were sheltering inside 
them, as was indicated by the increasing rate of suicide (Adams & Bradbury, 
1994). It is also acknowledged that by gathering the Bosnian Muslims together in 
one place it made it very easy for the Serb forces to carry through their policy of 
ethnic cleansing when they were ready. 
There are international laws and conventions that are in place to reduce the 
suffering of civilians in war and assist in the reduction of the levels ofviolence: 
• 	 1949 Fourth Geneva convention which protects civilian populations in times of 
war 
• 	 1951 UN convention on the status and legal protection of refugees 
• 	 1951 UN convention on the prevention of, and punishment for, the crime of 
genocide, specifically authorising the UN to act to prevent genocide. 
• 	 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) 
• 	 1980 Land mines protocol, which aims to regulate the use ofland mines. 
In times of war, however, adherence to these regulations seems to be the exception 
rather than the rule: acts of genocide are widespread in the wars in Bosnia and 
Rwanda~ land mines are an enduring and constant threat both during and after wars 
allover the world, as their cheap price means that they can be deployed in large 
numbers and kill indiscriminately (DHA, 1995a) and, with the increase in intrastate 
war, civilians are targets not accidental victims. Although the protocols exist, it 
seems that: 
" ... as soon as [States] are directly or indirectly involved in an anned 
conflict, most [will] qualify, interpret, or simply ignore the rules of 
humanity, evoking state interests and sovereign prerogatives. Political 
considerations prevail over humanitarian requirements and 
humanitarian concerns are used to further political aims" Independent 
Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, quoted in (Minear 
& Weiss, 1993, pIl) 
Section One: An Overview of Current Praxis 
Chapter Three: Humanitarian Relief in War 71 
With such widespread disregard for the international legislation, it would seem that 
there is more chance of instilling conflict reduction at the micro level by focusing 
on the civil society. Participatory and integrated action at the lower levels can 
greatly assist in the implementation of peace or in preventing an escalation of 
conflict, as witnessed in Somalia and in parts of the post-Yugoslavia where many 
local peace groups are trying to mediate between factions and reduce ethnic 
tensions (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). 
Peace can be built at all levels and in many ways. While it may not be possible for 
donors and agencies to operate on the macro level and stop war and conflict 
outright, it is within the power of all to act in a manner that does nothing to 
increase ethnic rifts or levels of tension within communities (Ellis & Barakat, 
1996a). 
A report from the NGOs and peace building workshop held in Afghanistan in 1994 
(Barakat, et aI., 1994) notes that the local community mistrusted the NGOs 
because of evident " ... nepotism and favouritism in funding and implementation". 
Such partiality is something that NGOs need to avoid when working in conflict, as 
perceived bias increases the tensions that exist between communities. Maintaining 
complete impartiality is hard to implement on the ground in conflict; the difficulties 
of getting all sides to agree to any intervention are understood. It is also possible 
that in order to act to the benefit of all and maintain an impartial policy, agencies 
may find themselves supporting factions and regimes whose actions they find 
morally corrupt. 
There are many examples of agencies that have deliberately biased mandates 
(Soroya & Stubbs, 1994). A prima facie example is the UNHCR, an organisation 
that defines its work purely in terms of refugees. Among the refugee and displaced 
person communities of the post-Yugoslav countries such a biased attitude has 
caused tension and increased ethnic rifts (Soroya & Stubbs, 1994), an issue that 
will be further investigated in Chapter Seven. UNHCR provides for the needs of 
the refugees and the needs of the displaced and host communities are left to other 
organisations to fill, as Stubbs and Soroya outline in their paper: 
" ... relief models have exacerbated tensions between refugees, 
internally displaced people and local communities. As each of these 
groups receives different help, from different agencies, based upon 
different assumptions and philosophies, it is not surprising that 
Section One: An Overview of Current Praxis 
Chapter Three: Humanitarian Relief in War 72 
divisions are exacerbated. It is not hard to imagine how accusations 
about one group being favoured, or privileged at the expense of others, 
can link in to an ethnicised nationalist agenda." (Soroya & Stubbs, 
1994, p8) 
As the numbers of NGOs acting in war grow, there is increasing risk of their 
actions contributing to the war economies that they aim to reduce. In Somalia, 
NGOs, the ICRC and the UN all pay 'freelance militia' large sums of money to 
protect their staff, premises and the provision of relief supplies through conflict 
areas (Adams & Bradbury, 1994). In doing so, they are making direct 
contributions into the war economy and thus fuelling the continuation of conflict. 
The vast numbers of NGOs operating in Afghanistan assist in freeing the men to 
engage in combat; by feeding and supporting their women and children, the NGOs 
enable the men to leave and fight, knowing that their families will be cared for 
while they are absent (Barakat, 1995 personal communication). Would it not be 
better to offer the men who see economic security and life purpose by serving in 
the militia an alternative employment that would support ultimate peace and 
development? 
It is possible for agencies to act without compounding the levels of conflict, 
Anderson (1993) outlines several projects that promoted peace and cross-faction 
integration during warfare. One of her examples covers the establishment of a 
children's magazine called Sawa in Lebanon. Each edition included stories of the 
history and culture of Lebanon so that L< ••• children, who could not know of them 
across fighting lines, could learn of a common Lebanese heritage" (Anderson, 
1993). The publication included blank pages for the children to write on and send 
back to the magazine for publication in the next issue, in the hope that a sense of 
shared culture could be developed on which to build if peace came. One reader 
submitted a peace pledge that was published and subsequently signed by many 
children and their parents. It is a small example and may seem insignificant, but it 
shows the ways in which humanitarian aid can act in order to promote an 
understanding and a wish for peace at the micro level. Establishment of 
communication at this level can open up a framework for conflict resolution at the 
macro level of state and nation (Adams & Bradbury, 1994; Anderson, 1993). 
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3.5 SUM:MARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has looked at the recent changes in the humanitarian system and has 
outlined the following issues facing relief agencies acting in circumstances of war 
and violence: 
i. The complex arena for the humanitarian community 
• Permanent emergencies 
• Root causes 
• Support for remaining capacities 
ii. Vulnerability in the environment of war 
• 	 Vulnerability as constructed by wealth, political affiliation, ethnicity and 
gender 
iii. Capacity in the environment of war 
• Coping mechanisms 
• The relief to development continuum 
• Contract culture 
• Accountability 
iv. Integration 
• Conflict reduction and peace building 
It seems that the problems left facing the humanitarian community are legion and 
insoluble. If the lessons learnt from action in natural disasters are combined with 
the lessons that need to be learnt for action in war, then it would appear that the 
international community will have to be re-staffed by a race of superhuman 
characters. As Slim (1995) outlines, the 'new' aid workers need to be aware of 
political issues~ they need to possess negotiating skills and understand conflict 
analysis and management; they need to be able to see through propaganda and 
understand the complexities of the new urban terrain and the altered 'clientele'; 
new aspects of vulnerability must be identified and understood; human rights must 
be monitored~ they must understand the requirements of permanent emergency 
situations characterised by chaos and the unexpected; they must be impartial and 
understand the need to build peace with every action and constantly be aware of 
the danger that the humanitarian practitioner, no longer a protected species, is now 
in. 
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This discussion of the environment of war raises many questions over the actions 
of the humanitarian community. Unlike action in natural disasters the choices in 
war are not so clear cut - the results of intervention are unpredictable and hard to 
foresee. Therefore to act in war, the model of intervention developed through 
natural disasters requires amending and reformatting to encompass the highly 
politicised and unpredictable nature of war. 
From the literature reviewed in this chapter and the previous one, two central 
discourses have emerged: 
• 	 Vulnerability and capacity 
Integration 
Their component parts suggest a framework of concerns that need to be addressed 
when assessing emergency shelter provision in war. 
3.5.1 Vulnerability and Capacity 
Chapter Two introduced the notion of vulnerability and stated that in natural 
disasters it was primarily the poor who were most vulnerable to hazard. From the 
literature discussed subsequently in Chapter Three, it can be seen that in war, the 
concept of vulnerability takes on many new layers and aspects. Vulnerability is no 
longer solely the province of the poor. Political affiliation, ethnicity, gender and 
wealth can make entire cross sections of society vulnerable to war. It is important 
that the root causes of these vulnerabilities are understood by the humanitarian 
community acting in war in order to avoid increasing the level of suffering. 
Chapter Two also introduced the concept of imposed vulnerability, as cited in the 
work ofBlack (1994); discussed within the discourses on dependency in the works 
of Harrell-Bond and Kibreab (Harrell-Bond, 1986, 1990, 1993; Kibreab, 1993) and 
reinforced by Zetter's discussion of institutionalised dependency as a product of 
labelling individuals 'refugee' (Zetter, 1987). This concept is a core issue -within 
this thesis as it deals with the effects of the humanitarian community's actions on 
individuals once they have become refugees or displaced persons. Harrell­
Bond's seminal work of 1986, argues that the manner of refugee assistance 
promotes dependency by usurping the decision-making and organisational capacity 
of refugee individuals and communities (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Black, 1994). In this 
chapter it has been mooted from the review of the literature, that it is important to 
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important to maintain the productive capacity of a society during war, in order to 
facilitate reconstruction in the post-war period. By imposing higher levels of 
vulnerability on, and increasing the dependency of, refugee and displaced 
populations during war, the humanitarian community can adversely affect post-war 
reconstruction. Thus, the literature suggests, it is important to maintain refugees' 
and displaced persons' capacity as productive social beings during the time in exile. 
It is these concepts that will form the framework for the analysis of the field data 
presented in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
3.5.2 Integration 
In Chapter Two the social, psychological and cultural value of integrating 
incoming populations with hosts was illustrated. It was also shown that the 
refugee-centric approach to relief provision, that favours incoming populations 
with resources and facilities over host populations, is likely to create conflict and 
increase tension. In this chapter, it has been mooted from the analysis of the 
literature, that when the humanitarian community is acting in war situations, where 
rivalry and conflict for scarce resources are endemic, the possibilities to further 
inflame the tensions through biased or unthinking actions are far greater. The 
process of integrating and providing for incoming populations in a war situation is 
a highly sensitive issue. 
The potential for relief programmes to exacerbate tension and conflict and the 
potential for participatory and integrated action to assist in instilling peace, are 
themes that are developed further in Chapter Seven where the findings from the 
field will be reviewed. 
These central discourses of vulnerability and capacity, and integration, and their 
component categories, form the framework for the analysis of emergency shelter 
provision for refugees and displaced persons in the Republic of Croatia. The 
following chapter introduces the fieldwork in Croatia and outlines the 
methodology utilised to illicit data for the study. 
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THE METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH UNDER FIRE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The issues derived from the literature reviewed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three 
emphasise the importance of agencies understanding the vulnerabilities and 
capacities of the target community prior to project design and enactment. In order 
for agencies to support the capacities of the target group; provide culturally 
sensitive aid; utilise existing resources; reduce conflict and preserve livelihoods, it 
is essential that they are fully cognisant of the context of their actions - they must 
understand the people and the location; the social, cultural, economic and political 
environments. This requires that agencies conduct pre-project assessment and 
evaluation of the real needs and requirements of the affected population. 
The author's understanding of this requirement has driven the way in which data 
was collected during this study. One central belief was that the reason behind 
misdirected aid provision lay partly in the inability or the unwillingness of the 
humanitarian community to ascertain and address real needs: this belief was 
reinforced by the literature review that was conducted. Thus this study was devised 
primarily to understand the impact of provision on the affected population; to 
determine the positive and negative effects of shelter provision on the recipient 
communities and host population. This was done simultaneously with questioning 
the agencies and the host government, in order to understand the economic, social 
and political opportunities, restrictions and agendas governing their provision. 
However, the primary emphasis has always been on ascertaining the effects of 
shelter provision on the refugees and displaced persons themselves. 
Being cognisant of this necessity, it was felt to be important to endeavour to 
understand the impact, relevance and sustainability of each project as well as the 
efficiency and effectiveness l . Many projects appear to be evaluated purely in terms 
of efficiency and effectiveness by the aid agencies that instigated them, largely 
1 These five components for evaluation are constituents of a framework for evaluators of 
development projects devised by the Evaluation Department of the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Samset, 1993) 
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because they are primarily accountable to the donor rather than the target group2. 
In other words, projects are evaluated with little consideration of the way they 
affect the target group. For example, if this framework of evaluation were applied 
to a fictitious housing project, the aim of which was to improve housing conditions 
for refugees through the construction of prefabricated housing units, the following 
scenario would hold true. The project would be said to be efficient if a large 
number of houses had been constructed for the least expenditure and if this same 
number of houses could not have been built in any cheaper or less time consuming 
way. So if the unit cost of the housing was low, the project would have been 
deemed efficient. Effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which the initial 
purpose has been achieved. So in the fictitious project, this could be measured by 
the number of houses that had been built, the number of families assisted and the 
extent of improvement to the infrastructure supplying the houses (Samset, 1993). 
Both of these measures assume, but do not attempt to verify, that the initial 
purpose of the project was correct and that provision of housing units was what 
the conununity needed. Neither component examines the positive or negative 
effects of the project on the refugee community. 
In order to gain a balanced and holistic picture of the hypothetical project it would 
also be necessary to understand the impact, relevance and sustainability of the 
project. In this fictitious case, therefore, to understand the impact of the project it 
would be necessary to see whether the project had any planned or unplanned 
negative or positive effects on the refugee community and on the host community. 
So, did the provision of constructed housing units curtail the abilities of the 
refugees to construct their own homes? Did it reduce income generating 
opportunities among the community or did it supply employment? Do the host 
community now live in worse housing conditions than the refugees and how has 
that affected the integration of the refugees into the community? To understand the 
relevance, it is necessary to ascertain if the project was tailored to the refugees' 
needs. Did they really require houses to be built for them or where they able to 
build for themselves? Did they feel that housing was the primary need or was there 
greater demand for agricultural implements or health care? How did the 
construction of a refugee settlement fit in with the local authority'S plans and the 
recovery and development strategies of the host goverrunent? The degree to which 
the project is relevant will, in tum, strongly affect the long term sustainability of 
2 This issue of accountability was previously discussed in Chapter Two 
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the project. Only if the recipient community themselves class the project's purpose 
as their primary need will they invest the time, effort and money into continuing 
and sustaining it after external support has been withdrawn (Samset, 1993). In the 
case of the hypothetical housing project, sustainability could be evaluated by 
measuring the occupation levels of the settlement; the degree of upkeep and repair 
exhibited within the settlement and the extent to which the units have been 
extended and adapted to individual needs. 
4.1.1 Structure of the Chapter 

The data for this thesis was gathered to generate an understanding of the impact, 





This chapter presents the ways in which this data was collected. Section two of the 
chapter, outlines the methodologies that have underpinned the data collection. The 
fieldwork is described in section three, where the experiences of the author are 
utilised to initiate a discussion on the appropriate methods for data collection under 
fire 3. Section four describes the methods by which the author has maintained the 
direction and focus of the study through peer review. The chapter concludes by 
presenting a set of general lessons distilled from the author's experience. The 
lessons are presented to further the discussion over appropriate methods to utilise 
when researching under fire. 
4.2 METHODOLOGY 
To evaluate and study the built environment it is necessary to utilise methodologies 
that can address the interactions between people and the physical environment and 
aid understanding of the built environment as it interfaces with social and cultural 
values. As Sinha outlines: 
"This will entail moving away from a deterministic model, in which the 
ability to generalise and statistical corroboration is emphasised, to one 
which seeks to understand the subjective experience of individuals and 
views unique events as keys to useful insights." (Sinha, 1991, pI7) 
Qualitative research methods enable understanding of the way people relate to, and 
are affected by, the built environment. They allow the researcher to capture the 
3 This discussion has been continued through publication of the author's findings in Disasters 
(Barakat & Ellis, 1996) 
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significance of housing for its inhabitants, as well as the wider political and 
economic structures that lie behind the shelter provision (Sinha, 1991). Such 
qualitative techniques can enable the researcher to understand the changes that new 
shelter forms bring about in lifestyles, in a way that quantitative techniques fail to 
do. As Peattie suggests " ... information about processes and about invisible 
structures is not readily derived from counting things" [Peattie quoted in (Hamdi, 
1991) p82]. Highly structured methods, such as surveys and questionnaires, may 
permit easy replication of the research process, but they do not capture underlying 
meanings. Indeed, in the field of housing, such techniques will result in little more 
than lists ofwhat is wanting in the built environment (Hamdi, 1991; Sinha, 1991). 
In addition to the parameters prescribed by researching the built environment, the 
researcher in war has other areas which govern the methodologies available for use 
due to the complexity and ever changing circumstances of war. Primarily, it is 
impossible for the researcher to be completely aware of all the aspects of the 
situation of war prior to entering the field. No amount of investigation undertaken 
before entering the field will completely prepare the researcher for each and every 
eventuality that they will find on the ground in the war zone. Thus, the war 
researcher needs to utilise flexible and open techniques that encourage chance 
learning and the discovery of the unexpected and unpredictable. This again points 
to the use of qualitative methodologies such as observation techniques and 
unstructured interviews, or what Chambers calls, "sitting, asking and listening": 
"Sitting, asking and listening are as much an attitude as a method. 
Sitting implies lack of hurry, patience and humility; asking implies that 
the outsider is a student; and listening implies respect and learning. 
Many of the best insights come this way. Relaxed discussions reveal 
the questions outsiders do not know to ask, and open up the 
unexpected." (Chambers, 1983, p 202, emphasis added) 
The researcher must also realise that there are some research techniques that are 
completely dysfunctional in a war situation. The use of a structured rigid 
questionnaire for instance will elicit little useful data. In war, people's response to 
questioning is affected by fear and suspicion (Barakat, 1992) and the appearance of 
a researcher brandishing a clipboard and survey form will only enforce their 
concerns and compromise the information elicited. Structured interviews evoke 
similar suspicion (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). 
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4.3 FIELD WORK 
The researcher in war is governed by a multitude of unpredictable parameters 
which tightly control appropriate and possible action. Personal safety; shifting 
battle lines and alliances and restrictions of movement are all concerns that have 
regulatory effects on the researcher in war. These restraints negate the use of 
highly structured methods and require the researcher to be reflexive, flexible and 
innovative. 
There is a paucity of information on the subject of data collection in war 4. The 
most relevant publications to date come from the field of development studies. The 
work of Robert Chambers (1983) and his analysis of the "Development Tourist" 
and subsequent proposition of "Rapid Rural Appraisal Techniques" provides some 
transferable ideas as do the studies by Dudley (1993) and Sinha (1991). From these 
works, it was possible for the author to develop a range of techniques for the study 
of the built environment in war time. 
War imposes severe restrictions on time available in the field, access to 
documented data, freedom of movement in the field and gaining access to the 
field5. These restrictions all suggest that the war researcher has to utilise a range of 
data collection methods in order to gather information. 
4.3.1 Chance Learning 
With information so hard to come by, the researcher must do everything possible 
to encourage chance learning. The researcher in war cannot predict when, where 
or how it will be possible to learn something, a fact which produces the dichotomy 
with established method in academic institutions. Some researchers have, for 
instance, told of the advantages of giving locals lifts and chatting in the back of a 
jeep on the way to the research site (Barakat, 1992, 1993; Dudley, 1993). Such a 
proposal meets with little enthusiasm within the realms of rigid research protocol. 
In the course of the field work for this thesis, much was learnt through many 
circumstances that could never have been predicted by the researcher. For instance, 
whilst waiting for a UNHCR driver to collect the researcher and translator from 
outside one collective centre, the researcher found herself in the middle of an 
argument that blew up between the resident refugees and displaced persons over 
4 The doctorate thesis of Sultan Barakat being the one notable exception that the author found 
(Barakat, 1992), dedicated as it is to the study of the reconstruction of the built environment after 
war. 
S These concepts will be discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. 
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perceived preferential treatment by aid agencies of one group over the other. A 
scene which indicated much about the underlying tensions in the centre, but which 
could not have been predicted when planning the field visit. 
This is not to suggest that the researcher in war situations should merely wander 
around in the field waiting for a chance encounter that will make all clear. What it 
does propose is that the war researcher must acknowledge that there are 
parameters that affect action in war and that the methodology utilised therefore 
must be flexible enough to address that. 
4.3.2 Range of Techniques 
Data collection in war requires the use of many different methodologies if it is to 
be successful: a technique that is often referred to as triangulation. Triangulation is 
regarded differently within the social sciences by adherents to various paradigms 
(Blaikie, 1991). To the positivist, triangulation is a way of overcoming problems of 
bias and validity; data gained through one method can be 'cross-checked' with data 
gained from another method or source, regardless of ontological or 
epistemological concerns, to establish veracity. It is a way of trying to overcome 
the perceived problems of bias that exist within qualitative research. To the 
interpretevist, triangulation is used to establish the existence of phenomena or 
values on some variable (Blaikie, 1991) not as a philosophically based attempt to 
establish one absolute truth. Different viewpoints of the same object increase our 
understanding of it. For example: " ... a man is a mass to an engineer, but a bundle 
of neuroses to a psychiatrist" (Kirk & Miller, 1986). 
The use of multiple tedmiques is an acknowledgement of the restraints that the 
circumstances of war put upon the researcher. It is necessary for the researcher to 
maintain a chameleon adaptability to data collection, blending into perceived 
contexts and situations. To function effectively the researcher in war has to utilise 
all the collection teclmiques at their disposal and realise the "... benefits of 
inventiveness and improvisation in methods of appraisal and research" (Chambers, 
1983). Thus, the author believes, in line with the interpretevist model of 
triangulation, that multiple techniques should be used in the environment of war to 
establish an holistic understanding of the subject under investigation. 
Thus, throughout the field work for this study, a number of inter-related techniques 
were used in order to elicit data. The researcher used three main methods to obtain 
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as full and holistic picture of the situation as possible within the constraints of war. 
Having spoken with others in the field, it was concluded that, throughout the two 
periods of field study, direct observation, participant observation and semi­
structured interviews should be used and existing archival data sought where it was 
available 6. 
4.3.3 Pre-field Preparation 
The need to be flexible means that the researcher must be very well briefed before 
arriving in the field (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). A basic knowledge of the geography 
of the country, the history of current conflict and the location and scope of 
alternative research sites were found to be useful during the field work for this 
study. 
An elementary grasp of some key words and phrases of the Croatian language 
assisted in getting from site to site and was of some use when trying to gather 
information, as well as a way of displaying courtesy to the local population. 
Additionally, the need for the researcher in war to be autonomous and independent 
cannot be too highly stressed. In a situation when the local population is in extreme 
difficulty and resources are limited, the researcher should not create an extra 
burden. This kind of autonomy requires meticulous preparation before entering the 
field. The researcher needs to be well equipped with all the physical requirements 
for gathering information (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). 
4.3.4. Programming 

Chambers (1983), in his seminal work on data collection among the rural poor, 





,~patial : 	 where issues of comfort and ease of access determine what the 
researcher sees 
project: 	 the researcher is drawn towards sites where contacts and 
information are readily available - inevitably a site that has been 
investigated before by many other researchers 
6 The author consulted with Dr Sultan Barakat, Dr Eric Dudley, Dr Roger Zetter and Dr Geoffrey 
Payne, about the appropriate methodologies for the study prior to entering the field. 
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person: 	 articulate key informants are not always representative of the typical 
opinions of a community and yet, because of their position and 
ability to communicate, they are often the only ones spoken with by 
the researcher 
season: 	 researchers have a marked tendency to conduct research in foreign 
countries only during periods of pleasant weather, thus many of the 
most severe problems faced by a community go unobserved. 
diplomatic: 	 diplomatic expediency can lead to selectivity over which projects 
are shown to the researcher 
professional: 	 professional specialisation generates a focusing that can lead to 
researchers missing links between processes 
A conscious attempt was made to avoid falling into the traps of these biases in both 
periods of study. 
4.3.4. 1. Spatial bias 
Although initially written to cover biases that existed in development research, 
where all effort appeared to be based on easily accessible urban sites rather than 
the remote rural areas; understanding this bias made the researcher aware of the 
necessity to try and investigate all types of situations. Consequently sites were 
visited that were within cities and towns (e.g. Varaidin 1 and 2, Hotel 
International), on the periphery of cities and towns (e.g. Spansko, Rokovci) and 
located far away from existing urban centres (e.g. Gasinci) (Fig 4.1). 
4.3.4.2. Project bias 
It has been stated that researchers are drawn to conduct research in camps and 
collective centres because they hold a captive audience for study and therefore are 
easy for the researcher to access (Stubbs, 1995). However, in Croatia, such 
behaviour would then result in an unrealistic study as, with the majority of forced 
migrants living in private accommodation, the conditions faced by the minority 
would be used to support a general argument about the majority (Ellis & Barakat, 
1996; Stubbs, 1995). 
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To avoid such bias, a conscious effort was made to conduct research among those 
living in private accommodation as well as in the camps and collective centres. This 
was made possible through the offices of the ODPR, who maintain a census of all 
the registered refugees and displaced persons throughout Croatia and could thus 






Fig 4.1. Map ofCroatia showing the location ofthe sites visited (source: the 
author) 
4.3.4.3. Person Bias 
The random way in which informants were selected guarded against this bias. 
There was never a decision to seek out the community leaders and speak only with 
them. In the camps and collectives, informants were chosen by the researcher 
randomly selecting houses to visit without prior knowledge of the resident family. 
If the inhabitants were happy to be spoken with then the interview would 
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progress7 . Several families were selected in this manner in each location. The 
process meant that a wide range of informants were interviewed, ranging from 
lawyers, teachers, architects and artists through to farmers, agricultural hands, 
refuse collectors and factory workers. 
4.3.4.4. Dry Season Bias 
It was anticipated at the beginning of the project that there might be substantial 
differences between the conditions for the refugees and displaced persons in winter 
and in summer, especially within the camps and settlements. Conditions that may 
be perceived to be satisfactory in summer when families could extend their living 
environment beyond the confines of the shelter, might become unsatisfactory in 
winter when the family would be largely house-bound. For this reason there were 
two periods of field research, one in the summer months of August and September 
1994 and one in the winter during January and February 1995. 
4.3.4.5. Diplomatic Bias 
The necessity to gain permission from the ODPR to conduct research in refugee 
and displaced persons accommodation caused some concern that it may not 
consequently be possible to avoid this bias: it was difficult to see how the 
researcher would be able to ensure that bad examples of accommodation were 
visited as well as good. However, it transpired that through the efforts of the local 
partner in the field, access was allowed to all camps and settlements without any 
attempts at concealment of those that were not acceptable 8. In convincing the 
government to back the project, the partner in the field had demonstrated the 
benefits to be gained from allowing full access to all types and levels of 
accommodation. She argued that it would only be possible to write a fair report if 
access was given to a complete range of accommodation, otherwise an incomplete 
picture of the government's efforts would be presented. 
7 None of the households approached in this manner refused to be interviewed; the usual pattern 
was an enthusiastic and hospitable welcome and a willingness to talk. 
8 The connections with the Study Centre for Reconstruction and. Development will be discussed 
later in tillS chapter 
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4.3.4.6. Professional Bias 
Chambers states that when professionals visit the field each sees only that which 
corresponds to their discipline. So, 
" ... a hydrologist enquires about the water table, a soil scientist 
examines soil fertility, an agronomist investigates yields, an economist 
asks about wages and prices, a sociologist looks into patron-client 
relations ... a doctor investigates health and hygiene and a family 
planner attempts to find out about attitudes to numbers of children . 
. . . [Such] narrow professionalism of whatever persuasion leads to 
diagnoses and prescriptions which underestimate deprivation by only 
confronting part of the problem" (Chambers, 1983, p23) 
To avoid possible professional biases during the study of Croatia, firstly, semi­
structured interviews were used to enable informants to set their own priorities of 
importance and secondly, a reflexive approach to data collection was employed. 
Reflexivity requires an acknowledgement that researchers are part of the social 
world and " ... are able to reflect upon [them]selves and [their] actions as objects in 
that world" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). During the field work, therefore the 
research process was turned back upon the researcher in an attempt to understand 
the effects of the researcher on the data collected, and the ways in which the 
researcher's own perceptions might affect the type of information that was 
collected. Only through the process of constantly questioning and evaluating the 
process while in the field and during analysis following the periods offield study, is 
it possible to expand the field of study beyond the constraints of professional bias. 
4.3.5 Gaining Access and Identifying Gatekeepers 
Gaining access to the field can be extremely difficult in war situations. Freedom of 
movement in the field inevitably requires permission from government or similar 
high level institutions, as well as permission from those manning military 
roadblocks, checkpoints etc.. In any research situation, those in authority will be 
cautious about giving access, but in war, the level of concern over giving 
researchers freedom of movement grows exponentially. 
Without a contact in the field who can speak the local language; introduce the 
correct people; talk to the right officials and generally assist in easing the way on 
the researcher's behalf, the struggle to actually get into the field will be long and 
hard. The ideal situation would be to enter into partnership with a local counterpart 
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who would assist the researcher in gaining access to the field (Barakat & Ellis, 
1996) 
This was indeed born out by the researcher's own experiences during both of the 
field trips to Croatia. Prior to the first trip to Croatia in August 1994, five months 
were spent trying to make contacts and establish connections. From the 
researcher's own contacts9 and from published lists of agencies working in former­
Yugoslavia, twenty four aid agencies and individuals were contacted and the leads 
they gave were followed up. Only four of these approaches received positive 
responses and of those, only two were in a position to help in the field. Ultimately 
it was meeting and subsequently forming a partnership with Marija Kojakovi6 of 
the Study Centre for Reconstruction and Development in Dubrovnik that enabled 
the researcher to conduct the field work at all. It was she who smoothed the 
researcher's way into the field by persuading ODPR to give the necessary 
permission to visit and live in the camps and collective centres around Croatia. 
It transpired that the researcher had written to the people in the government office 
that Marija eventually persuaded to grant permission for the study, however, the 
researcher had received no response to letters and, lacking a common language, 
had been unable to follow up the initial request with phone calls. When Dubrovnik 
was reached half way through the first period of field study and it was possible to 
sit down and talk with Marija face to face, it became clear how hard it had been, 
even for her, to persuade the government to give the researcher permission to 
conduct the study. 
" ... finally managed to meet with Marija on Wednesday evening ... she 
explained to me the difficulty she had in getting the Croatian 
Government Office to agree to allow me to do this study ... Professor 
Rebi6 [Head of the Croatian Government Office for Displaced Persons 
and Refugees] agreed to let me go into the camps and let me have the 
information in the end ... this was only agreed at the last minute 10 
(Field notes, August 1994) 
It became clear that the reason for the ODPR's reluctance to grant the researcher 
permission to study in Croatia was previous experience of individuals and 
9 The author attended the First International Workshop on Improved Shelter Response and 
Enviromnent for Refugees held by the UNHCR in Geneva in 1993. Many contacts with aid 
agencies were made here as well as meeting field officers working in the former-Yugoslavia. 
10 The researcber found out in Dubrovnik that it was not finalised until two days before her 
departure from England for Croatia. 
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organisations that had been condemnatory of the government's policies and 
practices. A willingness on behalf of the researcher to share the findings of the 
investigation prior to publication seemed to assist in smoothing the passage. 
Even with the permission of the government and the assistance ofMarija and many 
others in the field, it was still difficult to progress in the field ll. 
"Friday 
Arrived in Osijek at 10.30 and found Nada Arbanas at the ODPR office 
in Avenija Europska. She said everything was organised for my visit ­
though this turned out to be inaccurate. It transpired that Monday is a 
Public Holiday and that the camps and centres are all closed for 
visiting on the weekend and that there was no translator or transport 
that I could use" (Field notes, August 1994) 12 
This was just one of many difficulties on the first visit which arose because of the 
researcher's lack of knowledge of the Croatian language and an uncertainty as to 
exactly what was expected of the researcher by others. 
The second period of field study offered still further problems in terms of access. 
This time, it took four days to receive a second written permission from the ODPR 
to resume the field study, in spite of prior assurances that all was in order. With 
only two weeks free to spend in the field it was necessary to spend four days trying 
to find ways in which officialdom could be circumnavigated in order not to waste 
valuable time. Without the researcher's prior knowledge of the possibilities and 
alternatives gained during the first field trip, and the flexibility to act upon that 
knowledge, valuable research time would have been lost. 
Hammersley and Atkinson write that the researcher should be cognisant not only of 
those who have the power to grant access to the field, but also of those who 
perceive that they have the power (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). In situations 
of civil war this is crucial as the government may no longer retain control over 
certain warring factions and groups. This means that gaining government approval 
to pursue a line of research will not always mean that all settings in the field are 
11 See Appendix B for copies of permission letters. 
12 This situation was subsequently resolved when the researcher visited the UNHCR offices on 
the floor below and explained the situation fully to the head of office. Denis de Poerk provided a 
vehicle and persuaded one of his staff to translate and drive over the weekend. Without their 
assistance the time in Osijek would have been wasted and the researcher is very grateful for their 
kindness and help. 
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still open to the researcher (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). For the author, this necessity 
was spelt out during the second field trip, when trying to gain access to one of the 
camps in Zagreb. The author's letter of permission from the ODPR did not assist 
the passage into the camp. Indeed, when the author asked the head of the camp 
resident's committee if it was possible to look around the answer was " ... no, it 
was not possible. Delegations were always coming and people had had enough". 
The letter from the ODPR and the author's British citizenship, sparked a tirade 
against both the Croatian and British governments which was concluded with the 
opinion that" ... such visits [as the author's] got them nowhere and did nothing for 
them and they did not want anymore" (Field notes, February 1995). 
War offers many restrictions on the researcher's movement, the above illustrations 
are just a few examples. Restrictions can also come from the mining of areas or the 
unpredictable shifting of lines of battle. The complexities of a civil war make it very 
difficult for the researcher to gain access to the field and to pass gatekeepers. For 
this reason the researcher in war needs to be very flexible and adaptable. Personal 
experience of data collection in war leads this researcher to conclude that although 
it is advisable to try and plan the visit before going into the field, marking out 
where to go and what to see; the realities of war often mean that well planned 
schedules will have to be broken (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). The implications are that 
if the researcher still wants to achieve the objectives of the field visits, then there is 
a strong need to be flexible, both in the time tabling of the visit and the methods 
chosen to elicit data (Barakat, 1992). 
While this may be an acknowledged necessity In some of the social SCIence 
literature, such a suggestion runs counter to positivist methodological thinking, 
where such flexibility is seen to represent a lack of validity and to be " ... subjective, 
impressionistic, idiosyncratic and biased" (Burgess, 1984). However the 
parameters of war all conspire to force the researcher to maintain a flexible and 
chameleon approach to data collection. Attempts at adherence to set timetables or 
strict methodologies will result in the researcher returning from the field empty 
handed. 
4.3.6 Limitations on Time 
In war, it is impossible to predict the amount of time that will be available in any 
one location. There are many uncontrollable variables that govern the possibilities 
open to the researcher. There are cultural constraints of the working hours and 
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practices of local colleagues; renewed fighting or shelling or a shift in the battle 
lines can cut a field visit very short; personal constraints of finance for time spent in 
the field and difficulties in obtaining permission for entry into the field: all these 
aspects can severely curtail the time available for gathering information (Barakat & 
Ellis, 1996). 
Further constraints on time will be imposed by the magnitude of war and its multi­
sectorial effects. In order to gather a representative cross section of information 
and to avoid the propaganda-fed bias that could come from collecting data in only 
one area, data in war should be gathered from different areas within the contlict 
affected country. This implies a series of short case studies conducted in different 
locations and reduces the amount of time free to be spent in each area. This was 
the approach taken by the researcher 13. 
One way of compensating for the possible constraints on time imposed by war is to 
devise a checklist of observations (Hamdi, 1991) that can facilitate direct 
observation. Physical indications of social processes that can be clearly seen 
through direct observation and will give an indication of the underlying situation 
(Barakat & Ellis, 1996). For example, in Barakat's study of Yemeni resettlement 
villages, he used the extent to which the settlement had been transfonned in order 
to measure the degree of acceptance of the housing (Barakat, 1992, 1993). The 
category of investigation was broken down into observable, measurable indicators, 
such as: 
• Number of occupied houses 
• Emergence of new houses self built within the settlement 
• Maintenance and modification of the housing units 
• Establishment of gardens, plots, etc. 
With such a checklist, it was possible to get an overall picture of the level of 
acceptance of the settlement purely through walking around and directly observing 
(Barakat, 1993). In a study of the success of self-settled refugees in Zambia, 
Hansen speaks ofusing indicators such as possession of white goods (refrigerators, 
etc.) and electrical equipment, furniture, vehicles, etc., to gain a visible 
measurement of income and wealth (Hansen, 1990). 
13 See Appendix A for the full list of sites visited 
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In an effort to maintain an open minded approach it is necessary for the researcher 
to be reflexive and constantly review these indicators and add or change them to 
respond to knowledge accrued of the situation on the ground (Barakat & Ellis, 
1996). The daily practice ofmaking field notes was utilised as a good opportunity 
to reflect on the gathered information and adjust the checklist accordingly_ 
To enable the maximum use to be made of every opportunity to visit a camp or 
settlement no matter how swift, the author made a checklist of physical indicators 
that could be noted during visits 14. This list was added to and amended as the time 
in the field progressed and the researcher became aware of new parameters. 
The observation checklist was especially useful where time was short and where 
there were restrictions on the use of other techniques such as interviewing. For 
example, when visiting the previously mentioned camp in Spansko, Zagreb the 
researcher walked through the camp prior to finding the camp resident committee's 
chief Access to further investigate the camp was then refused. However, the trip 
was not wasted as during the researcher's walk to find the manager certain 
indicators had been noted, which allowed comparisons to be made later on when 
the researcher visited the sister camp Spansko 2. The following extract illustrates a 
few of these indicators: 
" I arrived at Spansko 1 - a barrack of subdivided, brown wood board 
sheds with fibre cement roofing. There were strings of washing 
everywhere and women sweeping the paths between vegetable plots 
containing rows of spring cabbage. Firewood was neatly stacked 
against the units. There were many cars most of which bore the 
Vukovar licence plate. A tractor and trailer were parked by the side of 
the plot and most of the windows had lace curtains up at them." (Field 
notes, February 1995) 
The lace curtains, tidily stacked fire wood and activity of path sweeping indicate an 
effort to invest in the accommodation through making it more visually acceptable. 
The vegetable plots show investment of time and money and a drive to utilise all 
available opportunities to improve the situation. The cars bearing the Vukovar 
licences show that this is a camp of displaced persons rather than refugees and give 
a measure of the degree of retained wealth. Although only a brief section, it shows 
how a comparison can be made with Spansko 2, a camp for refugees which was 
visited after Spansko 1. Here, the firewood was thrown in piles and no attempt was 
14 See Appendix C for checklist 
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made to utilise the surrounding land for gardens or vegetable plots. The windows 
displayed not lace curtains, but rags stuffed around the frames to keep out 
draughts. There were no cars visible and rubbish and waste littered the site. The 
atmosphere was all together different 15: 
" ... we arrived [at Spansko 2] and all I could hear was loud wailing 
coming from inside one of the units. A woman who was squatting on a 
pile of firewood in the early morning sun, rushed off into the barracks 
as we approached, returning a minute later with a woman16 who 
looked tired and fed up ... " (Field notes, February 1995) 
The checklist was useful in situations of limited time but, when the occasion arose 
where more time was available, then the opportunity was taken to utilise other 
forms of data collection such as semi-structured interviews or group discussions in 
informal, familiar and secure surroundings. 
4.3.7 Limited Information 
In war, it is increasingly difficult to obtain basic information such as records or 
maps either because they have been destroyed or because they are held under 
restricted access, or in some cases, where new settlements have been constructed, 
maps have not yet been produced. A good knowledge of the situation that existed 
pre-war can address some of these issues, as can the creation of one's own maps 
and records of information while in the field utilising basic survey methods, 
sketching and photographs (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). 
Such documentation of an area can be used to serve a dual purpose. It is often the 
case that a tangible focus enables people to meet and talk more freely, as it gives 
everyone a physical process upon which to concentrate and enables relationships to 
be built across it in a non-confrontational manner (Dudley, 1993). For instance, 
when the researcher first arrived in the camp of Gasinci 17, it was found that, 
despite earlier assurances to the contrary, there was no translator and no contact 
who spoke English. The researcher had little idea of the situation as it existed but a 
need to utilise the opportunity to learn as much as possible. Thus, the researcher 
utilised the process of documentation of the camp to provide an opportunity to 
initiate contact with some of the inhabitants. 
15 These inferences will be further discussed in Chapter Seven 
1 G The camp spokeswoman 
17 The researcher stayed here for a week. living in one of the units with a nurse and her two 
daughters. 
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There was no map in existence of the camp of Gasinci at that time, so the 
researcher started to sketch one out, measuring huts and units and sketching the 
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FIg 4.2. Sketch map ofGa,~inci created by the author (Field notes, August 1994) 
Within a couple of hours, there was a small band of children assisting the 
researcher, pointing out omissions in the map and encouraging the inclusion and 
sketching of their houses (Fig 4.3). Many of the children were learning English in 
the school, and through meeting them the researcher was invited into their homes 
and introduced to their families. The disturbance caused by the group attracted the 
attention of others in the camp and in this way the researcher met Dervis Kerovic 
who had lived in the camp for a year. He could speak English and offered to help 
with interviewing some families in the camp18. In this way the camp was mapped, 
the structures recorded and much was learned about social structures and 
processes through informal and non-confrontational conversations. 
18 He and his sister also became, and continue to be good friends, and the researcher is grateful to 
them for their easy friendship and great kindness. 
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This technique of using the physical obvious show of documenting the camp was 
useful in Gasinci, however, care was taken over where else the technique was used. 
In a war, there are people who will be suspicious of seeing someone obviously 
noting structures and creating maps or sketching. It is essential that the researcher 
is sensitive to the tensions and context within which they are working or risk 
losing, at the very least, the data that they have collected and whatever freedom of 









Self-presentation while in the field is very important and it has a considerable effect 

on the type and level of data which is collected (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). 

Not only is body language important but also dress; speech and demeanour; 

travelling companions and the manner in which the researcher arrives in the field. 

In terms of dress, it is necessary to be cognisant of the type of people that will be 
spoken with and how they will respond to the way of dress. For instance, a smart 
professional appearance may assist in gaining infonnation from a government 
official, but the same appearance will severely affect the type of information given 
to the researcher by the community. In war, an innate suspicion of officials asking 
questions develops. People worry as to the potential negative consequences of 
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their statements and so will try to give what they perceive to be favourable 
answers. Conversely, in war where all are competing for scarce resources, 
informants may also view the appearance of a perceived official as a chance to try 
and improve their situation by giving an exaggerated or distorted picture of the 
conditions (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). 
People have a tendency to tell you what they think you want to hear (Chambers, 
1983; Dudley, 1993), they will categorise you from their own experience and adapt 
their information accordingly. Thus, when the researcher was working in refugee 
and displaced persons camps, very casual dress was maintained which resulted in 
more open relations and free flowing information. It also guarded, to a certain 
extent, against falsely raising people's expectations that the purpose of the visit 
was to provide money or aid or to immediately improve the situation that the 
informants were in. 
To a certain degree, it is difficult to avoid raising people's expectations. In war and 
relief situations, communities become so used to foreigners moving around their 
camps, settlements and homes identifying worthy causes for their expenditure, that 
merely by being a foreigner in the camp expectations of assistance are raised 
(Barakat & Ellis, 1996). For this reason, the researcher always tried to clarify her 
own agenda to those that were spoken with, emphasising her student status, the 
hopes for the work that was being done and the long term nature of the study. It 
has been found that outlining the reasons for the study to those that are involved 
can be beneficial (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). The researcher found that when people 
were informed that their experiences were of interest, and that it was hoped to use 
them to try to help others in similar situations, they were very willing to help. 
There was also an element of relief that someone was interested in their situation: 
"Thank you for coming - at least somebody thinks about corning to 
visit us" ( Andric family, Osijek, January 1995) 
" ... I am happy that finally someone is coming to see how we live" 
(Displaced woman in Trgovacki Dom, Osijek, August 1994) 
The way in which researchers present themselves to the informants in terms of 
demeanour is crucial. It is very important to try and be sensitive to both the culture 
in which the researcher is working and to respect the pride and dignity of the 
people (Barakat & Ellis, 1996; Chambers, 1983). Understanding the culture and 
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traditions and the social structure is not only respectful, but can offer opportunities 
for learning. For example in Yemen, joining the men " ... chewing qatt; the local 
substitute for alcohoL." provides "...good occasions to question and listen". 
(Barakat, 1993). In Croatia and Bosnia, the ritual of brewing and drinking coffee 
provided the perfect opportunity for talking informally and learning in a casual 
environment through story telling. 
The way that the researcher chooses to arrive in a given research field can also 
affect the type of data that they then receive. In war, it is often the case that the 
only people who can get access into and out of certain places are the aid agencies 
or the military. Whilst getting transport with one of these groups may be beneficial 
in getting physically to the field, arriving in the community, settlement or camp in a 
jeep emblazoned with an agency logo or with military plates, will result in 
informants associating you with that group and consequently providing biased 
data. In order to guard against such bias, when the author did get lifts with 
members of the UNHCR, the vehicle was parked away from the research site and 
the remaining distance was covered on foot. This was especially important in 
Croatia, as many people mistakenly believe that UNHCR is a subsidiary of the 
openly despised UNPROFOR19, and it was thought that this could jeopardise the 
progress of the research or adversely affect the data that was received. 
4.3.9 Translation 
If the researcher has to operate through a translator, it is essential that they are of a 
similar disposition and degree of understanding. It is counter-productive for the 
researcher to try to dress and act in a sensitive manner if the translator is not doing 
likewise. 
In one situation, one of the author's translators appeared for work dressed in a suit 
and tie, and prior to entering the house into which he and the researcher had been 
invited, said, 
"...don't touch anything, don't eat anything and don't accept a drink ­
everything is dirty." (Field notes, January 1995) 
19 A fact evidenced many times by the graffiti we found scrawled in the dirt of the jeep when we 
returned to it after interviews. 
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An attitude such as this can be easily read by those being interviewed and is 
insulting as well as potentially detrimental to the research. It takes a lot of work on 
the behalf of the researcher to undo the damage that it causes in the interview 
situation. 
The best translators were those who came from the refugee or displaced 
community themselves, as they were recognised by those being interviewed and 
were sympathetic and understanding to the informants. They also gave the 
researcher an opportunity to talk freely with the translators themselves about their 
own expenences: 
" ... Vesna turned out to be an architect as well. She was from Sarajevo 
and spoke excellent English. It was a relief to be able to talk to 
someone fluently without the encumbrance of a translator ... " (Field 
notes, January 1995) 
4.3.10 Impartiality 
All researchers come into a research setting carrymg their own constructed 
ideological baggage; concepts and assumptions about a situation that are 
idiosyncratic. This is even more relevant in a war that has been extensively covered 
by inevitably biased media reporting. It is difficult to avoid collecting data that fits 
into a preconceived notion of the situation. It is also incredibly difficult to remain 
impartial and to retain an analytical standpoint when directly faced with the 
suffering caused by war. Sitting and talking with the victims of rape or with those 
who have been maimed or lost members of their family, deeply affects the 
researcher. It is impossible, and undesirable, for the researcher to try and remain 
unaffected and unresponsive to such suffering or even to remain neutral. However, 
the researcher should endeavour to retain a degree of balance by consciously trying 
to gather information from all sides and all levels to present an impartial picture 
(Barakat & Ellis, 1996). 
To travel the field looking, listening and learning from all possible sides and 
sources and constantly assessing the viewpoint is the closest the researcher can 
come to impartiality when working in a war situation. Thus, an open minded and 
reflexive approach was maintained allowing the author to constantly address and 
adjust her perspective. 
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4.3.11 Stress 
A final consideration is the importance of researchers being aware of the stress that 
both they and the informants are under. It is important to accept that sometimes 
the trauma experienced by the informants may mean that they will not participate in 
any form of questioning, conversation or investigation. When informants are as 
heavily traumatised as refugees from war, the researcher should have the sensitivity 
to respect their needs and not to force the situation by asking questions. In this 
case, if necessary, the researcher should fall back on other data collection 
techniques, such as direct observation, rather than persistent questioning. 
Where the researcher is conducting interviews with the survivors of war, they 
should also be aware of the potential effects on themselves. Constant and intense 
exposure to the horror of war and the terror experienced by its survivors have a 
deep effect. The nightly catharsis of writing field notes was found to help in 
controlling the extremes of emotion that experiencing war and listening to account 
after account of suffering and violence can bring (Barakat & Ellis, 1996). 
4.4 LEARNING TOOLS 
Throughout the study, attendance at conferences and workshops and the 
dissemination of the research findings among others in the field, were important 
components in keeping the research directed and relevant. Additionally, valuable 
information, not available through the literature, was obtained from attending 
conferences and workshops and this helped in directing and focusing the study. 
Of primary importance in directing the study was the author's attendance at the 
"First International Workshop on Improved Shelter Response and Environment for 
Refugees", which was held in Geneva in June 1993 by UNHCR. The workshop 
was convened because UNHCR recognised from the actions undertaken in the 
Gulf region and the forrner-Yugoslavia, that they were acting in a new arena, 
assistance now being needed in war-torn, developed nations with cold climates. 
This presented a set of circumstances far removed from their conventional field of 
activities in developing nations with " ... warm or moderate climatic conditions" 
(UNHCR, 1993). They were also finding that the sequence and scale of 
emergencies" ... prohibited in-depth analysis" (UNHCR, 1993). 
This workshop established an overwhelming need to examine the actions and 
projects ofthe humanitarian community in cold climate, developed nations affected 
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by war, in order to distil lessons that could be disseminated back into the 
international relief community to improve response. It is for this reason, that the 
research presented in this thesis focuses on the Republic of Croatia. Being a war­
torn developed nation with a cold climate it offers a perfect arena for study of the 
new problems facing the international humanitarian community. 
The findings developed during the research process were disseminated among 
those working in the field to test their applicability and accuracy. This was first 
done at the "Settlement Reconstruction in Croatia Workshop" held in Dubrovnik 
from the 12-16 September 1994 by the Study Centre for Reconstruction and 
Development and the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University 
of York. The author's contribution was a paper entitled "An Evaluation of Shelter 
Projects for Displaced Persons and Refugees in Croatia" (Ellis, 1994). This 
presentation was made during the last week of the first period of data collection in 
the field and thus enabled the author to gain valuable feedback from the 
participants on the initial findings of the research. It gave the author the 
opportunity to share her initial findings with a local and international audience. It 
also helped in establishing contacts for the second stage of data collection 20. 
The "Emergency Planning Conference '95", held in Lancaster in July 1995, 
provided another opportunity for the author to check the findings of the research 
within the humanitarian community. The author's paper was entitled "Issues in the 
Planning of Emergency Accommodation for Refugees and Displaced Persons 
Residing in the Republic of Croatia" (Ellis, 1995). This conference also presented 
the opportunity to gain up-to-date and first hand information on some natural 
disasters such as the Kobe Earthquake (Hayashi & Kawata, 1995) and these have 
been used to inform other sections of this thesis. 
Of the most use to the researcher was the international workshop that was 
instigated and organised by the researcher together with Dr Sultan Barakat of the 
Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York. This 
workshop held in October 1995 in Luton was structured so as to permit the 
findings of the research to be discussed and debated by the assembled participants. 
Invited attendants at the workshop were members of the ODPR, representatives of 
aid agencies working with shelter projects in Croatia, academics and professionals 
20 This workshop was attcndcd not only by many international experts but also by many members 
of the ODPR and representatives ofthe Croatian Red Cross and the UNHCR in Croatia. 
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specialising in the field of shelter for refugees and shelter in war, social scientists 
and shelter manufacturers and suppliers. As well as presenting one of the overview 
papers that initiated the workshop and outlined the findings of the research project 
(Ellis, 1995a), the author also directed the working groups so that discussion 
ranged over: 
• 	 The types of shelter provision and their effects on the recipient communities and 
host communities 
• 	 The existence oflinkages between relief and development I reconstruction 
• 	 Possibilities for implementing developmental relief in a war environment 
Through the discussion of these topics it was possible to subject the findings of the 
research to peer review and thus determine their accuracy, strengths and 
weaknesses 21. 
As a final method of validating both the findings of the research and the 
methodology used to support it, the author has produced two refereed papers, co­
authored with Dr Sultan Barakat. Of these papers, one outlines the findings of the 
research: 
"From Relief to Development: The Long Tenn Effects of 'Temporary' 
Accommodation on Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Republic of Croatia" 
and the other the methodology used for data collection in war 22: 
"Researching under Fire: Issues for Consideration when Collecting Data and 
Information in War Circumstances, with Specific Reference to Relief and 
Reconstruction Projects" 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
By way of a conclusion to this chapter, some general lessons have been distilled 
from the text. It is understood that no two situations are identical and thus there is 
little point in trying to make firm rules and regulations governing the actions of the 
researcher in war. However, it would seem that in view of the paucity of 
21 The findings of this workshop and a list of participants are contained in Appendix D 
22 These papers have been refereed by the panel of Disasters journal and appear in the June 1996 
issue. 
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information covering this area, it would be beneficial to those researchers who also 
work in the environment of war to try to suggest some guidelines. 
• 	 Flexibility and innovation in approach to data collection are important 
• 	 Collaboration with a partner in the field aids access and progress when in the 
research setting. 
• 	 Care needs to be taken with the way in which researchers present themselves 
when entering the research setting and when conducting the data collection 
• 	 Extensive preparation prior to entering the field is beneficial 
• 	 Looking and listening, rather than simply questioning, can avoid inciting fear 
and suspicion and increasing suffering 
• 	 Keeping fixed appointments to a minimum gives flexibility to utilise unforeseen 
opportunities and maximise the potential for chance learning 
• 	 Creation of a checklist of physical indicators of underlying social structures can 
facilitate fast information gathering when time is short 
• 	 Reflexivity and maintaining an open mind helps to achieve impartiality 
• 	 Sensitivity to the culture and the people encountered during research IS 
important 
• 	 Autonomy and independence stop the researcher becoming an added burden on 
the community 
• 	 Talking with a broad range of people in many locations can assist in balancing 
the propaganda 
• 	 Awareness of the dangers of war - land mines, snipers, increased levels of 
suspicion, etc., is crucial for maintaining personal safety. Unplanned actions can 
jeopardise the safety of the researcher and others. 
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• 	 It is important to realise when enough is enough and not get so obsessed by the 
process of data collection that harm or offence is caused to the community or 
the suffering of others is increased 
• 	 Subjecting the research findings to the analysis of others in the field focuses and 
refines the research 
The following four chapters in Section Two of this thesis, will outline the results 
obtained from the use of these research methods and means of data collection 
while in the field. 
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LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 

CHAPTER FIVE: THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
5.1.1 Structure 
This chapter serves to introduce the case study material by providing essential 
background knowledge of the last years of the former-Yugoslavia. To analyse and 
understand the underlying motivations behind shelter programmes and the policies 
and decisions that underpin them, it is necessary to have a basic knowledge of the 
machinations of the war and its peripheral effects. 
To this end, the chapter begins by describing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's 
slide into war and continues by outlining the main characters in the war, the shifts 
in allegiance and the history of phenomena such as the UNPAs (United Nations 
Protected Areas). This first section of the chapter does not attempt to provide a full 
chronology of the war in the post-Yugoslav countries. However, it does present 
certain key facts that the author feels have directly affected the development of the 
refugee and displaced person situation, and hence the shelter policies and 
programmes in Croatia. 
The second section of the chapter presents the quantitative data which describes 
the size of the refugees and displaced persons' community and its population 
characteristics; the finance required to support such a community and the range of 
shelter programmes implemented to address their needs and requirements. Such 
descriptions contribute to inform the discussions and analysis contained within 
Chapter Six and Chapter Seven. 
5.1.2 The Current Situation 
At the time of writing, the Dayton Agreement has just been signed and with the 
exception of some Serbian activities in Sarajevo and Croatian activities in the 
Mostar area, the agreement seems to be holding 1. It appears that the bitter war of 
the past five years is over and it is now time for the refugees and displaced persons 
1 The Dayton Agreement is a peace deal between the three main warring parties, brokered by the 
United States of America in the Autmnn of 1995. It was drawn up in Dayton, Ohio. 
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to return to their homes. The level of destruction evident within Croatia and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina leads one to question how this return will be accomplished. 
Current news reports suggest that the ethnic cleansing which has taken place over 
the past five years, ensures that the return of some to their homes will mean the 
expulsion of others. 
A journey through Bosnia-Hercegovina, or the once occupied territories of the 
Republic of Croatia, shows clearly the intensity of the physical destruction left in 
the wake of the war. The profusion of nationalistic graffiti daubed on the walls of 
remaining structures demonstrates the intensity of emotion, hatred and deep seated 
fear still felt by all sides. Slogans such as "Free Bosnia or Death", "Samo Sloga 
Srbina Spasava" ("Only Unity can Save the Serb")2 or representations of the 
chequered shield of Croatia are all clearly seen around the damaged and destroyed 
towns and villages of the post-Yugoslav countries. Orthodox churches, mosques 
and catholic churches, physical symbols of the religious affiliations of the Serbs, 
Muslims and Croats have been shelled and burnt, demonstrating the essential 
conflicts between the factions. In Serb held areas, Croat and Muslim houses have 
either been destroyed or taken over by Serbs; in Croat areas the surviving 
residences of Serbs provide shelter for Croat and Muslim refugees and displaced. 
The economies of Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia, afflicted by hyper­
inflation and structural refonns prior to the war, have now been destroyed by the 
five years of conflict. 
In this environment of destruction, millions of refugees and displaced persons who 
have spent the years of the war in exile in either post-Yugoslavian or third 
countries such as USA, Germany, Sweden and Norway need to return home. The 
investment required for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of these people's lives 
and livelihoods, and the Yugoslavian countries that once supported them, will 
require immense financial and physical inputs both internationally and nationally. It 
has recently been estimated that it will require US$5 billion to 'kick start' the 
Bosnian economy alone and that even this amount will last only three months 
(Elliott, 1996). Simultaneously, the level of emergency aid that keeps the refugees 
2 A slogan that is represented by the Serb icon of the symmetrical cross marked with four Cyrillic 
S's (c's in the Latin alphabet), the two left hand ones being mirror images of those on the right 
(I) 
ill 
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and displaced persons alive, wann and fed in the camps and settlements throughout 
the former-Yugoslavia will need to continue. The level of social welfare support 
must also increase as people start to return and try to rebuild their homes and lives. 
Has the way in which relief assistance was provided during the war anticipated and 
provided for this return of diaspora communities? Has the emergency aid addressed 
the longer tenn rehabilitation and reconstruction requirements that would follow 
the establishment of peace, or have projects been concerned only with the short 
tenn needs of the population? To attempt to answer such questions it is necessary 
first to establish the origin, nature and driving force behind the refugee and 
displaced person population. 
5.2 THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA 
5.2.1 The Interregnum: 1980 - 1988 
The interregnum opened with Tito's death in May 1980 and so began Yugoslavia's 
slide into self-destruction. His death caused genuine grief, which would have 
intensified had there been foreknowledge of the events to come: 
"We all cried, but we did not know we were burying Yugoslavia" 
(Silber & Little, 1995, p. xxvii)3 
To govern in his wake, Tito left in place a collective leadership which came to 
power on the 4th May 1980. This collective federal Presidency was made up of 
equal representation from the six component republics4 and two autonomous 
provinces5 of Yugoslavia, and was lead on a rotational basis by each of the 
representatives (Crnobrnja, 1994; Silber & Little, 1995) (Fig 5.1). This presidency 
was an attempt to maintain and promote equitable relations between the disparate 
ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. Knowledge of the ethno-nationalistic conflicts in 
Yugoslavia during World War Two, had impressed upon Tito that such a 
presidency was the only viable solution to the preservation of a unified Yugoslavia 
(Glenny, 1992). 
This federal presidency endeavoured to create the public impression that, following 
the death of Tito nothing had changed, that Yugoslavia was still viable and stable. 
3 A statement made by one ethnic Albanian Communist functionary 
4 Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro 
5 Kosovo and Vojvodina were nominally parts of Serbia but practically were politically equal and 
in possession of full representation on the Federation 
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They rode on the back of Tito' s reputation and failed to deal with the burgeoning 
economic and political undercurrents (Crnobrnja, 1994) . 
Fig 5.1. The I'ederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Source: Silber & Little, 1995) 
By the time of Tito's death, Yugoslavia was already in the grips of an economic 
crisis which had started in earnest in 1979. The problem was hidden from the 
Yugoslav public, the state bodies and the Party, but by 1980, foreign debt stood at 
US$18 billion and the trade deficit for that year alone was US$3. 5 billion. The 
economic problems were deep rooted in the policies of the previous twenty years, 
with their emphasis on industrial processes entirely dependent on imported raw 
materials, purchased using hard Western currency, and an extractive industry that 
was systematically neglected. There was simultaneously, no investment In 
agriculture, transport, energy production or health care (Cmobrnja, 1994). 
By 1981, the social, political and economic inequalities were producing high levels 
of frustration among the population. Frustrations that blew up in Kosovo, where 
there was a major student riot against the social conditions at the University. The 
riot left eleven dead and was widely televised and publicised. 
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By 1984, Yugoslavians were experiencing rationing of petrol, electricity, sugar and 
flour. The commission that had been set up by the presidency to stabilise the 
economy in 1982, had spent two years doing little more than tinkering with the 
problem. There was no attempt to tackle the problems of social ownership that 
were seen to be fuelling the crisis. Indeed, the commission seemed only to serve to 
divide the presidency and bring nationalist concerns to the agenda (Crnobrnja, 
1994). 
As the political leaders of the republics began to gam strength, they found 
themselves trying to explain a developing economic crisis to their people without 
blaming systematic causes, as to do so would involve self blame. The popular 
solution was to blame others. Croatia and Slovenia complained of the support they 
had to give to the less-developed republics, who in turn complained of terms of 
trade that favoured the developed republics. As two separate commissions failed to 
solve the problems of Yugoslavia, and the allegations between republics of who 
was to blame increased, it became obvious that the presidency could no longer hide 
behind the facade of the Titoist model. Radical changes would have to be made to 
endeavour to prevent the increasingly nationalistic tendencies overtaking 
Yugoslavia. 
Such reforms were shouldered by the Croatian Federal Prime Minister Ante 
Markovic who took office in 1989 at a time when inflation stood at 2000 per cent 
per annum. He attempted to bring economics to the centre stage, to consolidate the 
economic situation in order to create a platform for deeper social changes and 
overcome the increasing attractiveness of nationalistic solutions. In a package of 
reforms the Dinar (FRY national currency) was linked to the German Mark; 
imports were liberalised creating increased competition for the domestic market 
thus forcing poor producers to close down or improve. A large scale privatisation 
plan was set in place that radically changed the ownership structure. The reforms 
did start to significantly improve the situation, within a short time the inflation fell 
back to 60 per cent per annum and price increases were almost nil by 1990. To 
many his policies were seen to be in place too late - Yugoslavia was already 
deemed to be ungovernable (Crnobrnja, 1994). Reforms of policies controlling the 
finance of the JNA and the determination of wage rates ultimately thwarted 
MarkoviC's attempts at reform. The discussion that raged over these two issues 
within the presidency provided the forum for the republics and provinces to begin 
to differentiate their positions. Increasingly, national concerns were voiced by the 
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representatives and the confrontations and disputes within the Yugoslav federation 
grew. 
5.2.2 The Rise of the Land of Mordor: the Campaign for Greater Serbia6 
By 1987, the ethnic and national element of the crisis in Yugoslavia was clearly 
visible and publicised by the press. In their documentation of the death of 
Yugoslavia, Silber and Little lay the kindling of Serbian Nationalistic tendencies at 
the door of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts whose memorandum 
cataloguing national grievances was published in a mass-circulation daily, Vecernje 
Novosti (Silber & Little, 1995). In the document, it was alleged that Serbs had been 
in an unjust position since World War Two and that their very existence was 
threatened. It was stated that they were politically and economically discriminated 
against by the Croatians and Slovenes and that those in Kosovo faced total 
genocide (Silber & Little, 1995). Extracts of the memorandum published in the 
paper accused Croatia and Slovenia of conspiring against Serbia and stated that: 
" ... Serbs in Croatia have never been as endangered as they are today. 
The resolution of their national status must be a top priority political 
question." (Silber & Little, 1995, p30). 
The memorandum tapped a vein of concern endemic throughout Serbia, further, it 
gave courage and force to a Kosovan Serb protest group that had established in the 
months after an uprising of ethnic Albanians in 1981. By 1987, the message of the 
memorandum had taken root among the Serbian population of Yugoslavia. To 
dispel tensions in Kosovo, the Serbian President, Ivan Stambolic, was invited to 
Kosovo for talks with the local leaders. In a miscalculation that cost him his career, 
Stambolic sent Slobodan Milosevic 7 in his place to calm the Serbs and reinforce 
the Albanian leaders. 
On the day of the meeting, a crowd of Kosovan Serbs, inspired that Belgrade was 
taking notice of their perceived plight, gathered outside the meeting room. Through 
incitement, the protesters became violent, throwing rocks at the police and the 
building. In the hope of quietening the crowd, the Albanian President of Kosovo 
asked Milosevic to speak to them and calm them. The speech was to set the future 
for Yugoslavia: 
6 By 1991, foreign journalists were calling Serbia the land of Mordor. A reference to J. R. R. 

Tolkien's " ... dark vision of a fallen kingdom" (Glenny, 1992). 

7 Milosevic was leader of the Serbian Communist Party in 1987 
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"No one should dare to beat you. You should stay here. This is your 
land. These are your houses. Your meadows and gardens. Your 
memories. You shouldn't abandon your land just because it's difficult 
to live, because you are pressured by injustice and degradation. It was 
never part of the Serbian character to give up in the face of obstacles, 
to demobilise when it is time to fight ... you should stay here for the 
sake of your ancestors and dependants. Otherwise your ancestors 
would be defiled and descendants disappointed. But I don't suggest 
that you stay, endure, and tolerate a situation you're not satisfied with. 
On the contrary, you should change it with the rest of the progressive 
people here, in Serbia and in Yugoslavia." Slobodan Milosevi6, 24 
April 1987, as quoted in (Silber & Little, 1995, p 37). 
The Serbian political structure was set to change and Milosevic saw the power to 
do it in the Serbian people. In a series of manipulated meetings, controlled press 
releases and media reports, Milosevic ensured the destruction of Ivan Stambolic as 
president of Serbia. By January 1988, the interregnum that had opened with Tito's 
death, closed when Milosevic became the undisputed leader of Serbia. 
5.2.3 1988-1995: The Death of Yugoslavia 
By the Summer of 1989, Milosevi6's nationalistic campaign had reached a peak. In 
the Serbian press, the Knin area of Croatia was openly being referred to as 
"Krajina", and the head of the Croatian Communist League was increasingly called 
"Ustasa" (the term for the Croatian fascists of World War Two) In Krajina, retired 
army generals and politicians from Serbia were fostering armed rebellion against 
the Croatian party. The force of Serbia had already overthrown the authorities of 
Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro. In an attempt to retain its authority, at the 
December 1989 congress, the Croatian Party followed Slovenia and opted for 
multi-party elections the following spring. 
When the elections came, Franjo Tudman and his party HDZ (Croatian Democratic 
Union) won the poll. Tudman was a nationalist and like Milosevi6 built his power 
on mobilising his people. The taunts and operations ofMiloseviC's men in Croatia, 
provoked Croatian nationalist pride and opened the way for Tudman. However, the 
ethnic mix of Croatia and the encitement ofthe Knin Serbs would not make his job 
easy. Prior to the war the areas now known as United Nations Protected Areas had 
a Serbian majority in population terms (Figs 5.2 and 5.3). 
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Fig 5.2. Serb populous areas 0/Croatia prior to the war - areas which later 
became three a/the/our UNPAs (source: ODPR, 1995) 
It was in these areas that the Serbs mobilised to gain independence from Croatia: 
"It has not occurred to us to dispute the right of the Croatian Nation to 
secede from Yugoslavia, if that nation decides of its own free will in a 
referendum ... but I want to make it completely clear that it should not 
occur to anyone that a part of the Serbian nation will be allowed to go 
with them. Because the history of the Serbian nation in the 
Independent State of Croatia is too tragic to risk such a fate again" 
Milosevi6 speaking to Belgrade Student Rally, March 1991, quoted in 
(Silber & Little, 1995, p142) 
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MUNICIP ALITY NATIONAL STRUCTURE (1991) 
CROATS SERBS MUSLIMS 
Benkovac 13553 18986 25 
Donji Lapac 44 7854 22 
Dvor 1395 12591 31 
Glina 8041 13975 62 
Knin 3886 37888 31 
Kostajnica 4295 9343 119 
Obrovac 3761 7572 15 
Titova Korenica 1996 8585 93 
Vojni6 116 7366 436 
Vq~inmost 4043 11729 123 
FIg 5.3. National structure ofSerb populous areas ofCroatia (50urce: 1991 

National Censlls data) 

Both Slovenia and Croatia wanted secession from Yugoslavia. Each had held 
referendums in 1990 which had left little doubt that the populations wanted 
independence from Yugoslavia. For Slovenia, the decision was relatively simple, 
Milosevi6 had already made it clear that he would not fight to keep them in 
Yugoslavia, by June 1990 they were ready to move. For Croatia however, the 
decision was harder; the trouble in the Knin area and in Eastern Slavonia, the 
boycotting of the referendum by the Krajina Serbs and the knowledge that 
Milosevi6 would use Croatian secession to enforce a redrawing of the borders of 
Croatia to give the Krajina Serbs autonomy, made the decision more difficult. 
Slovenia declared independence on 25 June 1991, the Serbs put up little resistance. 
The JNA, the Serb controlled Yugoslav People's Army, did move into Slovenia. 
However, the conflict was brief and Slovenia was only at war for ten days. 
During the Summer of 1991, the Krajina Serb forces steadily extended the 
territories that they held in Croatia. Whole communities moved from these 
territories overnight during this undeclared war. The Dalmatian coast became full 
of the displaced and dispossessed. The Croatian National Guard, despite the 
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numbers ofvolunteers, were ill-equipped and ill-prepared and could do little to stop 
the advance of these lNA backed troops. 
In August 1991, simultaneous attacks on Kijevo in Krajina and Vukovar in 
Slavonia, left Croatia in little doubt that it was now at war. All JNA barracks in 
Croatia were besieged by the Croatian Guard, barricades erected and windows 
sandbagged. Fighting erupted in a broad arc around the territories that the Serbs 
had taken. These territories represented between one quarter and one third of 
Croatia and were linked by Serb held corridors through Bosnia. 
By the autumn of 1991, the United Nations had become drawn into the conflict. 
Cyrus Vance presented the UN peacekeeping operation on December 11th 1991 as 
an annex to the report of the Secretary General. The peacekeeping force 
(UNPROFOR) was proposed to create " ... conditions for peace and security, 
essential for the negotiation of a complete solution to the crisis" (Baletic, 1994). In 
Croatia, UNPROFOR mobilised to protect the four regions of Serb-occupied 
territory: UNP A North, South, East and West. As the war started to rage in 
Bosnia, the situation in Croatia grew calmer and by mid-May 1992, UNPROFOR 
were installed in the UNP As. 
5.2.4 Refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina 
By April 1992, the war had spread into Bosnia-Hercegovina, causing the largest 
movement of refugees and internally displaced persons yet witnessed in the conflict. 
While all wars produce refugees and displaced persons, it was estimated that by the 
end of 1993, the conflict in Yugoslavia had produced 4.2 million, that is one fifth of 
the pre-war population of Yugoslavia (Klein, 1994) and one fifth of the total 
number of refugees in the world. The largest displacement occurred in the first six 
months of 1993 as the war intensified in Bosnia-Hercegovina (Klein, 1994). By 
April 1993, the war was no longer Serb against Croat and Serb against Muslim. 
After a winter of tension, the Croats and Bosnian Muslims started to fight each 
other, a situation that endured until the US brokered Croat-Muslim Federation was 
formed in February 1994. Tensions began in the Croatian populous areas of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, which under the control ofMate Boban, became the Croatian 
state ofHerceg-Bosna. For the Bosnian Muslim refugees who had already fled into 
Croatia to seek sanctuary, this new tum of events caused further problems and 
increased tensions between the groups of displaced Croatians and Bosnian Muslim 
refugees. 
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Since 1992, the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina had caused thousands to 
flee from the North and centre of Bosnia. Their escape route was either to the 
Croatian Dalmatian coast around Split, or up into the Croatian capital Zagreb and 
areas of Slavonia. Croatia was already caring for thousands of displaced persons 
who had moved in 1991. Now, in the Summer of 1992, Croatia announced that it 
could take no more refugees and requested help from the international community. 
The effects of Croatia's ban on refugees meant that Bosnian Muslims still trapped 
in Bosnia, with no escape into Croatia, now had to flee across Bosnia into 
government held areas. By April 1993, the UN had been pushed into a position 
where they had to take some action to protect or evacuate the growing numbers of 
displaced persons held within Bosnia. Starting with Srebrenica, they established 
'safe areas', and thus the international community finally committed themselves ­
morally if not practically - to the protection of one side against another. 
However, the mandate that governed these areas, that combined elements of peace 
keeping and peace enforcement, meant ultimately that the areas were highly 
vulnerable to attack (Silber & Little, 1995). In the end, these safe areas assisted in 
the process of ethnic cleansing, gathering as they did Muslims together in one area, 
until the Serb forces were ready to move, surround and attack the areas, as 
witnessed in Srebrenica in 1995. 
Thus, at the time of the first field visit into Croatia in August 1994, the situation 
stood as follows: 
• 	 The Croatian - Bosnian Muslim conflict of 1993 was over and the federation had 
been in place for six months 
• 	 UNHCR was in place as the lead agency, controlling and co-ordinating all 
activities of international aid agencies in the post-Yugoslav countries 
• 	 The Republic of Croatia was host to 198,230 displaced persons (from the 
occupied territories of Croatia) and 190,772 refugees (Muslims and Croats from 
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia) 
• 	 The United Nations Protection Force was in place in the UNPAs maintaining a 
tenuous peace in the Serbian occupied territories within Croatia 
• 	 One quarter of Croatian territory was occupied, effectively disabling 
infrastructure connections between the North and the South of the country 
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5.2.5 Why Study Croatia? 
Croatia is highly representative of the new field of action for the humanitarian 
community. The war here reflects the shift, as discussed in Chapter Two, from inter 
to intra-state and thus has constructed civilians as the prime victims. Aid has to be 
provided to civilians located within a country still at war and thus subject to 
scarcity of resources and widespread destruction. The level of intervention by the 
international community ofaid agencies, humanitarian organisations and donors has 
been incredibly high. The environment within which they are working is one of high 
nationalistic feeling and political prejudice. These aspects conjoin to make Croatia 
the ideal arena for study. Thus, an analysis of the way projects and policies are 
implemented by the international community is essential to improve future action 
and intervention in other similarly affected countries. 
The amount of emergency aid and relief to the refugees and displaced persons 
within the post-Yugoslav countries over the past five years by both the 
international community and the host countries has been immense. UNHCR figures 
for March 1994 show that there were 3,766,000 refugees and displaced persons 
residing within the former Yugoslavia (UNHCR, 1994a) all requiring support, 
532,000 in Croatia, 2,740,000 in Bosnia and Hercegovina and 301,000 in Serbia. In 
the same report, aid to Bosnia and Hercegovina through UNHCR is shown to 
measure 22,475 million tonnes of food and non-food items during the month of 
February 1994. Croatia, received 9,357 million tonnes over the same period, 
Serbia 3,126. Thus, for a country bearing only one fifth of the number of refugees 
and displaced persons that Bosnia-Hercegovina hosts, Croatia receives a far higher 
degree of international assistance. Much of this anomaly may well be explained by 
the ease with which affected communities can be accessed in Croatia as compared 
to Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, regardless of the reason for this bias, it is this 
high level of international aid going into Croatia and the variety of international 
shelter relief projects being undertaken there, that make it an appropriate case for 
study. 
5.3 THE CROATIAN CONTEXT 
In August 1994, the Republic was host to 379,908 registered refugees and 
displaced persons (representing 8.86 per cent of the domicile population). The laws 
governing the rights and care of these groups were set up in 1991 by the Croatian 
Government, with the passing ofthe Regulation ofthe Status ofDisplaced Persons, 
which was later amended in October 1993 to the Law of the Status of Displaced 
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Persons and Refugees (ODPR, 1995). These laws state that registered displaced 
persons and refugees are entitled to: 
• 	 necessary accommodation 
• 	 nutrition 
• 	 financial allowance (depending on the type of accommodation and the height of 
individual income) 
• 	 assistance in psycho-social adaptation 
• 	 education of children 
• 	 health protection (refugees are only entitled to receIve free primary and 
emergency health care) 
• 	 humanitarian aid 
• 	 assistance in satisfying other vital needs 
At the height of the displaced person's crisis in November 1991, the Government 
of the Republic of Croatia established the Office for Displaced Persons and 
Refugees to care for the needs of the forced migrants. 
The ODPR estimates that the costs of caring for its refugee and displaced 
population run to US$528 million annually (ODPR, 1995) with accommodation 
costs accounting for US$203 million per annum. This financial burden is met by the 
state budget, the UNHCR and other donations (Fig 5.4). Those refugees and 
displaced persons accommodated in hotels cost the Croatian government 6.7 
German Marks per person per day (US$140 per month) for room and full board 8 
and US$210 per person per month for those in the camps and settlements 
(Mossberg, et al., 1994). 
The size of this economic drain is hard to bear for a country whose economy is 
simultaneously being destroyed by war. In 1991, Croatia's GNP decreased by 23.4 
per cent and by the same amount again in 1992 (Baletie, 1994). During the war 
approximately 30 per cent of the industry has been destroyed, 1,870 kilometres of 
main roads have been disrupted by the occupation of territories and the rail 
network covering two thirds of the territory has been paralysed. It is estimated that 
12 per cent of the housing stock has been destroyed and damaged, a figure that 
8 Whilst the hotels are full of refugees and displaced there is no chance to resume the tourism 
trade. Many hotel managers are pushing to have their hotels freed from providing 
accommodation. However it is estimated that it will cost between US$1000-2000 per bed to 
renovate the hotels. 
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II - DONATIONS 
81% 13% 5% l~o 
Fig 5.4. Financial burden ofaccommodation costs carried by organisations in 

Croatia during 199-1 (.<jource: ODPR, 1995) 

In June 1995, ODPR data shows 389,002 registered refugees and displaced 
persons, returnees and refugees in transit in the Republic of Croatia 9 (the latter 
two categories are distinctly in the minority, with only 4,061 returnees and 4,525 
refugees in transit) . Since May 1994, the total has started to rise steadily again due 
to refugees being sent back to Croatia from the third countries where they had 
temporary resident status. 56,000 Croatian Nationals are due to return to the 
Republic from third countries. 
Of the total numbers of refugees and displaced currently in Croatia, 78.52 per cent 
(305,449) are living in private accommodation. The remaining 21.48 per cent 
(83,553) are in organised accommodation (ODPR, 1995). Of the total number of 
registered individuals, 198,230 are displaced persons and 190,772 refugees. Both 
are reasonable evenly distributed in the private accommodation, though in the 
organised accommodation, displaced persons have the majority of places (Fig 5.5). 
9 Between August 14 and September 21 1995, the number rose rapidly again to 406,173 due to 
increasing intensity of ethnic cleansing in areas of Banja Luka and Vojvodina. Of these, 21,750 
were accommodated in organised accommodation. 
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TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION REFUGEES DISPLACED PERSONS 
Organised 30, 845 (36%) 52, 708 (64%) 
Private 159, 927 (52.3%) 145, 522 (47.7%) 
Fig 5.5. Breakdown ofnumbers ofrefugees and displaced persons in different 
accommodation types (source: ODPR, 1995) 
The largest numbers of refugees and displaced persons are located in the Zagreb 
region followed by the Osijek area of Eastern Slavonia. The distributions of 
refugees and displaced persons correspond closely to the areas of occupied 
territory and the escape routes from Bosnia-Hercegovina previously mentioned 
(Fig 5.6). 








Fig 5. 6. Occupied territories in Croatia and the UNPAs, the distribution of 
refugees and displaced persons corresponds to the areas ofoccupied territory 
(.<Jource: Jean, 1995) 
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5.3.1 Basic Typology of Accommodation Types for Displaced Persons and 
Refugees 
Private accommodation covers those families that are staying either with host 
families (20 per cent) or are living independently, which is broken down into those 
who have their own accommodation and pay rent; those who have their rent paid 
by an organisation; those living alone without paying rent, for example, in a 
summer cottage, and those who are illegally squatting in empty housing or on 
vacant land (Mossberg, et ai., 1994). Costs for those living in host families are 
largely met by the host family. This has resulted in the creation of a large number of 
'social cases' who also require financial assistance from the Croatian government. 
In fact, there are now more social cases requiring assistance than refugees or 
displaced persons in private accommodation (Fig 5.7). 
BENEFICIARIES NUMBERS 
displaced persons 186,005 
refugees 192,614 
social cases 237,408 
Fig 5. 7. Target beneficiaries living in private accommodation, January 1994 
(source: Mossberg, et at, 1994) 
There are 597 camps, settlements and centres that are termed 'organised 
accommodation' in Croatia. There are two basic types; those interchangeably called 
camps, settlements or villages (the terminology used usually depends on the 
affiliations of the speaker) and collective centres. Camps, settlements or villages 
are defined as accommodation that has been specifically newly built for use by 
refugees and displaced persons. The camps most usually consist of small, 
prefabricated, 'temporary' buildings located en masse on a flat site. Camps of this 
nature that will be discussed in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven are Cepin, Rokovci 
and Karlovac (Figs 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10) which were constructed by the GTZ and 
Kutina. which was built, and is still managed, by the DRC (Fig 5.11). Gasinci is also 
defined as a camp, but is of a slightly different origin in that it was originally an 
army barracks. Within its boundaries there are the original army huts as well as 
newly provided prefabricated units of two basic types (Fig 5.12). The other variant 
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on the basic camp is that of Micevac which is of a more 'permanent' nature and 
thus constructed of concrete breeze blocks (Fig 5.l3). It was designed and 
primarily financed by the ODPR and intended to provide accommodation for 
orphans or students once the displaced population return to their original homes. 
Nasele Prijatelstva, Cepin, Eastern Slavonia 
Accommodates 2590 Displaced persons 
oRefugees 
Managed by the ODPR, Built by the GTZ 
Camp 
Fig 5.8. The camp at Cepin (source: the author) 
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Blace Camp, Rokovci, Eastern Siavonia 
Accommodates 2120 Displaced persons 
oRefugees 
Managed by the ODPR, Built by the GTZ 
Camp 
Fig 5.9. Blace camp at Rokovci (source: the author) 
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Gaza, Karlovac, south of Zagreb 
Accommodates 	 1870 Displaced persons 
33 Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, built by the GTZ 
Camp 
Fig 5. JO. Gaza camp in Karlovac, close to the border of UNPA North (source: 
the authOl) 
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DRC Camp, Kutina. border of UNPA North 
Accommodates 307 Displaced persons 
873 Refugees 
Managed by the DRC and Residents' Committee, built 
by the DRC 
Camp 
Fif( 5.11. Danish Red Cross camp in /(ulina (.\'Uurce. 'he author) 
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Izbjegiice Centar, Gasinci. f)acko\i~c\a Satn'ca , 
Eastern Siavonia 
Accommodates 0 Displaced persons l
3100 Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, army camp with addItions built 
( by various agencies 
." . " ,\ 
, ~i:: Camp 
Fig 5 12. The 'Refugee Centre I at Ga.<;inc~ (wmrce · 'he authOl) 
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Micevac Camp~ Micevac, south of Zagreb 
- -'. ! > Accommodates 530 Displaced persons 
" ,
. oRefugees, 
~- , \ Managed by the ODPR, bui!t by the ODPR 
.: .... ~: ''\, 
: ~" .. 
'~~. Camp
'\ 
Fig 5. 13 The permanent t camp at Mu:evac (source .' the author) 
Collective centres are defined as buildings that have been adapted from their pre­
war use, they are most usually public buildings and therefore provide mass 
accommodation in one structure. For example, on the Adriatic coast and in the 
capital Zagreb, the hotels that once accommodated tourists and business men., are 
now collective centres for refugees and displaced Examples of such 
accommodation are the Hotel Posejdon on the island of Koreula and the Hotel 
International in Zagreb (Fig 5 14) Also on the coast, buildings that were purchased 
and used by companies as holiday homes for their workers now accommodate 
refugees and displaced persons. 
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Further inland, there are barracks that used to be used to house blue collar workers 
close to factories or industrial complexes which now serve as collective centres. 
Reference will be made in Chapter Six and Seven to such accommodation in Velika 
Gorica, in Zaprude and Spansko (Fig 5.15, 5.16 & 5.17). The old billets of the 
Yugoslav People's Army also provide accommodation. The two examples which 
will be discussed are the two barracks in VaraZdin, Prihvatni 1 and 2 (Fig 5.18) and 
Depadansa Vojama in Osijek. The latter is also known as the Gasinci Annex as it 
houses the overflow of refugees from Gasinci camp (Fig 5.19). 
Hotel International, Zagreb 
Accommodates Approx. 400 Displaced persons 
oRefugees 
Managed by the ODPR, hotel- half ofthe building still 
functions as a hotel 
Collective centre 
Fig 5.14. Interior ofone room at the Hotel International (source: the author) 
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Barracks, Velika Gorica, Zagreb 
Accommodates Displaced persons and Refugees 
( number unknown) 
Managed by the ODPR, formerly accommodation for 
construction workers 
Collective Centre 
Fig 5.15. Barracks at Velika Gorica (source: the author) 
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Zaprude Barracks, Zagreb 
Accommodates 658 Displaced persons and 
Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, formerly accommodation for 
construction workers 
Collective Centre 
Fig 5.16. Zaprude Barracks, Zagreb (source: the author) 
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Spansko Barracks, Zagreb 
',. ( \ /~h, ... __ , .'._" ,_"..:> Accommodates 0 Displaced persons 
, 
Approx . JbO Refugees 
" . Managed by the ODPR, formerly accommodation for 
construction workers 
Collective centre 
Fit( 5, 17. S)xmsko barracks, Zaweh (.\·ource: the author) 
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Pribvatni Oentar f, Varazdin, Northern CroaHn 
., . 
';-­ Accommodates 63 Displaced persons 
724 Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, formerly a ]l\JA army barracks 
Collective centre 
FiK 5 18. Prihvatni Centar 1, Varai din (\'()urce: Ihe author) 
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Depandansa Vojarna, Gasinci Annex, Dakovo, 
Eastern Slavonia 
Accommodates 0 Displaced persons 
271 Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, formerly a JNA barracks 
Collective centre 
Fig 5.19. Depadansa Vojarna, Collective Centre, f)akovo (source: the author) 
More imaginative, though not necessarily more appropriate, solutions come from 
re-used postal trains that have been shunted onto a side line and refitted to 
accommodate refugees and displaced persons, such as the Wagon Village in 
Ivankovo (Fig 5.20). Shipping containers, fitted with doors and windows can be 
located quickly and simply and provide alternative accommodation. Reference will 
be made to an example in Velika Gorica (Fig 5.21). Many schools and student 
accommodation were used as shelter in the initial stages of the crisis to provide a 
swift emergency response and some are still utilised to date. For instance, the 
Gradevinski Skolski Centar in Osijek and the Dacki Dom Graditjelskih Strukha in 
Zagreb (Fig 5.22 & 5.23). 
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Wagon Village, Ivankovo, Eastern Slavonia 
Accommodates 44 Displaced persons 
82 Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, former postal train, converted 
and located by Cap Anamur 
Collective centre 
Fig 5.20. Ivankovo Wagon Village (source: the author) 
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Shipping Containers, Velika Gorica, Zagreb 
Accommodates Approx. 35 Displaced persons 
and Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, located by ODPR 
Collective centre 
Fig 5.21. Shipping Containers at Velika Corica (source: the author) 
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Gradeviuski Skois ii Ceutar, Osijek, Eastern 
Siavonia 
Accommodates 172 Displaced persons 
I Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, fomerly a secondary school 
converted with assistance from the IRe 
Collective centre 
Fig 5.22. Graaevinski ,~OJSkl Centar, ()sljek (wJlIf'ce. the author) 
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Dacki Dom Graditeljskih Struka, Zagreb 
Accommodates 605 Displaced persons 
5 Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, formerly part of a graduate 
college, most of the college still functions 
Collective centre 
Fig 5.23. fJacki Dom Gradite?jskih Struka, Zagreb (source: the author) 
5.3.2 Aid Provision 
In theory, monthly payments (termed 'cash grants' by implementing agencies) are 
made to the registered refugees and displaced persons by the ODPR. These 
payments are financed by the Croatian government, in the case of displaced 
persons, or the UNHCR in the case of refugees. In practice, it is not always 
possible to meet all the payments. In 1993, UNHCR's budget for Croatia allowed 
only six of the twelve payments to be made, and in 1994, nine payments were made 
instead of the planned eleven (Mossberg, et at., 1994). 
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Displaced persons receive a payment of US$18 (approximately 100 KunalO) per 
month from the Government whether they are in private or organised 
accommodation. Unemployed displaced persons receive a further US$9 per month 
in line with all Croatian citizens. Retired displaced persons still receive a pension 
from the Croatian government, but retired refugees will not receive a pension as 
they have Bosnian papers. Only privately accommodated refugees received the 
payment of US$18 per month from the UNHCR (it is distributed via ODPR) until 
the end of 1994, in 1995 it was cut by 50 per cent. Refugees in collective 
accommodation do not receive a cash grant, as all costs are said to be met by the 
centre or camp. Both groups also receive family packages which include basic food 
and hygiene items, although these too have been reduced since 1 June 1995. Family 
packages were filled largely through donations, primarily from the European Union 
which in June cut its donation from 6000 tonnes per month to 3000 tonnes per 
month (ODPR, 1995). This means that the social cases that used to receive these 
packages as well, have now been dropped from the recipients. About 38 per cent of 
host families now qualify for some type of benefits as a result of taking in refugee 
and displaced families. 
The grants made to refugees and displaced persons are not enough to support them 
and need to be subsidised from other sources to provide a comfortable living 
standard. With unemployment levels currently very high in Croatia (16 per cent) it 
is not easy to gain work. Refugees are not prevented from working in principle, 
however, labour laws state that no job may be taken by a foreigner if there is a 
Croatian citizen to fill the post, thus work for refugees is harder to come by. This is 
reflected in the figures for employment which show 27.54 per cent of the potential 
working populationll of refugees unemployed and 3.07 per cent employed. As 
compared to 19.13 per cent unemployed displaced persons and 20.59 per cent 
employed (ODPR, 1995). Some of the displaced persons who were employed by 
firms located within the UNP As prior to the war, are still paid a retainer by the firm 
or have secured jobs in the sister branch where they are located outside the 
occupied territories. Numbers of refugees and displaced persons do work illegally 
or in seasonal and short term jobs. 
10 Kuna being the Croatian currency that replaced the FRY Dinar 
11 Children, pupils, students, retired persons and those who did not complete this section of the 
government census form (17,541 refugees and displaced persons (4 per cent) left it blank) are not 
counted as working population. 
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5.4 SUM:MARY AND CONCLUSION 
The data in this chapter provides the background reference material for the 
following discussions of shelter provision in Chapter Six and Seven. The situation 
within which the humanitarian community is acting in Croatia is an indeterminate 
one where there is neither outright war nor total peace. At the time of the periods 
of field study, two thirds of Croatia was free territory and peaceful, one third was 
occupied by Serb forces and Croatia, as a nation, was still engaged in combat 
against the Serbs within Bosnia. A tentative federation existed between the 
Croatians and Bosnians following their year of conflict in Bosnia. The United 
Nations Protection Force was keeping an uneasy peace in the occupied zones 
effectively ensuring that displaced Croatians could not return home. The Republic 
was host to many thousands of refugees and displaced persons who held different 
degrees of legitimacy and were provided for by many different international and 
national organisations with little cross co-ordination or referencing. 
These are the conditions which form the background to the field data analysis that 
follows. The analysis is divided into two chapters which cover the two central 
themes of this thesis: 
• Vulnerability and Capacity 
• Integration 
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CHAPTER SIX: IMPOSED VULNERABILITY AND REPRESSION OF 
COPING STRATEGIES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Through presentation of the findings of the investigation in Croatia, this chapter 
informs the vulnerability and capacity discourse initiated in Chapter Two and 
Chapter Three. In these chapters, the importance of understanding and addressing 
vulnerabilities and capacities in natural disasters, refugee situations and wars was 
discussed. It was seen to be important that the humanitarian community supports 
the coping mechanisms and capacities of refugees and displaced persons during 
relief operations, as only in this way does relief facilitate development or 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. In the light of the mass devastation that war 
causes, the need to retain the strength and capacity of refugees and displaced 
persons during the years of exile or displacement becomes crucial (Ellis & 
Barakat, 1996, 1996a; Ellis, 1995a). 
Chapter Two introduced the concept of a priori and imposed vulnerability. A 
priori vulnerability being a condition of either poverty or wealth, geographical 
location, political legitimacy, ethnicity or gender that exists prior to a hazard 
occurring. Imposed vulnerability being that which is forced upon an individual by 
the conditions in which they find themselves after the hazard has occurred. For 
individuals of the Former-Yugoslavia, their ethnicity and geographical location 
made them vulnerable to attack when war began, this was their condition of a 
priori vulnerability. This condition, combined with the hazard of war, forced them 
to migrate. The findings of this study show that once they had fled and were 
sheltered in Croatia, repressive relief policies, operational in some locations, 
undermined innate coping mechanisms and enforced an imposed vulnerability. This 
imposed vulnerability is the degree to which the livelihoods of the refugees and 
displaced persons, and their capacities as productive social beings, are put at risk 
by the application of restrictive and authoritarian shelter programmes. 
The pressure and release model initially presented in Chapter Two, has been 
adapted by the author to show the progression from a priori to imposed 
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vulnerability (Fig 6.1). Such a model illustrates the cumulative nature of 









return! rehabilitate/ reconstruct 
Dependency increas<o'S 
with gr;:ater levels of 
vulnerability 
Fig 6.1. The progression from a priori to imposed vulnerability using the pressure 
and release model (source: the author) 
The findings from the field study in Croatia will be adduced to show that it is a 
lack of enabling interventions that ensures that refugees and displaced persons 
are reliant upon handouts, not a lack of individual motivation or ability. This 
chapter will present data to illustrate that in the accommodation where refugees 
and displaced persons have access to resources and where their own innate coping 
mechanisms are supported by cognisant intervention, there is no laziness, lack of 
aptitude, absence of creativity or unwillingness to invest energy in self-sufficiency. 
All signs that the literature designates as symptoms of dependency are missing. 
Only in the camps and settlements where the access to enabling interventions is 
denied and centralised control systems are in place, are the refugees and displaced 
persons dependent on external assistance. In such accommodation, the lack of 
support affects not only their ability to function in the situation of exile, but also 
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negatively affects their long term ability to return and reconstruct their lives and 
livelihoods as it undermines innate capacities (Anderson, 1993). The work of 
Kibreab (1993) and Harrell-Bond (1986), among others, reviewed in Chapter 
Two, shows that when coping mechanisms and capacities are undermined, future 
development is prejudiced. The author believes, in line with Barakat (Ellis & 
Barakat, 1996, 1996a), that reconstruction is also prejudiced by relief that denies 
access to enabling interventions. This belief was reinforced during the discussions 
in the working groups at the workshop on improved shelter response held in Luton 
in 1995 (Barakat & Ellis, 1995). In order to reconstruct, it is necessary to build 
material and psychological reserves in exile, to cushion the initial period of return. 
Even when such reserves are unlikely to be sufficient to fully support return, the 
knowledge that they exist gives courage and ability to return and reconstruct. For 
those who have no such reserves, the thought of return, though desired is also 
debilitating, for it is coloured by fear over survival and means of support. 
The findings will show that investment in refugees and displaced persons while in 
exile, through supporting their innate coping mechanisms and allowing them 
access to existing socio-economic structures, promotes their independence and 
autonomy and thus retains their capacities as productive social beings. In the light 
of the mass physical, social and economic investment required for post-war 
rehabilitation and reconstruction, retention of productive capacity is important 
both on an individual and a national level (Barakat & Cockburn, 1991). 
6.1.1 Structure of the Chapter 
To understand the manner in which emergency shelter provision can undennine 
capacities and coping mechanisms, and impose vulnerability on refugees and 
displaced persons; the discourse has been divided into three component sections: 
• Decision making 
• Organisational capacity 
• Access to resources 
These categories have been derived from the work of Harrell-Bond (1986) and 
Kibreab (1993) and validated through presentation by the author at conferences 
and in journals 1. 
1 i. International Workshop: Towards Improved Shelter and Environment for Refugees and 
Displaced Persons within the Post-Yugoslav Countries, Luton University (Ellis, 1995) 
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Harrell-Bond's seminal (1986) work, reviewed in Section 2.3.2 of this thesis, 
argues that dependency is increased by relief regimes that usurp the decision 
making and organisational capacity of refugees. The same section outlines 
Kibreab's (1993) work which promotes the hypothesis that the lack of access to 
resources fostered by the current relief model, is the reason for dependency 
among refugee individuals and communities. These three themes are the essence of 
the vulnerability and capacity discourse. 
To facilitate the presentation of the discourse in this chapter, the author has further 
divided Harrell-Bond's category 'decision making', into two smaller sections: 
• Choice and control 
• Personal performance of familiar tasks 
Thus, the findings presented in this chapter to support the discourse on imposed 
vulnerability and repression of coping strategies, are structured as follows: 
1. Decision making 
• Choice and Control 
• Personal performance of familiar tasks 
n. Organisational capacity 

lll. Access to resources 

6.2 DECISION MAKING 
6.2.1 Choice and Control 
The level of personal control and the degree of choice retained by the refugees and 
displaced persons are significant components of vulnerability that is imposed. The 
less autonomy refugees and displaced persons are allowed to retain while in exile 
and the more they are prevented from utilising their ability to fill their own needs, 
the greater their enforced reliance on outside assistance becomes with the result 
that they are more vulnerable in the long term. This imposed vulnerability occurs 
not because of the aid that is provided per se, but rather the manner in which it is 
provided. For example, it is not that organised shelter is a bad solution in itself, but 
ii. IRAP Conference on Forced Migration, Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya (Ellis & Barakat, 
1996) 
iii. Ellis & Barakat, (1996a), refereed paper in Disasters Journal 
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if those in such accommodation are segregated, marginalised and not supported to 
be self-sufficient, then the accommodation is a disabling solution. The way shelter 
aid is provided in many cases curtails and denies the innate coping mechanisms of 
refugees and displaced persons by adopting systems of rigid centralised control. 
Such policies of control deny the capacities of refugees and displaced persons to 
help themselves and thus promote a long term reliance on external aid or social 
welfare assistance making them less able to return home and rebuild their lives. 
6.2.l.1 Flight 
Patterns of lack of choice and control can be traced from the instant that refugees 
and displaced persons are first forced to leave their homes. The testimonies of both 
refugees and displaced persons illustrate that from the first threat of danger, choice 
is curtailed and the passage into exile is controlled by others. For many it is the 
first experience of a pattern of life that will persist throughout their time in exile. 
"We didn't know that we were going to end up here. When we were in 
Banja Luka and we were preparing for the trip we were told by the 
Red Cross that we would be going to Sweden straight away. But they 
tricked us because we were stopped on the frontier in one small place 
and we lived there in a tent camp for a while. My baby was born there. 
From there my family was brought here to Gasinci because they didn't 
have papers and people without papers get sent to collective centres. I 
was sent to hospital in Zagreb because of my baby and then later 1 was 
brought here to join my family. We have been here for eight months 
now." (Bosnian Muslim Refugee family from Gasinci camp, February 
1995) 
"I am from Bosanski Samac, I had a flat there. I was taken from there 
and put in a concentration camp with my son. He is still there, but I 
was sent away. I didn't want to leave my son, I didn't want to go 
anywhere and when 1 was leaving that camp I didn't know where I was 
going. I was brought here to Gasinci by the Red Cross and have stayed 
for three years." (Bosnian Muslim Refugee family from Gasinci camp, 
February 1995) 
"Firstly we were living in our home in Bosanski Samac, then the war 
started and we moved to my sister's in Slavonski Samac. We were 
there two days before the fighting surrounded us again, so we all 
moved again. This place too became caught up in the fighting so we 
left for Slavonski Brod. We were there for two or three days before we 
could check in with the Red Cross who got us out." (Croatian Refugee 
family in Varaidin camp, February, 1995) 
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Even those in private accommodation retain little control or choice over their 
ultimate destination: 
"This is the seventh place that we have lived in over the past three 
years. We have been living in and around Osijek first with my brother­
in-law, then my best man, and so on. People told us that we could stay 
as long as we wanted, but then after a couple of months, we get asked 
to leave because it is too crowded or there is no money. So we have to 
find another place" (Displaced Croatian couple from Eastern Slavonia 
living in Osijek, January 1995) 
It is inevitable that in the first stages of crisis when many thousands of people are 
flooding into a country there will be confusion and disarray. In such conditions, 
there have to be organisations that can take control and guide people to positions 
of safety. The chaos and confusion regarding the ultimate destination of refugees 
and displaced persons or the possibilities to leave for a third country are 
regrettable, but understandable in the initial rush of the crisis. In 1991, in Croatia, 
when the first movement of displaced started, there was no centralised 
governmental organisation to co-ordinate activities. Even after the establishment 
of the ODPR, the situation was still chaotic as those appointed did not possess the 
experience to deal with such crises or have the power to enforce decisions: 
"The Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees is hopelessly 
understaffed and does not possess any direct-decision making 
competence" . (Kreutner, (1993), speaking ofODPR's performance in 
August 1992 when ODPR had been in existence for eight months) 
" ... the role of, and the assumptions made by the ODPR (as well as the 
calibre of some of the staff, it has to be said) is a major question" 
(Stubbs, personal communication, March, 1995) 
The initial lack of choice or control retained by the migrants during flight can be 
explained by the chaos and disorganisation, however, the perpetuation of such a 
lack of autonomy is both detrimental and disabling. Instead of personal control 
being returned to the refugees and displaced persons at the earliest opportunity, 
centralised control systems are retained and perpetuated in the name of efficiency. 
A lack of control from the most basic to the highest level endures in many of the 
'emergency' accommodation types throughout Croatia. 
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6.2.1.2 Personal Space 
At the most basic level, residents lack control over personal space and retain no 
degree of privacy within the accommodation. In this way, temporary shelter is a 
constant reminder to individuals, not only of how much they have lost, but also 
how little they have left, for not even personal space belongs to the individual 
anymore. Shared accommodation means control over space is divided among the 
previously unacquainted inhabitants ensuring that overriding individual control 
over personal space is removed. The loss is particularly debilitating when refugees 
and displaced persons compare their past with their present situation: 
"It was really nice back there. We had everything .... It was a big house, 
measuring eight by eight metres which was just the house. We had a 
basement below, a big kitchen. There was cellar, where I stored my 
wine and then a cold room to keep the meat that I cured. I had a boiler 
room for machinery for heating, a big stove for central heating. A 
garage of course. A special room for smoking meat. Space for the 
chickens, a special room for my tools and pig houses for the pigs I 
kept. At least twenty pigs a year were raised. Then we had built 
ourselves a root store and a structure where we stored the com. 
Further down we had two rows of fruit trees, land for com and 
vegetables. Then one nice place like a small arbour where we could sit 
and see the grapes hanging all around us. 
Now we have no space, we are sharing a few rooms in somebody 
else's house. We cannot bear it, after all that we had and built up for 
thirty or forty years, now this is all." (Displaced persons living in 
private accommodation in Osijek, January 1995) 
Shared accommodation, whether organised or private, leaves residents with no 
privacy and little or no personal space. The Gradevinski Skolski Centar in Osijek is 
a converted secondary school that provides collective accommodation, mainly for 
single persons. Each room is a dormitory that contains bunk beds and a few 
wardrobes (shown in Fig 5.22, p134). Personal space is reduced to the area of the 
bed, multiplied by the vertical distance between it and the bed above, or the 
ceiling, and a portion of a wardrobe. There is no partitioning to offer privacy, no 
way of delineating a personal and private space. The rationale for the high 
densities of residents per room, is that as single persons rather than families, the 
residents do not require more space. Those who share the rooms are of the same 
sex and mostly elderly and thus it is seen to be acceptable to accommodate them in 
such a manner. However, the inappropriateness of the solution can be seen 
through the choice that the inhabitants make to sit in the corridors with their 
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friends all day rather than staying in their rooms with individuals whom they have 
no choice but to share an unsought for intimacy (Fig 6.2). 
Gradevinski Skolski Centar, Osijek, Eastern Slavonia 
Accommodates: 172 Displaced persons 
1 Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, former secondary school 
Collective Centre 
Fig 6.2. Residents prefer to sit with friends in the corridors rather than in their 
rooms (source: the author) 
A similar concept is utilised within Varaidin, where female residents whose 
husbands are fighting in, or have been killed by, the war, are located together. 
Here the beds are more spread out and are singles rather than bunks which at least 
gives the individuals accommodated here a greater volume of space. VaraZdin is an 
improvement on the Gradevinski Skolski Centar as here, some attempts have been 
made at partitioning using a donation of hospital screens (Fig 6.3).Which at least 
allows for some degree of demarcation of private space. The screens do not 
however, allow for individuals or families to control the light and noise that they 
get in their personal space, as the screens are only fabric and finish a metre or so 
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below the ceiling level. In a room which is shared by young children and elderly 
women, this causes tension and disruption. 
Prihvatni Centar 1, Vanlidin, Northern Croatia 
Accommodates 63 Displaced persons 
724 Refugees 




. .;¢~'"\. . Collective Centre 
Fig 6.3. Hospital screens are used to provide some partJlioning (~·ou,.(;e . the 
author) 
The camp of Gasinci is constructed of three basic sbelter types. In the larger units, 
those that were the original army huts, accommodation is shared between several 
families In these huts of 97 by 6.3 metres, where usable space is restricted by a 
pitched roof that slopes from the ridge height of 3.35 metres to an eaves level of 
o5 metres, there are as many as 15 beds (which gives 4m2 per person) with no 
partitions between them. Those who have been in the camp for a long time have 
managed to get hold of spare sheets which they have draped around certain beds 
to provide some privacy. As in Varaidin, this provides nothing more than visual 
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screening. The lack of elementary privacy ensures that there is little chance to 
retain a normal family life; both inter, and intra, family relationships become very 
strained. 
"1 don't know how it can be otheIWise, we have no choice, here no one 
has their own privacy" (Refugee speaking in Gasinci camp, February 
1995) 
With Gasinci being a transit camp for refugees, families are coming and going all 
the time. This creates problems within the camp, as those who remain in the camp 
for a long time resent the constant rearrangement of living space and the 
disruption to their lives caused by new comers. 
" ... I would also like to live here with only people who will stay here 
until they return home. 1 do not like to live with people who are here 
for a couple of months and then leave. 1 can't stand people coming and 
then leaving, it's upsetting." (Refugee from Gasinci camp, February 
1995) 
Within Gasinci, there is a highly protective attitude towards space, with the result 
that when new refugees are due to arrive in the camp, families will physically 
remove free beds from their units and hide them, in order to persuade the 
management that there is no room for more people in their units (personal 
communication, UNHCR field officer for Gasinci, February 1995). The reaction is 
far worse in the winter months when the intense cold and wet force refugees to 
remain inside the unit, where they are constantly together with one another. 
The protective attitude is combined with increasing fear on behalf of the long term 
residents from Banja Luka of the new refugees arriving from the Bihac pocket. 
Many of these new arrivals are accused of following Babic, the rebel Muslim 
leader of that area. With space in the camp being at a premium, the management 
has to locate the newcomers with previously resident families, the results are 
clearly visible. Existing residents strew the floors of the units with rubbish and 
verbally abuse the incomers to try and force them to ask to be relocated (personal 
communication, UNHCR field officer for Gasinci, February 1995). 
When refugees have so little left, the maintenance of what they do have becomes 
of vital importance to them. Each gain in space they achieve when a family moves 
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out is held on to savagely. Improved levels of privacy when other families leave 
are too precious to be given up lightly: 
"It has been much more difficult in this room than it is now. In the past 
we have had to share with strangers, sometimes with whole families. It 
was difficult then, now we have the room to ourselves and have done 
for some time which is better. But my sister lives in accommodation on 
the coast in Orebie, there they have their own privacy, even their own 
bathroom and a piece of corridor. That is good but this is bad .... None 
of the places where we get put can be home, we know that. What is 
important is privacy wherever you are. To have a place where you can 
make your own schedule and not have other people to work round" 
(Croatian refugee from Travnik, in Depadansa Vojarna Collective 
Centre, Gasinci Annex, February 1995) 
The findings suggest two essential criteria governing the allocation of space to 
refugees and displaced persons in collectives and camps. Firstly, the distance 
maintained between those deciding where refugees and displaced persons should 
live and the refugees and displaced persons themselves. Secondly the reality of the 
long term status of what is wished by the Government to be temporary 
accommodation. 
The former issue revolves around the ODPR and aid agencies endeavouring to 
optimise densities in accommodation. If a certain type of shelter is listed as being 
able to take four persons, then it must take four persons. For instance, the 
inhabitants of one of the shipping containers visited in Velika Gorica were a 
gentleman of sixty two sharing with a mother of sixty five and her two sons of 
forty two and forty seven. The accommodation measured 6 by 2.5 by 2 metres and 
had originally been shared by the mother and her husband and the two sons (giving 
3.75m2 per person). When the husband died, the ODPR moved in an elderly 
gentleman who was a stranger to the family, because on their records there was a 
spare place for him. An examination of the container would have shown that 
where a family may have shared such a unit, it was not suitable for more than one 
family to share. 
The only time families will not have to share 'oversized' accommodation is when 
members of families are ill or disabled. Only then will the family receive more 
private space. 
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Such a ruling leads to many families simulating illness in order to receive more 
space: 
"The biggest problem is lack of space. Many families here are asking 
for more space. They say that members of their family are sick and it is 
really important for us as management to realise who is really sick and 
who is not, because everyone is trying to get these papers and a room 
to themselves." (Refugee representative on the management committee 
for Kutina, January 1995) 
Such behaviour links to activities outlined in the literature where refugees are 
designated as liars and cheats because they exaggerate their conditions in order to 
receive more from the aid agencies (Harrell-Bond et at., 1992). However, such 
behaviour should be viewed in the context of the refugees' situation. They have 
been forced into a way of life where they are denied access to many resources and 
retain little control over their own lives. Their actions and exaggerations are 
merely a coping mechanism used to try and make their situation as acceptable as 
possible. It is almost inevitable that if agencies and governments treat refugees and 
displaced persons as groups that have to be provided for and cannot provide for 
themselves, then those refugees and displaced persons will utilise that attitude to 
their best advantage. 
Such behaviour is a way of ensuring access to resources that they are otherwise 
denied. During conversation with a couple living in Blace camp in Rokovci, it was 
evident that they were very concerned that the author was there to assess the 
amount of space that they had, as they utilised every opportunity to emphasise 
their requirement for the space. They were the sole occupants of accommodation 
that was designed to take four persons, and throughout the conversation 
unsolicited references were constantly made by the husband to his state ofhealth: 
" I left V ukovar first because I am an invalid. For twenty five years 
now I have had some mental problems ... .It would be very difficult for 
us to accept someone else to live with us because I am a hard medical 
case. Actually it is very, very difficult for anybody to live with me 
because when I am angry then I am really tough you know? I am 
normal now because I am taking medication, but it would be really 
difficult for me even to live with my son, for instance. When we were 
on the coast a social worker promised that we would live alone here." 
(Displaced man in BIace camp, January 1995) 
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Then again some twenty minutes later, the husband interrupts the conversation to 
show a certificate: 
" ... this is from the psychiatric hospital in Zagreb - when I left the 
hospital I got such a certificate to show that I had received medication" 
(Displaced man from BIace camp, January 1995) 
This desire to retain privacy as the most basic level of control over life is easily 
understood. Communal living is not a feature of life in Croatia. Even within 
extended families, the sons and daughters would inevitably construct a home 
within the plot of the parents, rather than sharing the house itself 
The second criteria that governs the allocation of space in accommodation is the 
actual long term condition of the perceived temporary status. The Croatian 
Government is not prepared to acknowledge the long term nature of the refugees 
and displaced persons and thus conditions of emergency are maintained. However, 
the author suggests that such a policy is not beneficial to the Government. In the 
long term, although refugees may ultimately return home, the Government will 
have to provide the social welfare that displaced persons will require as a result of 
living in inappropriate emergency shelter. While people can live in overcrowded or 
inappropriate accommodation for short periods of time, to maintain the situation 
beyond a month or two has depredatory effects on the residents. To live in 
emergency shelter for four years, as some of the residents of collective centres 
have done, has very serious debilitating effects. There is a human hierarchy of 
needs which defines that although refugees and displaced persons will be grateful 
at first to find themselves alive and warm and dry, they will soon start to desire to 
be in accommodation that fulfils more of their needs. Satisfaction with emergency 
shelter does not last long: 
" It is difficult to think about our problems now, because at first all of 
us were happy. We found accommodation here and we were alive. But 
now, we are thinking about the future, now it is something else." 
(Refugee in Kutina camp, January 1995) 
The lack of control over personal space is obviously alien and unacceptable to the 
refugees and displaced persons and yet, agencies, donors and the ODPR, persist in 
locating them in such accommodation. The stated legitimacy of such an approach 
is lack of funds. It is obviously far less costly to accommodate many families or 
individuals together in one building than to construct or locate separate buildings 
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for each. It would also seem that money invested in partitioning existing buildings 
is thought to be a luxury rather than a necessity by those who administer the 
budgets for accommodation. Such concepts are the result of structures of 
accountability that focus more on costlbenefit calculations than humanitarian or 
moral concern. It is not 'humane' to house people in such conditions for extensive 
periods. As an emergency, short term solution it may be necessary, but the findings 
of this study show that when such a solution is permitted to extend into long term 
and permanent accommodation the innate capacities of those thus housed are 
undermined. Would such accommodation exist if agencies and donors were more 
accountable to the target population? 
6.2.2 Personal Performance of Familiar Tasks 
The findings indicate that the loss of control over personal space is compounded 
by the loss of intangibles such as the familiar routines and social patterns that 
previously shaped existence. The loss of recognised daily activities and routines 
that were linked with the built environment of home is endemic in accommodation 
that operates under centralised provision. In such accommodation, control over 
familiar day-to-day activities such as food preparation and bathing is retained by 
the management. The following list of rules and conditions can be seen in the 
corridors of one of the collective centres in VaraZdin, Prihvatni 2, and illustrates 
perfectly the lack of autonomy preserved by the residents: 
"The first time [any of the following] rules are broken, residents will 
receive a warning, the second time they will be evicted from the centre. 
It is strictly forbidden to be in the corridor after 8pm or to disturb the 
inhabitants of the centre in any other way. It is strictly forbidden to 
take humanitarian aid or any fom1 of clothing or footwear out of the 
centre. It is strictly forbidden to sell any kind of goods on the local 
market. It is forbidden to leave the centre after 10pm. 
Waking up is at 7am, personal hygiene until 8am. Lights are switched 
off and residents should be asleep by 10pm. This is with the exception 
of those persons over 18 who can watch the television programme 
Image upon Image (daily political broadcast). The regular time for 
taking showers is between lOam and 1 pm on weekdays, 10am until 
4pm on Saturdays. Smoking in either rooms or corridors is strictly 
forbidden. Daily rest is from 2pm until 5pm (no loud music should be 
played). Visits are allowed from civilians until 8pm, they may not stay 
overnight. Croatian Army soldiers may stay for up to four days with 
written permission." (Rules displayed in VaraZdin 2, quoted in a 
bulletin posted by Za Mir Transnational Network, Zagreb, on the 
Forced-Migration electronic network, 3 April 1995) 
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Such rules treat refugees and displaced persons more like pnsoners than 
individuals who have been forced to leave their homes for reasons beyond their 
control. Although this level of centralised decision making over day to day 
activities is an extreme example, it is representative of the pervasive attitude that 
refugees and displaced persons are a burdensome group that need to be provided 
for rather than a group capable of controlling their own lives if given adequate 
support. 
Forced migration results in the loss of that which is familiar to an individual or 
community. The findings show that this dissociation, is exemplified partly by the 
loss of familiar patterns and routines and partly by separation from physical 
possessions such as the home. Refugees and displaced persons are constantly 
reminded of the magnitude of these losses by day to day residence within a camp, 
collective centre or private accommodation. The testimonies of the refugees and 
displaced persons all illustrated the intensity of feeling felt by the loss of the 
physical manifestation of 'home'. This sense of loss does not diminish with time 
but is nurtured and fed by the experience of living in a temporary shelter - a 
constant visual reminder of the change of circumstances. 
6.2.2.1 Food Preparation 
Out of the thirty one camps and collective centres visited 2 only four; the Naselje 
Prijatelstva in Cepin, Blace at Rokovci, Gaza at Karlovac and the DRC camp at 
Kutina, operate policies which enable residents to chose and prepare their own 
food and meals, thus retaining some link with their familiar pre-war routine. The 
inhabitants of these camps recognise the importance of retaining control over such 
an activity as food preparation: 
" ... here we have a lot of freedom. We live together. We are cooking. 
It is very important to cook alone, what we want to eat today we can 
prepare for ourselves ... " (Displaced family in Gaza camp, January 
1995) 
All the other camps and collectives visited provided pre-prepared meals from a 
central location. Such meals are either prepared on the premises by staff in one 
central kitchen or delivered ready cooked from another location and distributed 
within a canteen. In some centres, for instance the Gradevinski Skolski Centar in 
Osijek and Prihvatni 1 in Vara.zdin, residents are not even allowed to take these 
2 Sec appendices for a full list of sites visited 
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pre-prepared meals back to their rooms, but must eat in a centralised restaurant at 
a specified time. This ruling is only waived for those who are very sick and unable 
to walk to the central canteen. 
In Gasinci, food is prepared in a central kitchen by the army and residents are 
called to collect it three times a day over the Tannoy system that covers the camp. 
The elderly will send younger members to collect the food as it involves a walk 
across the camp as well as queuing for long periods of time. With 3,100 people to 
be fed, the management calls them in three batches according to the sectors of the 
camp in which they live. The food is served in great warehouses and can either be 
taken back to the refugees' houses or consumed on the premises at the great 
wooden tables. Refugees must show their authorisation card in order to receive 
their meals. The entire process is both degrading and dehumanising and is 
unfortunately common throughout those camps that provide centrally prepared 
food. It seems however, that Gasinci is the only one that controls every movement 
of the refugees through a speaker system. Refugees are informed when to collect 
their post (again in batches), when to collect their food and when to visit the 
management office or the UNHCR building. 
The removal of such a familiar process as food preparation, preserves and 
perpetuates the lack of control first felt by migrants during flight from the home. 
The rationale given by controlling organisations for centralised production and 
distribution of food and meals inevitably focuses on efficiency of organisation and 
reduction of expenditure. Indeed, the costs of providing adequate power and 
facilities are high, especially so in those buildings that have been converted from 
their pre-war use to provide accommodation. Old schools, army barracks or 
workers holiday hostels are not equipped infrastructurally to provide enough 
electricity to supply a cooker in every room. The camp at Gasinci, which holds 
3,100 people has a continuous problem with the electricity supply. Practically 
every household has acquired at least one single plate hob which they use for 
boiling coffee and re-heating the food they are given in the central kitchen. The 
resulting demand on the electricity supply frequently damages the power supply, 
which costs money to repair. The management has conducted raids throughout the 
camp and tried to confiscate the hobs with little success, the process merely serves 
to further alienate the refugees (personal communication, UNHCR field office for 
Gasinci camp, January 1995) A less demeaning approach would have been to have 
prevented the intensity of the point load on the infrastructure in the first place. 
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Locating so many refugees together in one camp was inevitably going to place a 
strain on the existing resources. Had refugees been spread more evenly through 
the region instead of being kept in one large camp, the demands on infrastructure 
would have been dissipated across the supply and thus less disruptive. It would 
also have been possible to avoid the negative segregational aspects of camp life. 
6.2.2.2 Accountability 
Whilst acknowledging the difficulties of finding finance to upgrade facilities such 
as collective centres, the severe negative consequences of removing basic, 
recognised routines from the daily life of refugees and displaced persons, need to 
be understood. Such policies which impose vulnerability and create long term 
dependency should be avoided at all costs. The centralised process of giving pre­
prepared food at pre-ordained times, daily reinforces the subordinate status of 
refugees and displaced persons as beneficiaries or charity cases. It does not 
encourage the belief that they are competent, productive members of society 
capable of performing basic tasks. Once again it appears that a lack of 
accountability on behalf of agencies to the refugees and displaced persons and an 
obsession with costlbenefit analysis perpetuates poor accommodation methods. 
6.2.2.3 Cultural Applicability 
Such a lack of accountability is compounded by the absence of monitoring and 
evaluation procedures of those centres, camps and private accommodations 
already in use. A prima facie example of disregarding the lessons that can be learnt 
from existing accommodations is that of the jointly implemented Croatian and 
Swedish Red Cross camps of Sasna Greda and Pisarovina, constructed in 1995. 
Despite the clearly visible difficulties that had arisen over four years in 
accommodation that removed control from refugees and displaced persons, here 
once again, centrally located, shared cooking and bathing facilities were provided. 
Although in these two camps the inhabitants are allowed to cook for themselves, 
there is still only one central kitchen which all will use. The rationale behind the 
provision of centralised kitchen facilities given by the Red Cross was that it would 
get individuals out of their houses to meet and interact while cooking in the 
kitchen (Mossberg et ai., 1994). The reasoning is without foundation in the 
Croatian tradition, as there is no indication that the residents of the units, all 
displaced persons, would ever have engaged in such activity before the war: their 
homes and villages were not constructed around central kitchens where everyone 
met to cook. The Croatian staffed Croatian Red Cross knew that such processes 
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would be completely alien to the inhabitant's pre-war lifestyle and yet permitted 
the camp to be built in such a manner. 
The action of the Croatian Red Cross office negates the concept outlined in the 
literature that working with a local counterpart is one way to ensure the cultural 
applicability of relief projects. The case illustrates that while the local counterpart 
may well be aware of those interventions which are culturally applicable and those 
which are not, unless the counterpart is accountable to the recipient group rather 
than the projector implementor and trained to understand the negative 
consequences of removing control from refugees and displaced persons, then 
projects are just as likely to be misdirected. In view of the long term status of 
emergency periods in intra-state war, it is essential that relief provision is culturally 
sensitive. The camps outlined above are clearly not culturally appropriate and thus 
fail to meet real needs of the inhabitants. If acting through a local counterpart is 
still no insurance that projects are culturally sensitive, then alternatives need to be 
sought. 
The actions of the Red Cross could be explained in one of two ways: either a lack 
of accountability to the target group or a lack of monitoring and evaluation of 
existing accommodation types. Unfortunately, examination of the accommodation 
in Croatia and the testimonies of refugees and displaced persons indicate that the 
omission of both practices is endemic in the field of shelter. The basis for the 
absence of monitoring of shelter programmes could be a lack of understanding of 
the extreme psycho-social effects that poor accommodation can have on 
inhabitants. 
6.2.2.4 Psycho-social Effects of Shelter 
There are many projects being undertaken by humanitarian organisations 
throughout Croatia that call themselves 'psycho-social'. Their emphasis is on 
assisting the refugees and displaced persons to recover from the continuing trauma 
induced by flight and exacerbated by the conditions of exile. Such projects focus 
on programmes of group activities such as handicraft groups for women or open 
sessions for individuals to share commonly held experiences. All such specified 
programmes are monitored, to record standards and effectiveness, by the ODPR 
or the Croatian Ministry of Health under Article 7 of the Croatian Law on 
Humanitarian Organisations and Humanitarian Aid (ODPR, 1995). However, 
programmes that provide accommodation come under no such monitoring 
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arrangement, as they are not deemed to have psycho-social effects. There is no 
provision to monitor the negative psycho-social consequences of types of 
accommodation on the population resident within them. For projects that provide 
physical items such as housing or food or hygienic items, the only legislation that 
exists as regards monitoring is that they be inspected under the following 
conditions: 
1 . The keeping of records on the humanitarian aid collected and 
distributed 
2. The distribution of the collected aid in compliance with the way and criteria 
defined by internal by-laws ofa humanitarian organisation 
3. Specified-purpose ofthe humanitarian aid (Yaansah, 1995) 
In other words, a housing project would be monitored by ensuring that it had 
recorded the numbers of units provided and the numbers of families assisted; that 
the units had been given to those registered for assistance with the government 
and that the initially stated aim of the project complied with legislation governing 
the objectives of humanitarian aid. Thus, the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
project would be monitored but not the social, psychological and economic effects 
that it was having on the resident community. Accommodation programmes that 
have negative psycho-social effects on the resident population therefore go 
unchallenged, and indeed, are repeated by other agencies in their projects. As 
evidenced by the Red Cross camps of Sasna Greda and Pisarovina. 
There is also no monitoring procedure to cover the psycho-social condition of 
those living in private accommodation. For, as they only receive material aid of 
food and hygienic parcels, cash grants and seeds, the only government controlled 
monitoring procedure that the provision will be subjected to is that of counting the 
numbers of items supplied and the numbers of families assisted. No organisation 
monitors the ways in which those who are privately accommodated are coping 
with the stresses and difficulties imposed by the accommodation type. The only 
way of measuring satisfaction at present seems to be that the ODPR keeps track of 
the numbers of requests from those in private accommodation to move into 
collective accommodation. 
The findings suggest then, that the humanitarian community needs to constantly 
reminded of the significance of shelter types and methods. A home is more than 
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four walls and a roof, it is a place of refuge and the centre of domestic life. It 
marks the existence of 'family' and as such has strong emotional ties. It is a visible 
statement of social position and condition. The psychological and social 
importance of 'house' and 'home' need to be recognised. Accommodation that 
maintains a state of permanent emergency and thus denies residents the 
maintenance of daily routines; denies their privacy and personal control; 
segregates them from the wider society both physically and socially; labels 
them "different" and removes their dignity and value as social beings is 
accommodation that imposes severe psycho-social stress upon the 
inhabitants. Such stress is debilitating in the short term and, when imposed over 
long periods, induces a long term reliance on external assistance. Refugees and 
displaced persons accommodated in such a way are less capable of returning to 
their homes and rebuilding when peace is declared. 
Accommodation that does not provide for activities such as meal preparation to be 
carried out on an individual level strips away identity and traditionally understood 
roles. This argument for control over basic processes extends further to other 
areas ofhuman interaction with immediate space and the built environment. 
6.3 ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY 
The camp at Kutina run by the DRC is one of the few that has a policy of actively 
promoting inhabitant's control and involvement in every day activities and 
endeavours to implement it. The initial mandate claims: 
" ... inhabitant participation in decision making was a basic philosophy. 
The idea was to work with not for the inhabitants" (Kristensen, et al., 
1994) 
Although overall control is maintained by the Danish Red Cross (DRC) 
management, there is a settlement council made up from the ten constituent areas 
of the camp which comments on and is involved in all decisions made within the 
camp. The DRC also employs some of the camp residents to work with the 
management, thus providing employment opportunities as well as projecting a 
familiar interface for those residents who come to discuss their problems and 
concerns with the management. 
It is interesting to note that the management admits that it has been harder than it 
anticipated to give "autonomy" to the residents (Manager of Kutina camp, 
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personal communication, January 1995). The Manager based this comment upon 
an incident that occurred shortly before the second field visit to the settlement in 
late January 1995. The residents' committee had been given the task of distributing 
a consignment of children's shoes which had been received from Italy. In the 
intervening period between consultation with the management and the actual 
distribution taking place, the committee altered the agreed allocation method with 
the result that the distribution became more of a scramble. As a result, many 
families got no shoes at all, whereas some others managed to obtain several pairs, 
a situation which caused much ill-feeling between the residents and led to 
accusations of stealing. The management then had to advise on the ways in which 
the problem could be rectified and calm many angry families. 
Incidents such as this have led the DRC management to believe that the residents 
of Kutina camp are finding it difficult to regain control over their lives. However, 
the author believes it is contestable that this behaviour illustrates an ineptitude for 
personal control rather than an inability to manage a diverse group of individuals. 
Responsibility for, and control over one's own life and family is a very different 
condition to being responsible for an entire settlement. In a pre-war situation all 
people, with the possible exception of children, the elderly and disabled, would 
have had control over their own lives and that of their families, but the number 
who held positions of management or governance would have been few. It would 
be unfair therefore, to assume that a lack of management capability can be directly 
compared to a lack of ability to control family life. 
However, this is not to condemn the idea of a residents' committee but to suggest 
that its value lies not in its ability or inability to manage the entire settlement, but 
in the fact that it allows the refugees and displaced persons to represent their views 
to the management. Such a committee gives them legitimacy and empowers them 
to effect control over their own living conditions. In this way, they can advise and 
comment upon the decisions made regarding all facets of camp life and put 
forward their own needs and requirements to be enacted by a management team. 
Such a committee serves an invaluable function of providing a forum for real needs 
to be proposed and understood and for the maintenance of the refugees' and 
displaced persons' status as productive social beings. Such forums also exist in 
other camps and collectives, the Hotel International, Zagreb and Cepin being two 
further examples. 
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Those in private accommodation are in an inferior posltlon 10 tenus of 
representation of their needs to those in authority. There is no representative on a 
committee to whom they can tum and express their difficulties, they have only 
themselves. For many, this represents a severe problem, as individuals possess 
little legitimacy to effect change alone. Successive attempts to raise issues and 
difficulties that result in failure cause apathy and a lack of desire to try further. 
One couple and their three children, one of whom has severe learning difficulties, 
are living in Osijek in accommodation that measures 3 by 7 metres and contains 
only a minute cooking area and bedroom/living room. They have successively 
failed to receive new accommodation through ODPR and were thus driven to try 
other means: 
"We went to see one person who said he could get us accommodation 
in a vacant Serbian flat that he knew of. If we paid him a certain sum of 
money he would guarantee that we could have it. We paid him the 
money and arrived on the doorstep of the new flat only to find that 
another family were already there. He won't give our money back to 
us, so now we are stuck here." (Privately accommodated family in 
Osijek, January 1995) 
When asked why they did not seek assistance to help regain their money, the 
couple replied that they had been advised to tell the mayor or someone " ... but 
1 
i 	 why should we call him., just so that he can come to this house and take pictures 
I, 	 and laugh at us?". Such a perceived lack of legitimacy and power of representation 
makes the privately accommodated very vulnerable to abuse and easy targets for ~ 
\ 	 deception and fraud. 
6.4 ACCESS TO RESOURCES 
At a higher level than privacy, representation and control over day-to-day routine 
activities, is control over the surrounding physical environment. Such control 
would include access to land for cultivation and, ultimately, the ability to adapt and 
extend the unit of accommodation. This level of access is a prime enabling 
intervention for refugees and displaced persons as it supports their innate coping 
mechanisms in the face of inadequate aid and denial of formal economic 
opportunities. 
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6.4.1 Allocation of Cultivable Land 
The camp at Kutina demonstrates how the layout and planmng of the camp can 
affect access to land for cultivation The layout of the camp is such that each 
house is located on a large plot ofland (Fig 64). 
" 




Kutina camp, Kutioa. Northern border of UNPA 
North 
Accommodates: 307 Displaced persons 
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Managed by the Danish Red Cross, built by the Danish 
Red Cross 
Camp 
Fig 6. 4. The housing layout showing the large plots allocated 10 each house 
(source: the author) 
fhe amount of land gives the opportunity for the residents to plant gardens and 
vegetable plots, which means that they can improve the range of their diet as weB 
as having some activity to occupy the tIme The importance of the ability to 
improve the diet can be seen when it is understood that the food basket given to 
each family contains omy dried and tinned meat, fish and vegetables in addition to 
oil, bread and powdered milk. Without the access to cultivable land, refugees and 
displaced persons are reliant on nutritional relief that does not fulfil needs. They 
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are caught in a institutionalised system which denies them access to the resources 
they need to fill their own needs at the same time as not providing them itself. 
In camps that follow this policy of giving land to the residents, the testimonies of 
refugees and displaced persons indicate the importance to them of such provision: 
"I had a room in a hotel - but a hotel is nothing more than four walls 
and a roof, I wanted tIlls land and this view of the trees" (Displaced 
Man from Vukovar, living in Micevac Camp, January 1995) 
"We are satisfied with this camp because we are a family that wants to 
work and we want a piece of land. This piece of land means everything 
to us" (Refugee family living in Micevac Camp, January 1995) 
"It is very good that we have a backyard here; that we can raise fresh 
vegetables at the very least. It's good because we can't stand eating 
from the tins and cans all the time, and we can't buy fruit and 
vegetables from the market without money." (Displaced couple living 
in BIace camp at Rokovci, January 1995) 
To allow even greater access to land, the management of the DRC has signed 
leaseholds with the farmers who own the land adjoining the settlement in Kutina, 
so that residents can extend their productive land with an allotment. Tools for 
managing the land were provided by the DRC, as were the initial requirements for 
seeds. The camps of Rokovci and Cepin also adopt such an approach with houses 
located on large plots to give land for cultivation (Fig 6.5). 
UNHCR runs an annual project through which they distribute seeds to refugees 
and displaced persons: 
"After we had distributed the seeds in Spring, it was very, very nice to 
see this land last Summer. When we came in the late afternoon or the 
early morning we could see half of the inhabitants on the field, digging. 
There was a nice channel they had dug for the water and they were 
taking this water and watering their vegetables .. .it was good to see it." 
UNHCR field officer Osijek office speaking ofBIace camp in Rokovci, 
January 1995) 
Several of the houses in BIace camp were displaying signs announcing to passers­
by the excess produce that they had for sale, one was also offering eggs from their 
cruckens. In addition to supplementing the diet through cultivation, therefore, 
access to land can also provide income generating opportunities through the sale 
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of surplus produce. In this way refugees and displaced persons are afforded yet 
more control over their lives through the purchasing power ofan income. 
Naselje Prijatelstva, Cepin, Eastern Slavonia 
Accommodates: 2590 Displaced persons 
oRefugees 
Managed by the ODPR, built by GTZ 
Camp 
Fig 6.5. Housing layout showing the allocation ofcultivable plots (source: the 
author) 
Those in private accommodation also receive seeds either through the CRC or 
Caritas (Catholic church aid organisation). Approximately 50 per cent of those in 
private accommodation have access to land that is either donated by the 
community (18 per cent) or the property of the landlord (53 per cent) or that of 
the church or friends or relatives (29 per cent) (UNHCR, 1994). CRC donates 
seeds to groups and Caritas supplies them at less than market price or for payment 
in kind with part ofthe produce. In some cases, the Gradevinski Skolski Centar for 
instance, Caritas also makes land available to individuals in collective centres, in 
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return for a share of the harvest: this food is then incorporated in the centrally 
supplied, pre-prepared meals that are sent to camps and collectives. The remainder 
of the harvest is retained by the cultivator of the land. 
The testimony of one displaced woman in the Gradevinski Skolski Centar, showed 
that she found the access to the land invaluable: 
" I am eighty years old but I still wake at four every morning and go to 
work on this land. I have to work because I know that when I go back 
to my home I will have nothing, so I work to grow vegetables and sell 
them for money." (Displaced woman in Gradevinski Skolski Centar, 
February 1995) 
This provision of materials and resources is important in maintaining the autonomy 
of the refugees and displaced persons who reside in the camps, settlements and 
private accommodations. To avoid reliance on external aid, the affected 
community needs not only the ability and will to keep control over their own lives, 
but also the access to the resources necessary to maintain that control. By 
providing the land for the refugees and displaced persons to cultivate, aid agencies 
are facilitating the communities' abilities to meet their own needs and enabling 
individuals to retain their autonomy and motivational characteristics that will 
facilitate the eventual return to, and reconstruction of, the home. 
In many of the settlements and camps where refugees do not have the land to 
cultivate, camps which inevitably are those which also have a policy of centralised 
food provision, the residents are seen by outsiders to be lazy and indifferent. 
However, the will or ability to do something on its own, will achieve little unless it 
is combined with the physical resources necessary to perform the task. Refugees 
and displaced persons need access to cultivable land as well as the desire to 
cultivate the land; one without the other will not succeed. 
The land needs to be practically accessible to the family as well. One group spoken 
with in Velika Gorica had been offered land by a friend and also had managed to 
bring their tractor with them when they fled, so in theory, they should have been 
able to cultivate the land and grow vegetables for sale or private consumption. 
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However, the family had problems with getting to the plot: 
"We used to have a large agricultural household. In one year we would 
produce about ten tons of corn and we also kept pigs, chickens and 
bees. For us it would be very good to have access to a parcel [plot of 
land], but it needs to be near to this house. Someone offered us a 
parcel for cultivation but it wa.s ten miles away and not accessible by 
bus, so we would have had to drive, which needs petrol, which costs 
money, which we do not have. So we had to turn it down." (Displaced 
family living in ex-construction barracks in Velika Gorica, January 
1995) 
The atmosphere in the camps of Kutina, Rokovci and Cepin, where the residents 
have access to land and seeds and tools for cultivation, is very different to that 
which prevails in places such as Gasinci or the hotels or the army barracks. The 
construction of Gasinci has actually removed an opportunity to give control to the 
residents. When the units were constructed across the upper part of the site they 
were erected on a vast concrete platform which was poured to keep the levels of 
mud down in the Winter and to provide a base for the huts. However, the concrete 
means that there is no available land for these residents to cultivate vegetables that 
could supplement their diet. Additionally the units have been placed very close 
together, one metre apart, back-to-back with a path of three metres running along 
each row (Fig 6.6). This makes it impossible for residents to even locate pots for 
vegetables around the unit. Around the units in the lower part of the camp among 
the pine trees, the residents have more space and no concrete decking to contend 
with. Although little grows underneath the pine trees, the residents have 
established small vegetable patches where they can spend time and energy 
cultivating their flowers and vegetables. This is a clear indication that despite the 
fact that they receive no tools and no seeds through aid agencies there is still a 
desire to retain a little autonomy and act for themselves. 
6.4.2 Control over the Built Environment 
If camps and settlements are to be constructed by aid agencies then they need to 
be planned to allow for future growth. The extra land will not only provide space 
for cultivation as mentioned above, but will also provide room for the houses to be 
extended by the residents if they wish to. Such a possibility is not only important 
for the refugees and displaced persons themselves, as will be discussed later, but it 
would also comply with the agencies notions of efficiency. It is unlikely that any 
agency will ever be persuaded to provide more than the minimum space standards 
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for housing that they see to be temporary. However, if such houses can be located 
in larger plots, then they can be extended and adapted incrementally by the 
resident families to fit their own space and usage needs. In this way, the 
accommodation would meet agency requirements for maximum numbers helped 
for the lowest cost and would also fulfil the needs of the occupying family . 
Izbjeglice Centar Gasinci, Dakovacka Satnica, 
Eastern Slavonia 
Accommodates 0 Displaced persons 
3100 Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, originally JNA barracks with 
additions built by many agencies 
Camp 
Fig 6.6. The tight housing layout showing the access path (source: the author) 
TWs process of incremental adaptation gives the residents one of the highest levels 
of control over their lives. They can shape their built environment to their own 
requirements and needs. It could be argued that such an ability to adapt the built 
environment is a luxury that millions of people across the world, refugees or not, 
do not possess, so why is it important to allow refugees and displaced persons to 
control and adapt their surroundings? 
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In general tenns, as was seen in Chapter Two, activity and participation as soon 
after experiencing trauma as possible, help in the psychological healing process. 
Such activities as food preparation and cultivation of land and adaptation of the 
immediate environment all help towards recovery from trauma. Levels of stress are 
far greater when it is perceived that control and choice are lacking (Rapoport, 
1969). Therefore, giving refugees and displaced persons the chance to adapt their 
built environments is the ultimate healing process and the highest method by which 
to regain some of the control that was lost as soon as they fled their home. 
For refugees and displaced persons, the ability to adapt the built environment is 
especially important for, while they can bring their culture, traditions and language 
with them from their homes, physical possessions are harder to bring and most 
often left behind. Of these, the most important is the home. The loss of home 
which is the scene for domestic life with all its emotional associations, is keenly 
felt and the hardest to bear when subsequently located in an environment which 
was not selected but imposed, does not fulfil needs and is not possible to 
change or personalise: 
"I'm not thinking about my home. I have to think in this way or else I 
will go crazy. Some people here are always talking about their life 
before, about what they had, what they have lost. I always want to say 
to them " OK., it was nice, we all had something nice, but now it is 
gone, now it's time to think about something else" I don't know if it is 
the right way to think - but it is what I must do to stop myself going 
crazy" (Refugee from Sarajevo speaking in Kutina Camp, January 
1995) 
Control is perceived to be lacking more by those living in camps and collectives 
than those in private accommodation, for the simple reason that those in private 
acconunodation organised it for themselves and did not find it imposed upon 
them. Therefore, for those in the camps and collectives it is important that they be 
provided with the opportunities to adapt their immediate built environment. The 
camps of (epin, Rokovci, and Kutina where such adaptations are encouraged, 
show the benefits of allowing such control over the environment: 
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"We said, do whatever you want to the houses so that you have the 
space that you need and so that it would be more pleasurable for you 
to live there. Now every house looks different, and personally I think it 
looks better like that. For instance, this one has made a long porch for 
which they supplied the wood ~nd we got them some panels for the 
rooffrom Sweden." (Manager, Cepin settlement, August 1994) 
The commensal arrangement described above, where materials are provided by the 
management when individuals make their own personal investment to obtain 
materials, both encourages the adaptation process and overcomes potential 
concerns with security of tenure. In the literature covering the incremental 
adaptation of squatter settlements by owners, it is documented that residents are 
more likely to invest their own money and time in their property if they know that 
they will not be evicted from the plot (Abrams, 1964; Turner, 1976; Zetter & 
Baker, 1995). Therefore, in squatter settlements where it is wished to encourage 
the improvement of houses through self-help activities, tenure is assigned to the 
resident. The squatters' situation bears some similarities to that of refugees and 
displaced persons, as they are both endeavouring to make their homes in areas 
where both the community and the local municipality are unlikely to welcome 
them. In war, it is doubtful that local municipalities will assign tenure to incoming 
displaced persons or, even more improbably, to refugees. In a situation where all 
are competing for scarce resources and the host community has also been affected 
by war, any allocation of rights or resources to refugees and displaced persons that 
the hosts perceive to be theirs, will cause conflicts between the incomers and 
hosts. In Croatia, it would also be difficult to assign tenure of land to incoming 
residents as, in many cases, the ownership of such land is still disputed as a result 
of the change from the socialist regime that was in place prior to the war. Thus, by 
allocating materials for extension to the house on a quid pro quo basis, the 
residents of camps and settlements are encouraged to make their own investment 
in materials and thus extend and improve their housing units without the necessity 
of allocating tenure. Thus, the residents of Cepin are in possession of perceived 
tenure as personal investment is legitimised by the management's comparable 
investment. 
The literature indicated that host governments would be wary of allowing the 
consolidation of shelter, as it implies that refugees and displaced persons are then 
permanent rather than temporary. However, there is no indication among the 
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testimonies of the refugees and displaced persons that the act of adapting or 
extending the housing unit curtails their desire to return home. 
"We are laughing at you for asking us such a naive questIon, of course 
we still wish to return home. The return to our home in Plitvice is all 
we are talking about here all the time. We have been in Karlovac for 
three years and yet in Just a few minutes we would be packed and 
ready to go back to our home." (Displaced family in Gaza camp, 
Karlovac, January] 995) 
•._---- -_._--- ---' 
fig 6. 7, One o/the houses in Summer 1994 (source: the author) 
The changes to individual houses in the camp ofCepin were very noticeable. In the 
five months between the author's two visits to the site, the bouses had been 
extended further and the additions improved upon (Fig 6 .7 and 6.8) 
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Fig 6.8. The same house in January 1995 (source: the author) 
The same process but to an even greater degree can be seen in Blace camp at 
Rokovci, where extensions that were once wood and boarding have been 
incrementally improved with bricks and blocks and render. Fences have been 
constructed around the units, garages built, paths laid and vegetables patches and 
flower borders established 3 (Fig 6.9). Residents have invested their time and their 
3 The visible level of investment in the Rokovci camp may be a reflection of the origin of the 
residents, all of whom are displaced persons rather than refugees and of whom the vast majority 
come from rich towns located within the pre-war Vukovar county in Eastern Slavonia. This area 
comprised a thin strip of land following the Danube river and was an important commercial, 
industrial and transport centre. Residents within this area were seen to be wealthy prior to the 
war beginning, wealth which they have, to a comparable degree. retained. Thus many of the 
houses in BIace can be seen with garages and satellite dishes attached. 
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money in adapting the houses and in trying to retain a degree of normality within 
the new environment. 
Blace camp, Rokovci, Eastern Slavonia 
Accommodates: 2120 Displaced persons 
oRefugees 





Fig 6.9. The improvements to the camp showing the paths, fences and profusion 
oftelevision aerials (source: the author) 
Looking again at the upper level of the camp at Gasinci, it can be seen how the 
layout prevents the extension, adaptation or personaiisation of the housing units. 
With such a tight layout there is virtually no opportunity to change the houses. 
Despite the lack of opportunity, residents have endeavoured to extend their units 
the only possible way and have covered over the gap between two houses to make 
extra storage space (Fig 6.10). However, as fast as they constructed such covered 
areas, the camp management pulled the structures down as they constituted a fire 
hazard. Thus, the refugees are denied all opportunity to adapt their units and yet, 
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with up to eight individuals living in a space of 18m2 (2.25m2 per person), there is 
clearly a great need to extend the space. Once again, the relief aid that had been 
provided is inadequate and yet refugees are prevented from improving the 
situation through their own efforts. 
b:bjeglice Centar Gasinci, Dakovacka Satnnca, 
Eastern Slavonia 
Accommodates 0 Displaced persons 
3 100 Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, originally JNA barracks with 
additions built y many agencIes 
Camp 
Fig 6.10. The makeshift extensions built between the units (source' the author) 
Those refugees who live in the housing units on the lower level of the camp do 
have the opportunity to extend the houses as they are more spread out due to the 
steeply sloping nature of the site and the absence of concrete decking 
Consequently, many of these units have extensions, built on out of materiaJs that 
they have managed to collect incrementaJly from the camp and its environs (Fig 
6.11). They are, of necessity, small extensions because the residents of Gasinci are 
not provided with materiaJs and so they must rely on those that they can find 
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However, the profusion of extensions on the southern side shows the level of their 
desire to adapt the space With densities as high as they are within the houses 
(4.2m2 per person), this wish to extend the space is understandable 
Izbjeglice Cenhn Gasinci, Dal(ov8cl(a Satnira. 
'" / ), Easlern Siavonia 
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 Accommodates 	 oDisplaced persons 
3 I 00 Refugees 
Managed by the ODPR, originally JNA barracks w1th 
addilions built by many agencies 
Camp 
Fig 6. I r Incremenlal extension of the housing units on 'he southern side of the 
camp (source : the authOl) 
For those in collective centres and private accommodation there is no opportunity 
to extend or adapt the house and rarely any land which is available to cultivate 
" . .. we have heard about other places where there are flals with their 
own bathrooms and separate bedrooms and living rooms and a garden 
in the front , and we are dreaming about such a solution (Croatian 
Refugee speaking in Zaprude Barracks, January 1995) 
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In those buildings that have been converted from their pre-war use, there is no 
opportunity for the residents to adapt the accommodation. So families remain 
occupying the one room that they have been allocated, sharing central facilities 
with the other residents. 
The psychological benefits of residents being able to adapt their houses should be 
recognised and provided for, however, this is not to suggest that every single 
refugee or displaced person will want to extend their property or plant gardens. 
The groups of refugees and displaced persons are not homogenous communities of 
like-minded individuals all wishing to build houses and plant potatoes. There will 
be those who do not wish to undertake such activities because they lack the ability 
or the knowledge or the motivation to do so. A recent UNHCR survey conducted 
among privately accommodated refugees and displaced persons in Slavonia, 
showed that only one family out of one hundred interviewed " ... did not feel like 
working so never used the seeds" (UNHCR, 1994) which had been donated by the 
CRe. 
Residents may not wish to invest time and energy in the property as a result of the 
lack of choice in the original location. If they have no vested interest in staying in 
the location, there will be little motivation to invest time and money in improving 
it: 
"It is strange, when I first arrived I wanted to change the house to how 
I wanted it. But now, I realise that I cannot, because this place is not 
for me. I have no feeling for this place. I will go somewhere else and 
start again, but not here ... " (Refugee from Sarajevo speaking in Kutina 
camp, January 1995) 
Others feel strongly that they do not wish to adapt the house because it signifies 
their acceptance of the condition of exile and suggests that they have abandoned 
their hopes of returning home: 
" No, we feel very strongly that we will not work on this house here. 
We will not do anything because our hope to go home is very big. It is 
our normal house or nothing." (Displaced family in Gaza camp, 
Karlovac, January 1995) 
The choice to extend the unit or not remains with the resident The essential 
concept is not that the refugees or displaced persons do extend and adapt their 
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units, but that they have the choice to do so if they wish. The accommodation 
provided should make allowance for residents to extend their houses or have land 
to cultivate if they wish to. The psycho-social benefits of refugees and displaced 
persons retaining control over their lives from the very basic level of day-to-day 
activities, such as food preparation, to the highest level of control over the built 
environment, need to be promoted. The importance of the type and method of 
accommodation in retention ofcoping mechanisms and recovery from trauma need 
to be acknowledged to be of primary importance. 
6.5 REFLECTIONS ON PROVISION 

Recent comments received on a paper prepared by the author and Sultan Barakat, 

which made proposals to give refugees and displaced persons in Croatia more 

control and autonomy stated: 

"During the most intense influxes of refugees and displaced 
persons ... there was no time to plan, discuss or construct adequate 
shelter facilities. Most of these buildings were not suited for 
accommodation of any duration ... they were certainly not designed to 
facilitate individual family cooking or gardening activities. Centralised 
accommodation was inevitable and indeed essential." (Murray, (ex­
director of Scottish European Aid, now a consultant working in 
Mostar and Tuzla) communication by fax to the author, January 1996, 
emphasis added) 
The stated "inevitability" of centralised provision needs to be questioned. As the 
initial discourse in this chapter has shown, the first rush of refugees and displaced 
persons combined with either non-existent organisational structures or existent 
structures which lack experience of refugee movements, does create chaos. In 
such situations it is inevitable that refugees and displaced persons will be sheltered 
wherever there is a space. However, that refugees and displaced persons then 
remain in such emergency accommodation for years at a time, should be neither 
"inevitable" nor "essential". Murray goes on to outline how in Bosnia the donors 
used the unstable military and political situation as a reason not to invest in the 
upgrading of accommodation centres or the relocation of the minority of refugees 
and displaced sheltered in this way. Thus such 'emergency' accommodation 
remained and the residents were kept in a situation of permanent emergency for 
periods of up to four years. The same reason for retaining refugees and displaced 
persons in inadequate shelter is almost constantly audible within Croatia. Agencies 
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and donors insist that camps and collective centres and organised centralised 
provision are inevitable because there are no alternative economical solutions. 
The author contests these statements. Is it really inevitable that refugees and 
displaced persons must be sheltered in inadequate accommodation or only 
inevitable because it is imposed by an international community that knows nothing 
other than centralised provision of accommodation? In Croatia, 79 per cent of 
refugees and displaced persons have found accommodation with host families, not 
necessarily relatives or pre-war friends, would it not have been possible to offer 
financial incentives to other families to come forward as hosts to accommodate the 
remaining 21 per cent? Comparatively, it would have been much cheaper for 
agencies to fund cash grants for host families to accommodate refugees and 
displaced persons than building and renovating the collective centres and camps 
(Section 5.3). Such accommodation would also have provided shelter that was 
more culturally appropriate and socially supportive than any form of organised 
accommodation could ever be. However, such financial support is an invisible 
contribution and cannot be used to visibly promote the 'good works' of the 
humanitarian community. Media coverage and visibility are important to aid 
agencies and donors, as illustrated in Chapter Two (Section 2.3.7). Verification of 
the importance ofvisibility and press coverage comes from the Italian Government 
which recently refused to invest in the renovation of an existing hotel to 
accommodate elderly displaced persons until they were assured that there would 
be media coverage of the opening of the centre and articles and books published 
about the process (personal communication, Cizmek, 1995). 
The agendas of agencies and donors that motivate them to promote the 
construction of visible centres and camps and encourage centralised aid provision, 
need to be reconfigured to provide more appropriate aid. The severe and long 
lasting consequences of removing personal control from refugees and displaced 
persons have to be understood. Such consequences actually mean that such shelter 
solutions cost more money in the long term. At present, donors in Croatia are 
funding a myriad of psycho-social programmes that focus on group activities and 
discussions. Such programmes are only necessary to undo the damage that 
has been caused by the institutionalised way in which refugees and displaced 
persons are accommodated. It has become apparent that the shelter provided has 
served to increase the levels of stress and trauma experienced through war and 
flight. 
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It makes no sense to spend money on curing a condition that was perpetuated by 
trying to minimise outlay in the first instance. Alternatively, it is sensible to provide 
the accommodation in a way that enables refugees and displaced persons to regain 
control over their lives and supports, rather than supplants, their innate coping 
mechanisms. Thus, shelter will not increase the levels of stress and trauma already 
experienced. 
Centralised provision facilitates the act of humanitarian relief for the aid agency 
and donor instead of supporting the needs of the refugees and displaced 
community - it is a solution for the benefactor not the beneficiary. Such 
policies illustrate agencies' accountability to the donors rather than the recipients 
of aid. It is also evident that there is no effective needs assessment prior to 
programme implementation, or monitoring and evaluation after projects have been 
completed. The comments of refugees and displaced persons have been adduced 
to show clearly the importance to them of maintaining control, of having privacy 
and ofbeing able to access resources. 
Testimonies of the refugees and displaced persons show, although it is not defined 
in such tenns by them, that when they compare their accommodation to that of 
others, they always wish for accommodation that gives them more control over 
their lives: 
"The rooms in the hotel were better than here, but here we have a lot 
of freedom. We live together. We are cooking. It is very important to 
cook alone, what we want to eat today we can prepare ... " (Displaced 
family in Gaza camp, Karlovac, January 1995) 
Every house has a kitchen and we are all doing our own cooking and 
it's OK and we all have our own toilets, everybody. It's much better. .. 
I heard about some Swedish settlement that they built near Sisak. And 
they built one place for cooking and one place for the bathroom which 
everyone is supposed to share. I don't know how many houses ~hey 
have but I think it is much better here" (Refugee from Sarajevo 
speaking in Kutina Camp, January 1995) 
"My sister who is living on the coast in Orebic has her own priv~c~, 
her own bathroom, even a piece of corridor. That's good but thIS IS 
bad." (Refugee speaking in Depadansa Vojama, Gasinci Annex, 
February 1 995) 
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"We recognise that this is a better solution than Spansko, because we 
have our own bathroom, own toilet, our own space. We would prefer a 
house with a garden but this place is better than others" (Displaced 
person in Hotel International, January 1995) 
"It would be nice to have a garden, then I could spend time working 
there rather than sitting in the room all the time" Dacki Dom 
Graditeljskih Struka, Zagreb, January 1995) 
"We have heard about other places where there are flats with their own 
bathrooms and separate bedrooms and living rooms and a garden and 
we are dreaming about such a solution" (Croatian Refugee living in 
Zaprude ex-construction barracks, January 1995) 
Maintaining refugees and displaced persons in conditions where they lack control 
and choice, ensures a high degree of imposed vulnerability. This imposed 
vulnerability creates groups with slower recovery rates, as the community's ability 
to function autonomously is restrained and dependency on external assistance is 
enforced. Alternatively, programmes that support the capacities and abilities of the 
refugees and displaced persons move beyond aid to empowerment and thus 
promote longer term solutions. 
Once labelled as refugees or displaced persons, the treatment of such groups by 
the wider society makes their livelihoods vulnerable to destruction. This imposed 
vulnerability in Croatia is linked to numerous factors and is not an absolute 
concept. As has been shown, it varies depending on whether the migrant is in 
organised or private accommodation; the levels of control maintained and the 
access to physical resources such as land and building materials that is facilitated. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter highlights a number of issues that need to be addressed if the 
humanitarian community is to improve its allocation of emergency shelter solutions 
in developed, war-torn nations such as Croatia. Recommendations that address the 
following issues win be listed in the final chapter of this thesis: 
Can refugees and displaced persons be provided with shelter that allows the 
maintenance of dignity and privacy, when aid agencies and host governments 
endeavour to obtain maximum densities in accommodation? 
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Long term accommodation in emergency shelter has depredatory effects on 
refugees and displaced persons. How is it possible to negate such effects? 
Personal control over familiar routine tasks can assist in the psychological 
recovery of refugees and displaced persons and facilitate the maintenance of their 
productive capacity. How can such control be encouraged? 
Locating refugees and displaced persons in vast, designated camps and settlements 
places uneven strain on existing resources and serves to label and segregate the 
inhabitants. How can the practice of encampment favoured by aid agencies and 
donors be curtailed? 
How can the implementing agenc1es be made accountable to refugees and 
displaced persons as well as donors? 
How can the cultural applicability of shelter and consequently its greater 
supporting role, be ensured? 
What are the positive psycho-social effects of shelter types and how can they be 
encouraged to the exclusion of negative effects? 
What mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure that lessons are learnt from 
past shelter programmes? 
How can the humanitarian community ensure that its shelter programmes 
accurately fill the needs of refugees and displaced persons? 
How can access to enabling mechanisms be ensured? 
How can host governments be made to see refugees as a resource and not as a 
burden? 
This discussion of imposed vulnerability and repression of coping mechanisms is 
complemented by the exploration of the issue of integration. The physical and 
social integration of refugees and displaced persons into the host community have 
strong positive and negative effects on the maintenance of livelihoods while in 
exile. These issues will form the basis of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: PHYSICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 

INTEGRATION IN PRACTICE 

7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature reviewed in Chapters Two and Three indicated that it is the sum of 
refugees' physical and non-physical capacities that enables them to survive and 
cope (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Anderson, 1993). This implies that refugees 
require an organised access to social, economic and physical resources. Yet, as 
Wilson (1992) states, in many cases refugees' coping strategies are affected by 
rules and regulations that deny their interaction with hosts. 
It is the social, economic and physical integration of incomers with hosts that this 
chapter will address. Findings from the study in Croatia will be adduced to show 
how policies that deny the interaction of incomers with hosts negatively affect 
refugees, displaced persons and hosts. 
The findings will show that the physical integration of camps, collective centres 
and private accommodations facilitates the social and economic integration of 
refugees, displaced persons and hosts. This suggests therefore, that the location 
and planning of camps and settlements particularly, must be carefully considered by 
implementing agencies. 
Harrell-Bond's (1986) definition of integration speaks of the co-existence of 
refugees and hosts. The study of Croatia shows that the prevalence of internal 
displacement in addition to migration across borders, means that integration must 
now embody refugees, hosts and internally displaced persons. The three factions 
possess widely differing degrees of legitimacy and yet must be provided for 
without perceived discrimination or partiality. All three groups have been affected 
by war, and so aid provision could utilise their shared suffering to bring them 
together, and yet it will be shown that programmes and projects fail time and again 
to address these commonalities of experience. The lack of integration of refugees, 
displaced persons and hosts combined with discriminatory aid policies increases the 
levels of tension and conflict between groups. 
--
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The findings also illustrate the importance of a country like Croatia, which is at 
war and yet retains peaceful areas which can shelter forced migrants, avoiding the 
spread of conflict throughout areas of peace. Thus, it will be shown that policies 
must aim to reduce ethnic rifts between refugees, displaced and hosts and 
endeavour to rebuild trust and co-operation at the micro-level. The study shows it 
is important therefore, that where hosts are expected to share existing scarce 
resources with incomers, there is a reciprocal arrangement whereby the provision 
for the incomers made by the humanitarian community also benefits the host. 
Integration must be a two way process in order to build a platform of mutual 
understanding at the micro-level that will aid post-war reconstruction. 
These are the issues that will be discussed within the findings presented in this 
chapter. To facilitate the presentation of the findings, the following discourse will 
be divided into the two main categories addressed in the literature (Wilson, 1992; 
Harrell-Bond, 1990; Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Anderson, 1993): 
• Physical integration 
• Social and economic integration 
7.2 PHYSICAL INTEGRATION 
Physical integration can be defined as the extent to which the physical structure 
and infrastructure comprising the accommodation for refugees and displaced 
persons merges into the population centres of the hosts; the degree to which it is 
interwoven into the existing fabric of towns, cities, villages and hamlets; the extent 
to which it is dependent upon and contributes to existing communities. Examples 
from the study will be adduced to show that shelter projects located within, or on 
the periphery of, existing settlements, where the physical interaction and interplay 
of vehicular and pedestrian roots is high, promote greater social integration 
between incomers and hosts. The movement of traffic and pedestrians through and 
around camps, collective centres and private accommodations creates 
opportunities for mutually beneficial social and economic activity. 
7.2.1 Private Accommodation 
In this regard, therefore, those who are located in private accommodation benefit 
most from their place of shelter. This accommodation by default is located within 
existing urban structures. The refugees and displaced persons housed in this way 
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are diffused within the community rather than located in one specified area which 
would strain the local resources and infrastructure. Their social integration is 
facilitated as they are not 'obvious' to the host community; they are not in a 
labelled, designated and defined environment. As they are perceptually less 
intrusive on the host's environment, they cause less tension within the community. 
Privately accommodated refugees and displaced persons are not seen to receive 
specialised attention, nor they are visibly treated in any way better than the host 
community, this perceived 'equality' facilitates the acceptance of incomers within 
the host community. The findings show that only where there is visual and 
perceptible imbalance in receipt of goods and aid between incomers and hosts, or 
where incomers are defined as 'different' by their accommodation, will the 
relationship between incomers and hosts become strained. 
7.2.2 Collective Centres 
Applying the same concept to those in collective centres, it can be seen how they 
too benefit from being located within existing settlements. One of the main 
advantages of physical integration is that it facilitates access to education, health 
and employment opportunities for refugees and displaced persons: 
"The benefit of this accommodation is the location, in Zagreb, it is 
technically within the town. Because of that it is easy to get to the 
school, to the institution where we go for medical treatment and so 
on ... " (Croatian refugee family in Zaprude barracks, January 1995) 
At the same time however, refugees and displaced persons in collective centres 
lack the invisibility of those in private accommodation. As collectives are 
converted public buildings, the host community is made very much aware of the 
presence of refugees and displaced persons through the loss of the building'S 
primary function to the community. This acts to increase the tension between the 
incomers and the hosts, as not only are the hosts to share the few resources that 
they still retain with the incomers, but they also completely lose some of the 
resources that they possessed pre-war. This may not be a problem when the 
building provided workers' accommodation or housed the army, but where the 
collective centre is located in an old school or hotel then the loss is felt more. Such 
an attitude is particularly prevalent in areas of the Adriatic coast where tourism 
was the primary pre-war source of income for the population. Despite the present 
lack of tourists in Croatia, hotel owners are constantly pushing to have the 
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refugees and displaced persons moved on from their hotels so that they can resume 
trade (ODPR, 1995). 
The data shows that there is a concern within the host community that providing 
physically integrated accommodation will ensure that some of the displaced 
persons and refugees will not want to return to their homes when they are able: 
"Dubrovnik is a special situation compared to the rest of Croatia, 
because here it is possible to go back home. But, the government must 
do something to push them back home, because they have been here 
for three years and it is easy for them here. For the young ones from 
villages they are now living in the town, it is easy to get to school, 
there are places to go in the evening, there is no long journey to get 
back home. They like it here and do not want to go back to their life in 
the villages." (Manager of the Bellevue Hotel, Dubrovnik, September 
1994) 
However, the fears of the hosts seem to be ill founded due to the difference 
between 'not wanting to return' and 'being allowed to stay'. The displaced may be 
able to remain while the ODPR is paying for their accommodation, food, heating, 
health care and education, however it is highly unlikely that they will be able to 
afford to stay once the government stops this funding. Even if they could afford it, 
current policy is that as the ODPR is reconstructing the villages and houses in the 
Dubrovnik hinterland, the occupiers are being 'encouraged' to return with the offer 
of financial and material benefits as well as penalties for non-compliance 
(Handabaka, 1995). With the government in such a position of strength, it is 
unlikely that displaced persons and refugees will be allowed to remain in organised 
accommodation once their return or repatriation is possible, thus concerns about 
the permanence of incomers in the host community appear unfounded. 
7.2.3 Camps and Settlements 
It is primarily the purpose built camps and settlements that are less likely to be 
physically integrated into existing built environments. The literature indicates that 
in general, land made available by a host government for the location and 
construction of camps and settlements is margina11and of little development value. 
It is therefore unlikely that camps will be found in the heart of existing settlements, 
where land has a high value. The location of camps in Croatia complies to this 
hypothesis, as they are all either peripheral to existing settlements or totally 
segregated from them. However, the camp ofCepin, shows that even those located 
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on the periphery of a town can be designed to physically interact with the town and 
thus promote the social integration of the incoming and the host communities. 
The three GTZ camps of Cepin, Rokovci and Karlovac are all located on the 
periphery ofexisting towns on arterial roads (Fig 7.1). 
Naselje Prijatelstva, 
Eastern Slavonia 
Located on the periphery 
of Cepin town 
Gaza Camp, South 
of Zagreb 
Located on the periphery 
of Karlovac town 
BlaceCamp, 
Eastern Slavonia 
Located on the pcriphcI)' 
of Rokovci town 
Fig 7.1. Plans of the three GTZ camps showing the locations 011 arterial road') 
(source: Kreutller, 1993) 
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Thus all three camps are passed by a large volume of traffic each day. This in itself 
provides economic and social opportunities for integration with the host 
community. For example, in Rokovci, one family has extended their house, which 
is located on the main road, to provide a bar - the Biffe Prognanik (Displaced 
Persons' Bar). It attracts custom from the residents within the camp and passing 
trade from those driving by and so provides a place for social interaction between 
hosts and incomers (Fig 7.2). 
. .
'-'1----' 
Blace camp, Rokovci, Eastern Slavonia 
Accommodates: 2120 Displaced persons 
oRefugees 
Managed by the ODPR, built by GTZ 
Camp 
Fig 7.2. The Biffe Prognanik, the Displaced Persons' Bar (source: the author) 
While it is possible to gain a degree of interaction just from the passing traffic, the 
degree of integration achieved when traffic is passing through the camp rather than 
merely passing by the camp is far higher. Cepin is the only one of the three camps 
which benefits from some through-traffic. The roads that pass through it, link areas 
of the existing town and thus provide a short cut for the host community to get 
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from one location to another. This physical planning, which appears to be more by 
accident than design as it has only occurred in one of the three camps, has resulted 
in the settlement becoming an integral part of the town. The host conununity 
through-traffic has encouraged both social and economic integration, in that the 
displaced can sell the produce from their own gardens by the roadside and attract 
customers from the host and the displaced community. A look at the other two 
camps of Rokovci and Karlovac shows that although they too are located on main 
arterial roads, there is no reason for the traffic to divert off these roads and through 
the camps unless they have specific business in the camps. Thus, the opportunities 
for physical mixing of hosts and incomers and resultant social integration are 
negated. 
The physical interaction and integration of Cepin camp is supported by other 
activities. The displaced children attend the existing local school rather than a 
specific school constructed solely for them in the camp. This helps with the 
integration of the displaced and the host community, as the children from the camp 
play with their friends in the town and those from the town come to the camp. The 
integration with hosts is also facilitated by the composition of the camp residents 
who are almost entirely displaced persons (the ratio of displaced to refugees is 
115: 1) who used to live, at most, a matter of twenty kilometres away from where 
they are now living: 
"We are from Tenja, we can see our old house from the roof of one 
building in Osijek, it was like a suburb of the city, it is quite hard for us 
to be so close ... " (Displaced family in Cepin, August 1994) 
The residents, therefore, knew the area of Cepin well in pre-war times and many of 
them still retain the same jobs that they had in Cepin, or the central town ofOsijek, 
prior to the war. There is a familiarity which fosters feelings of security and safety: 
"This place is closer to my home, that is why I came here. Osijek was 
the centre for everyone who used to live in Eastern Croatia before the 
war. People from a circle around of about thirty five kilometres all 
came here to do their shopping and so on. So I feel that this place is 
nearly home" (Displaced woman speaking in Cepin camp, January 
1995) 
The degree of familiarity aids in the process of integration, as there is no massive 
alteration in the environment or the traditions and culture of the region. For 
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refugees, the change in surroundings is always more severe and consequently 
harder to come to terms with. Locating settlements for refugees and displaced 
persons close to their place of origin is a positive benefit for integration of the 
incomers as it provides a culture and landscape with which they are familiar. 
However, it does also provide a cause for concern in terms of security, as for the 
displaced persons, their place of origin is located in occupied territory and although 
UNPROFOR is supposed to retain the peace in these areas, there have been 
instances where shells have been fired into the free territory of Croatia. The town 
of Karlovac where Gaza camp is located, has been particularly targeted by enemy 
fire throughout the period of UNPROFOR residence, and the camp has been hit 
during these shelling periods. While the host population is also in danger during 
these attacks, it does seem that the displaced persons are more vulnerable in their 
cellar-less, prefabricated timber houses. The security of settlements is an issue that 
the displaced persons and refugees see to be of importance: 
"It is good that we are near to our original home, because the area is 
familiar, but then there is still shooting all around here, we can hear it 
at night. Zupanja is under constant fire and it is only 15kms from here. 
When they shoot at it, this place shakes. This place would be a lot 
better if they built a shelter" (Displaced man in Blace camp, Rokovci, 
February 1995) 
The benefits of locating displaced persons and refugees in familiar surroundings 
where possible, suggest that it is a policy that should be encouraged, in 
combination with supply of the appropriate safety considerations such as air raid 
shelters. Refugees and displaced persons have lost many of their physical 
possessions, the belongings that they can retain and bring with them into exile are 
their culture, traditions and abilities. Items that are familiar to them and cannot be 
taken away with ease. Moving into an environment which is sensitive to such 
cultures and traditions facilitates the recovery process from the trauma of war and 
flight. Such patterns and traditions are also reflected within the built environment, 
by locating new camps and settlements close to the place of origin of refugees or 
displaced persons, such familiar environments can be emulated. For foreign aid 
agencies, who do not know the areas in which they are working, this process is 
greatly assisted by working with those who understand and are familiar with the 
local environments and traditions. 
F or instance, the jurisdiction for planning laws in Croatia rests with the provinces, 
thus the plans that the GTZ had drawn up for the camps at Cepin, Rokovci and 
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Karlovac in Zagreb had to be redesigned with the municipal planning authorities in 
each town. In their report, the GTZ regret that they were " ... only able to bring 
limited influence to bear on the development plans" (Kreutner, 1993). They label 
the plans developed for Rokovci and Cepin "monotonous", and state that the 
planning consortium could not be "persuaded" to give up their unimaginative 
design. The author suggests that it is a benefit to the occupants of Cepin and 
Rokovci that the GTZ did not manage to change the designs of the municipal 
planners, for the resulting "monotonous" plans are highly reflective of the 
traditional settlements in the area of Eastern Slavonia. A drive around the 
surrounding countryside would have shown the GTZ that many of the villages are 
planned on a linear, 'corridor' basis to simply follow the line of the road. Thus the 
patterns of the plans of Cepin and Rokovci are intimately familiar to the displaced 
persons resident there and offer the security of a known structure. This physical 
integration thus increases the social interaction between incomers and hosts and 
also facilitates the continuance of understood cultures and familiar traditions that 
provide security. 
In a marked contrast to Cepin, the camp of Gasinci, located within Croatian Army 
territory is almost completely segregated from the host community. The camp is 
within an old army barracks that has been extended to accommodate 3,100 
Bosnian Muslim refugees. It is a designated transit camp for those going on to 
third countries, but in reality those who are older, or less well educated, or 
physically or mentally disabled cannot get residency in a third country and remain 
in Gasinci for many months or years. Even for those who do eventually get 
residency in a third country, the wait can be over a year. As the camp is located 
within army territory it is, by its very nature, located away from surrounding towns 
and villages. Because of its army links, the camp is surrounded by high fences and 
barbed wire and the entrance is marked by a manned checkpoint. Between the 
camp and the nearest town of Dakovacka Satnica, some fifteen minutes bus ride 
away, there are no other settlements, villages or farms. Indeed, the only visible 
structures are watchtowers containing armed guards. Thus the residents of Gasinci 
are physically totally segregated from the host community. Their entrance and 
egress from the camp is controlled by the fact that they require written permissions 
from the management to leave the camp, and then they can only do so on the 
organised bus which leaves once daily for Dakovo or on the Red Cross 
transportation if they are going to hospital in Osijek: 
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" ... Of course it is better for us to live in some other place rather than 
Gasinci because Gasinci is some kind of camp, because it is surrounded 
with wire and we don't feel free. We have to ask for exit cards to get 
out, we have to wait in line for everything and that is why it is better to 
live elsewhere." 
"...I would like to have the freedom to walk where I want, to go by 
bus where I want ..." 
"1 lived in Tuzla for a while. And it was better there, because I could 
walk freely even with the grenades and fire and here, I cannot move... " 
(Comments from refugees living in Gasinci Refugee Camp, in Eastern 
Slavonia, February 1995) 
Compared with Cepin settlement, where "People are free to come and go .... We 
like to call this settlement a village because we haven't got any fences around and 
the people like to stay here ... " (Manager of Cepin camp, August 1994), the camp 
of Gasinci displays a very different policy. The segregation labels the residents of 
Gasinci 'refugees' and therefore 'different' and promotes the sectarian way in 
which they are viewed by the wider community. As they are entirely Bosnian 
Muslim refugees the segregation and labelling enforces underlying ethnic rifts that 
result from the war between Croatia and Bosnia. The conflict and tensions are 
therefore perpetuated and dispersed from the heart of the war in Bosnia into areas 
of relative peace. The segregation and consequential way in which these refugees 
are labelled by the hosts, further affects their access to existing resources within the 
host community. The refugees are then caught in a self-perpetuating downward 
spiral where segregation breeds suspicion and resentment which further increases 
their segregation from the hosts. Such segregation denies refugees access to the 
enabling mechanisms that would promote the maintenance of autonomy. 
7.2.4 Discrimination and Bias 
The visible difference between the integration of Cepin camp that holds 2,590 
displaced persons and no refugees and the segregation of Gasinci which holds 
3,100 Bosnian Muslim refugees and no displaced persons speaks vociferously of 
the attitude of the Croatian authorities towards those of Croatian nationality and 
those of Bosnian nationality. An attitude exemplified by a member of UNHCR 
during an interview with a displaced family: 
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"They have been offered the chance to move into Gasinci, which is 
better than here as they do not have to pay for anything and they get 
their food. However, they have a pride of which I approve - they are 
Croats, they have the right to live in Osijek. It would be, let's say, 
impolite, to put them into Gasinci" (Croatian UNHCR field officer, 
Osijek, January 1995, emphasis added) 
The Croatian Government policy for provision of aid to refugees and displaced 
persons, as outlined in Chapter Five, would suggest that refugees and displaced 
persons receive exactly equal treatment (with the exception of long term 
healthcare). However, although the categories of aid given to both groups are the 
same, education, housing, etc.. The unwritten levels of assistance within those 
categories show distinct hierarchy to firstly displaced Croatians, secondly Croatian 
refugees and finally Bosnian refugees. The data will show that such policies of bias 
and segregation, while understandable though not condoneable, serve only to 
widen existing ethnic rifts and do nothing to promote an atmosphere of peace for 
post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
While it is easy to see the benefits of an integrative approach, the findings in 
Croatia show how hard it is to actually achieve. Harrell-Bond's definition of 
integration indicates that groups of Bosnian Croatian, Bosnian Muslim and 
Bosnian Serb refugees need to co-exist and share scarce resources with displaced 
Croatians and Croatian nationals. For Bosnian Muslims, the problems began to 
arise with the start of hostilities between Croatia and Bosnia in April 1993. As 
outlined in Chapter Five, following a winter of tension these two forces began to 
fight each other. Muslim refugees who had fled to Croatia following the onslaught 
of the Serb forces in 1992, now found themselves taking refuge in a country with 
whom they were technically at war. Such a situation makes integrative policies 
hard to implement by even the most determined aid agency. The experience of the 
DRC in trying to allow Bosnian Muslims into their settlement illustrates the point 
precisely. Their camp in Kutina opened in February 1993, right at the time when 
relations between Muslims and Croatians were deteriorating. The camp was to 
take the most needy cases from the refugees and displaced persons already resident 
in the town of Kutina regardless of ethnicity. However, all those within the town 
were feeling the effects of the war, the strain placed upon existing scarce resources 
by the influx of refugees and displaced persons had affected the hosts just as much 
as the incoming refugees and displaced persons. Everyone, therefore wanted to 
benefit from the potential improvement in their situation that the DRC camp could 
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bring. This competition made the allocation of places in Kutina very sensitive, as 
both the displaced persons and the town residents objected to the Muslim refugees 
benefiting over Croatian nationals. It was they who put great pressure on the 
Kutina municipality and the DRC delegation to deny Muslims access to the camp. 
It is hard for agencies operating within the ethno-nationalistic environment of 
Croatia resulting from the war, to implement projects and programmes that are 
impartial and unbiased. The DRC report on Kutina states: 
" ... if DRC had not been responsible for the management ... the 
settlement would no doubt have become purely Croatian. Many 
inhabitants of especially Muslim origin have expressed to DRC that our 
presence was of decisive importance to the security of their everyday 
life in the settlement. "You are our guarantee", they said. 
... [That] some people within the ODPR might have preferred a 
different ethnic makeup ... became clear in July 1993, when the ODPR 
without previous notice appointed three managers for the three DRC 
refugee settlements. For the settlement of Kutina, the appointment fell 
to one of the inhabitants who had quite clearly expressed that there 
ought not to be any Muslim refugees in the settlement" (Kristensen, et 
al., 1994) 
Ultimately, the ethnic makeup of the settlement was as follows: 
Ethnicity Number 
Croatian Displaced Persons 343 

Bosnian Croat Refugees 761 

Bosnian Muslim Refugees 314 

Bosnian Serb Refugees 10 

Fig 7.3. Ethnic make-up QfKutina Camp (source: the author) 

A balance which still favoured those with Croatian citizenship, but did at least 
accommodate a percentage of Bosnian Muslim and Serb refugees. With the 
authorities within the Kutina area under such great pressure from the local 
inhabitants and the displaced community within Kutina to provide only places for 
Croatians; it was a struggle for the DRC to make as many places as they did for 
those ofother than Croatian Nationality. 
Such attitudes of segregation are a contributory factor to imposed vulnerability. 
The physical integration as displayed by Cepin camp offers opportunities for 
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income generation, healthcare and education and while it will never be a pettect 
match for all that the inhabitants have left behind, it does provide a degree of 
support through the return to understood ritual and routine. For those in Gasinci, 
the segregation is not only a constant reminder of their new status of refugee but 
also denies their opportunities for self-sufficiency and increased control. 
Many reports of increased tensions throughout the centres and private 
accommodations of Croatia, as a result of the Muslim-Croat conflict show the 
difficulties that both Muslim and Croat refugees suddenly began to encounter as 
the conflict led to fights and attacks within settlements. As one refugee reported: 
"We were living in Savudrija, but there were mostly Muslims there and 
we are Croatian so when the conflicts between Muslims and Croats 
began, we had to leave and come here." (Croatian Refugee in 
lvankovo Wagon Camp, January 1995) 
Such conflicts have led to the segregation of refugees from displaced persons, 
rather than attempts to maintain integrated patterns as in the DRC camps. A look 
at the figures for some of the biggest camps and collectives within Croatia, shows 
that camps are wholly dedicated to either refugees or displaced persons or they 
have distinct majorities ofone or the other (Fig 7.4). 
Camps such as those of the GIl support policies of segregation and discrimination 
by complying with governmental insistence that displaced persons be given priority 
when the allocation of accommodation takes place. The table shows how the GTl 
camps comply to the patterns of segregation of refugees from displaced persons 
and of discriminatory projects against refugees. The GTl report states that the 
project was initiated to provide accommodation for" ... approx. 20,000 displaced 
persons and refugees in Croatia" (Kreutner, 1993, emphasis added). The camps 
were located in areas which were already overflowing with refugees and displaced 
persons and were intended to alleviate some of the overcrowding. In this light, the 
allocation of accommodation mainly to displaced persons in the Gaza camp of 
Karlovac can be understood, as there were 15,045 displaced persons to only 1,040 
refugees, although the ratio of refugees to displaced in the camp is less than that 
within the potentially recipient community. However, the two camps built in the 
Osijek and Vinkovci regions were located in areas where there were far more 
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balanced numbers of refugees and displaced persons! and yet the displaced 
community still received priority. Instead of endeavouring to stop such 
discrimination, the GTZ have endorsed the policy through their tacit acceptance. 
Through their actions, the GTZ have helped increase the ethnic rifts between 
refugees and displaced persons and promoted conflict rather than utilising their 
programmes to build peace on the micro-level. 
Centre Refugees DisElaced Persons 
Gasinci 3100 0 
Savudrija 1750 0 
Obonjan 400 0 
Stobrec 448 0 
Kamenjak 693 26 
Puntizela 313 9 
Rokovci* 0 2120 
Cepin* 0 2590 
Karlovac* 33 1870 
VaraZdin 1 724 63 
VaraZdin 2 673 40 
Kutina ** 873 307 
Lipovljani** 478 576 
Fig 7.4. Balance qfresidents in some ofthe camps and collective centres (source: 
dataJrom ODPR, 1995) 
* Camps implemented by the GTZ 
** Camps implemented by the DRC 
It is important to integrate the refugees and displaced persons with each other, to 
guard against perceived bias and consequent widening of ethnic rifts. The two 
camps in Spansko, a suburb within Zagreb, show the way in which refugees and 
displaced persons can construct notions of bias. Both centres were barracks lived 
in pre-war by construction workers during the fabrication of Spansko suburb, both 
consist of sub-divided wooden sheds with central washing facilities (Fig 7.5 and 
7.6). Spansko 1, that used to belong to the company Industogradnje, houses 
displaced persons, Spansko 2, that was owned by Tempo, houses refugees. The 
two camps are separated by a distance of approximately one kilometre and have no 
1 28,335 displaced persons to 12,203 refugees in Osijek region and 14,863 displaced persons to 
19,031 refugees in the Vinkovci region, ODPR figures for August 1995. 
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contact with each other. It is the lack of integration between the two camps that 
encourages the perceptions of bias by the refugees, for there is no verbal contact or 
sharing of information that would enable each group to know exactly what the 
other receives. There is a difference in what each group receives, for refugees in 
organised accommodation do not receive a cash grant whereas displaced persons 
do 2. 
Industogradnje. Spansko 1, Spansko, Zagreb 
Accommodates: 652 Displaced persons 
oRefugees 
Managed by ODPR, previously construction workers' 
barracks 
Collective Centre 
Fig 7.5. The camps for displaced persons in ,~pansko suburb (source: the author) 
However, the lack of contact between the two groups exaggerates the differences. 
Without interaction, the only evidence of the amount of aid and assistance each 
group receives is the visible state of the two camps, and that of the displaced 
2 Inequalities in provision will be discussed later in this section. 
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persons is visibly better. There are many cars and a tractor or two, net curtains at 
the windows, vegetable patches established and tools for cultivation. 
Tempo, Spansko 2, Spansko, Zagreb 
Accommodates: 0 Displaced persons 
approx. 360 Refugees 
Managed by ODPR, previously construction workers' 
barracks 
Collective Centre 
Fig 7.6. Camp for refugees in the Spansko suburb (source: the author) 
The reality however, is that the visible wealth of the displaced persons' camp is 
higher largely because they were able to bring so much more with them when they 
fled, and not because of cash grants that they have received since being in the 
centre. Examination shows that the cars have Vukovar licence plates, and thus 
were available to be loaded up with personal possessions when the owners fled. 
The more complex nature of flight through occupied territory that refugees took, 
meant that they could not carry anything with them and could not come out in their 
own cars. Such visible wealth and lack of information, enforced by segregation 
results in exaggerated perceptions ofbias: 
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"They [the displaced persons] have much nicer accommodation. They 
have bett~r food. and they get more money every month, someone cares 
about theIr heatmg. In this camp we are helpless, no one cares about 
us, because now we are from a different country and no on wants to 
know about us." (Refugee in Tempo barracks, Zagreb, February 1995) 
Enforced feelings of discrimination only serve to widen ethnic rifts and do not 
facilitate the reunification of a country following such a war. There are conflicts 
between refugees and displaced persons when they are located together in the same 
centre. A vitriolic argument that broke out during a visit to the collective centre 
Hotel Posejdon on the island of Korcula, was ample testimony to the tensions that 
result from accommodating both groups together. Although it is difficult to put the 
two together, it would be more beneficial to work at solving the differences of 
living together than to separate the two in an attempt to prevent the problem. 
Separation does not solve the problem, as has been shown, separation only serves 
to increase the feelings of discrimination. Locating the opposing factions in the 
same accommodation, however, enables reconciliation of the differences and 
promotes the building of an ultimate peace at the grass roots level. Through 
establishing communication at the micro-level agencies can aim their shelter 
projects at the root causes of the conflict. By addressing the ethnic rifts that exist, 
and accommodating refugees and displaced persons together, agencies promote the 
maintenance of post-war peace when it comes. El Bushra's "process of conflict" 
diagram illustrated in Chapter Three shows how war will start again if the causes 
are not addressed during the period of 'fragile peace'. In the Croatian context, it is 
possible to address the causes of the conflict between the Croatian and Bosnian 
Muslim sides while the refugees and displaced persons are both accommodated in 
Croatia. If such underlying tensions are not addressed, but actually increased 
during exile, then the fragile peace that currently exists between the Croatian and 
Bosnian forces is unlikely to survive once attempts to re-build Bosnia as a multi­
ethnic state begin (Fig 7.7). 
It is interesting to note that over the past two years many projects have appeared in 
Croatia which pass under the title of 'conflict resolution'. These heavy, top-down 
projects are instigated by, and receive funding from, the international community 
and are aimed at bringing opposing groups together. One such project aimed to 
bring together members of the group of displaced persons with members of the 
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~r~up.of re~gees living in the free territory of Croatia with members of the rou 
hvmg In Knm controlled UNP A North and South. g p 
Underlying ethnic tensions reappear 








1'IK 7. 7. FI Bushra 's process (?fconflict model, adapted to show the current 
Croatian situation (source: the author) 
I 
Not only does the project re-enforce divisions by specifYing the characteristics of 
the groups that will be included - refugee, displaced and citizens of occupied 
zones. It is also an artificial union to remedy a situation which was initially created 
by the unthinking application of humanitarian aid policies. Had groups of refugeeI and displaced persons not been segregated into separate locations from the 
beginning of the influx into Croatia - there would be little need to later enforce I 
t artificial unification projects. 
I 
I It has to be understood, that policies of integration would be facilitated were there not such discrimination between the assistance given to refugees and displaced 
I 
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persons. The entire aid system discriminates one from the other, as the individuals 
are labelled either refugee or displaced as soon as they register; refugees receive 
blue cards and displaced persons, yellow. The distinctions are then reinforced 
, 
not 
only by the Croatian government but also by many members of the international 
community that tie the aid that they give to certain groups. Whilst such policies of 
discrimination by the Croatian government can be understood, though not 
condoned, it is hard to see what benefit NGOs gain from discriminatory behaviour. 
The practice of earmarking aid seems to be endemic in many agencies. UNHCR, as 
the name suggests, deals primarily with refugees, not internally displaced people, 
Marhamet (a Muslim organisation) will predominantly help Muslims, Caritas (a 
Catholic organisation) focuses on Croatians. The resultant inequalities of such a 
system only serve to increase tensions. 
7.3 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
When it is well managed, integration into existing social systems such as 
employment, healthcare, education not only serves to unite incomers and hosts, but 
also reduces the imposed vulnerability of groups. When refugees and displaced 
persons can support themselves through income generating activities in the same 
way as they did pre-war, then they are less dependent on outside assistance and 
retain a higher level of control over their own lives. 
7.3.1 Employment 
In Croatia, access to income generating opportunities is a problematic issue for 
both refugees and displaced persons, although existing legislation makes it more 
difficult for refugees. There is nothing in Croatian law that forbids members of 
either of these groups to be employed within Croatia, however, there is legislation 
that states that jobs can only be taken by a non-Croatian citizen if there is no 
Croatian already resident in the vicinity that can do that job instead. With 
unemployment currently standing at 16 per cent within Croatia, it is unlikely that 
there will be no Croatian citizen available for any job opportunity. It is therefore 
highly improbable that a Bosnian Muslim would ever be able to be appointed for a 
job over a Croatian Citizen. This lack of access to employment opportunities, 
·combined with policies that restrict refugees' coping strategies, as described in the 
previous chapter, generate high levels of imposed vulnerability on refugees. 
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Many displaced persons are still on the books of the factories and organisations for 
whom they worked pre-war. These employers are theoretically supposed to pay the 
staff a retainer even though it is no longer possible for the employee to work 
However, the reality is that the retainer is seldom received, as the firms are in 
financial difficulties due to decreased production and demand, and yet the 
displaced are categorised as employed and cannot therefore be legally employed 
elsewhere. 
"1. am still in work, even though the company doesn't exist in Zagreb, 1 
stIll formally belong to it so from time to time we are receiving a few 
hundred Kuna [£1 is approximately 8.5 Kuna]. For instance this last 
year I received two hundred Kuna [£25.00]" (Displaced person in the 
Hotel International, Zagreb, January 1995) 
Additionally, those registered as employed do not get the cash grant from the 
ODPR regardless of the regularity of the payment from the firm. Legal access of 
these groups to employment is then restricted, which encourages displaced persons 
to either seek and acquire seasonal or part time work that is cash-in-hand; sell 
personal possessions and belongings or to depend on assistance that is provided by 
relatives overseas or the government and aid agencies. 
Employment statistics for both groups, collected in a UNHCR survey of privately 
accommodated refugees and displaced persons in Slavonia, show that 72 per cent 
of the popUlation have some form of income other than the cash grant. Almost half 
of these families have at least one member of the family working, although the 
frequency of employment is three times higher for displaced persons than refugees. 
The remainder receive their alternative income from relatives overseas or relatives 
working elsewhere in Croatia or a pension from the government (this latter 
payment only goes to displaced persons). 
One of the largest financial burdens falls to those in private accommodation, for 
while those in the camps and collectives receive their accommodation, heat, water 
and power without charge, those in private accommodation have to meet these 
costs themselves. These costs, combined with the minimal access to employment 
opportunities, are the primary reason for the privately accommodated to move into 
collective accommodation and camps. While few have to pay rent per se, many 
have to contribute to or pay entirely for services such as electricity which would 
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cost an average of 86DM (£58.25) per month. The cash grant received is only 
122DM (£82.63) per month for a family of four: 
" ... We have known the man we live with for some years so we don't 
have to pay rent, but we do have to pay a share of the bills. It is a fairly 
typical situation, and even though the costs are shared it is still 
difficult." (Displaced family living in Osijek, January 1995) 
There are aspects of legislation in place that seek to curtail some of the secondary 
coping mechanisms of refugees and displaced persons, for instance that of the 
selling of personal possessions. Refugees and displaced persons can be often seen 
in the markets throughout Croatia endeavouring to sell the tinned and dried food 
that they receive through humanitarian aid parcels. In most cases, this is done not 
so much to raise an income but to enable the refugees and displaced persons to 
then purchase the fresh fruit and vegetables which they do not otherwise receive. 
Such a practice not only serves to improve the diet of the refugees and displaced 
persons, but also promotes social interaction between incomers and hosts in the 
market place. The management of Varaidin 1 found this practice so alarming that 
they included in their prodigious list of rules - "It is strictly forbidden to take any 
kind of humanitarian aid out of the centre. It is strictly forbidden to sell any kind of 
goods on the local market". The second sentence was added to the list after the 
management discovered that when the inhabitants were forbidden to take aid items 
out, they gave them to members of the host community to take out and sell for 
them. A practice that shows a high degree of social interaction with the 
surrounding community, and yet was curtailed for no obvious or understandable 
reason. 
It would seem to be more logical to question why the inhabitants felt it necessary 
to sell their aid and then address the problem, rather than just banning them from 
selling their possessions. If rations are sold because they are perceived to be 
inappropriate by the recipients and do not fill their own understanding of their 
needs, then agencies need to do something to make food provision appropriate. 
This could be done either by changing the content of the food basket, although as 
the need is for fresh fruit and vegetables this would not be appropriate, or by filling 
the need for fresh food in another way. Alternatives would be to give them access 
to land, tools and seeds or to allow them to sell the dried goods as they are doing. 
This second way benefits the host community as well as it gives them access to 
tinned products that they cannot obtain elsewhere. 
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Testimonies of refugees and displaced persons show that another copmg 
mechanism utilised to overcome restricted access to legal employment is seasonal 
cash-in-hand work as agricultural labour: 
"In Spring, the Croats start to come to the camp and ask people to help 
them with their land, and then again in Summer, people work for 
Croats digging potatoes and picking corn ... " (Refugee family in 
Gasinci camp, February 1995) 
Those in collective centres and camps on the Adriatic coast can still manage to 
obtain seasonal work in the hotels during the Summer. However, the opportunities 
are much less than existed before the war, due not only to the war keeping the 
tourists away, but also to the accommodation of refugees and displaced persons in 
the hotels. 
The desire to work and earn money on any basis, bears testimony to the ability of 
refugees and displaced persons to fulfil their own needs if they are given access to 
enabling interventions. It negates the concept that refugees are incapable beings 
solely reliant on external assistance in order to survive. Where they are permitted 
to meet their own needs they will. 
7.3.2 Education 
As regards access to education, most refugee and displaced children receive their 
education in existing schools within Croatia. In many locations, this use of existing 
resources assists the host community as well as promoting the integration of 
incomers and hosts. In Kutina for example, instead of investing in a separate 
school built in the camp just for the children of the settlement, the DRC invested in 
increasing the resources of the existing school in Kutina. In this way, the school 
receives the resources and assistance it needs to support the increased numbers of 
students, and also receives investment that benefits the host community both 
currently and in the future when the refugees and displaced persons return home. 
"Instead of establishing a school for the children in the DRC 
settlements, an agreement was made very early in the project .phase 
with the school authorities about integrating the children into Kutina's 
schools and classes .... It was the idea to extend the contact network 
across ethnic and social boundaries, ... but the school administration 
lacked resources for the implementation of the co-operation. Like in all 
other sectors in Croatia the economy was under heavy strain. It was 
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financially possible t~ cover th~ extra costs which is why DRC 
supported the purchasmg of teaching aids and furniture for the pupils." 
(Knstensen, et aI., 1994, p3) 
In this way, tensions that may have arisen over the sharing of a limited resource are 
diffused at the same time as providing an opportunity for the incomers to interact 
with the hosts. As the DRC's document continues to report, friendships were 
established by the children across ethnic and social boundaries. Such symbiotic 
relations mean that there is integration between the hosts and incomers among the 
children, and as the incoming children are of Croatian and Bosnian nationality, the 
policy assists in a small way towards the healing of ethnic rifts. 
However, not all refugee and displaced children are taught in existing schools. For 
some3, education is provided in specifically constructed camp or settlement 
schools. Documentation from the ODPR., states that the instances where special 
schools are in operation are locations where: 
" ... the number of refugee children [i]s so high that the small local 
schools d[ 0] not have the capacity to take them all (for example, in the 
Gasinci centre where there are 320 children of school age)" (ODPR, 
1995, appendices) 
Such a remark gives some indication of the effect on resources of constructing vast 
camps and settlements for refugees and displaced persons. Such huge influxes 
swamp local facilities, resources and markets, ensuring that even if there were jobs 
available or existing schools and health centres, there would never be enough to 
support so many individuals. Concentrating refugees and displaced persons all 
together in one camp or settlement creates pressure points on local services, rather 
than spreading the demand evenly throughout the community and thus dissipating 
the load on resources. In this regard, those refugees and displaced persons living in 
private accommodation who are dispersed throughout communities have the 
possibility ofgreater access to services and opportunities. 
7.3.3 Reciprocal Relations 
Access to existing social services is important for incoming communities, as it aids 
the process of integration and facilitates the maintenance of independence by the 
refugees and displaced persons. However, the potential for such integration to 
3 In 1994-95, 2,540 children out of 28,724 were taught in specifically constructed facilities. 
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cause conflict with the host community is great, especially within a war tom 
country where all are affected by the scarcity of resources and the trauma of war. 
Therefore, enabling access to services and opportunities needs to be facilitated in 
such a way that benefits the host population as well as the incoming population. 
Investment in improving and expanding the existing local facilities to accommodate 
refugees and displaced will also visibly benefit the host. Settlements such as Gaza 
in Karlovac, where health facilities specific to the camp were built instead of 
investing in the existing large hospital which had been badly shell damaged, only 
serve to create tension. In Micevac, provision of services to those in the camp 

easily exceeds the facilities that exist in the surrounding villages: 

"We have got a shop, we have a post office, we have a community 
house with a service every Sunday - and that is the best thing because 
the other villages around this camp haven't got a church, or a post 
office, they have nothing. This camp is one of the best in Croatia" 
(Manager ofMicevac, August 1994) 
Hosts are expected not only to share their own scarce resources but also to remain 
congenial when incomers receive preferential treatment. Feelings of good will and 
welcome seldom survive in an atmosphere of perceived prejudice. It would seem 
therefore that where the UNHCR has a policy of parity which ensures that refugees 
are maintained at the same standard as the host, that there should be a reciprocal 
policy, for both international and national aid agencies, where hosts are maintained 
at the same level as the incomers, or at least benefit from the assistance given to 
refugees and displaced persons. 
in addition to providing settlements and camps that benefit the host community 
once constructed, the construction of new built settlements can also be used to 
feed the host's employment and economic situation. The three GTZ camps were 
built using local construction firms for the infrastructure and foundation work, 
which gave employment opportunities to local Croatian businesses and thus 
recycled some money back into· the economy. However, when it came to the 
housing units themselves, the GTZ believed that" ... the local market would not be 
able to supply them in the brief period available" (Kreutner, 1993, p2). They 
therefore tendered the fabrication of the panels for the housing units out in 
Germany and gave the contract to a German-Turkish consortium. As the GTZ 
report details "this project also provided employment for a large number of people 
in Turkey" (Kreutner, 1993). However, it would seem to be far more beneficial, if 
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the project had provided employment for large numbers of people in Croatia and 
circulated some money back into the hosts' economy. While Croatia may not have 
been able to supply the cement-bonded particle boards and lightweight steel frames 
that GTZ were planning to use, the construction industry could have supplied other 
materials, thus generating yet more employment opportunities. 
The GTZ report cites the need for speed and the urgent need for the "emergency 
accommodation" as reasons why it was necessary to seek a source for 
prefabricated boards outside Croatia. Yet, the accommodation that they 
constructed is not "emergency", it is far longer term than emergency. Indeed, much 
of the validation for the project appears to have been post-rationalised once it was 
in place, rather than considered prior to implementation. 
The entire project seems not to have been conceived to match the conditions on 
the ground in Croatia, but pre-conceived in Germany, before the situation in 
Croatia had even been assessed. Indeed, the report begins with the statement that : 
"In Summer of 1992 the Government of the Federal Republic of 

Germany decided to make 50 million DM available to the Federal 

Foreign Office within the context of humanitarian aid to provide 

accommodation for approximately 20,000 displaced persons and 

I refugees in Croatia in buildings capable of withstanding the rigours of 

I winter. It was envisaged that approx. 8,000 persons would be housed
! in 3 new settlements to be erected, and approx. 12,000 persons wouldi 

i be accommodated in buildings more or less destroyed by the war which 

were to be rehabilitated." (Kreutner, 1993, p2) 
I 
I The GTZ were not even commissioned until after the decision had been made as to 
I what to provide, no one had conducted a needs assessment in Croatia to establish real requirements or potentials. The necessity of building prefabricated camps of 
J shelter was not derived from a knowledge of the requirements of the hosts or the 
,I refugees or the displaced persons. Had the GTZ been allowed to take the time to 
I assess the requirements of the hosts and the incomers, to evaluate the alternative 
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7.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter highlights the issues that the humanitarian community will need to 
address if its shelter provision is to facilitate the integration of refugees and 
displaced persons into the host community. The findings have shown that 
integrative policies are essential for refugees and displaced persons if they are to 
maintain their capacities to support themselves. By providing them with access to 
existing social and economic structures, the humanitarian community empowers 
the refugees and displaced persons. Such empowerment promotes longer term 
solutions and facilitates the return home and post-war reconstruction. The data has 
shown that in order to operate integrative policies, aid agencies must invest in the 
host population simultaneously with the refugee and displaced populations, only in 
this way can the apportionment of scarce resources be achieved without increasing 
levels of conflict between incomers and hosts. 
The study of Croatia indicates that in a war situation, programmes that integrate, 
rather than segregate, refugees and displaced persons establish communications at 
the micro level, guard against perceived discrimination and reduce rather than 
increase existing ethnic rifts. Thus, despite the difficulties of implementing such 
policies in ethno-nationalistic environments, it seems that agencies should 
endeavour to pursue integrative policies, rather than supporting, by default, 
policies of discrimination. 
Only through integration into existing socio-economic structures can refugees and 
displaced persons hope to maintain their innate coping mechanisms and abilities to 
meet their own needs. Imposed vulnerability is reduced within integrative projects, 
as more enabling mechanisms are available to the refugees and displaced persons 
and thus they have more ability to maintain their productive social status. 
Maintenance of this status is ultimately beneficial to the hosts as well as the 
mcomers. 
The final chapter of this thesis will review the central issues of vulnerability and 
capacity, and integration raised within this thesis and thus propose a series of 
recommendations for improving shelter provision in war. 
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of this thesis it was stated that there were three primary reasons 
for conducting this study. 
• 	 Current praxis for organised shelter is both debilitating and detrimental to the 
long term recovery and development of the refugees and displaced persons it 
accommodates . 
• 	 Fifty years after World War Two, the humanitarian community is no longer 
solely operational in developing nations with tropical or semi-tropical climates, 
but has found itself acting once again in developed nations with cold climates. 
• 	 There is a paucity of research on shelter for refugees from, and persons 
displaced by war. The resulting lack of understanding of the extreme 
environment of war creates complexity for the humanitarian community acting 
within it. 
The analysis of the literature and the findings from the study in Croatia indicated 
that if current shelter provision in developed nations in situations of war is to be 
improved, then there are two central areas that need to be addressed: 
• 	 Vulnerability and capacity 
• 	 Integration 
The discourses presented within this thesis, have shown that repressive and 
authoritarian shelter policies undermine the innate capacities of refugees and 
displaced persons and enforce an imposed vulnerability which is detrimental in the 
short term and in the long term, adversely affects post-war reconstruction (Harrell­
Bond, 1986; Kibreab, 1993; Black, 1994; Zetter, 1987, Ellis & Barakat, 1996, 
1996a). The findings further illustrated that it is the sum of refugees' and displaced 
persons' physical and non.physical capacities that enables them to cope. This 
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resources. Thus, integrative policies are essential if refugees and displaced persons 
are to retain their status as productive social beings during the years in exile. The 
data also showed that in an environment where all have been affected by war, the 
apportionment of scarce resources to incomers and hosts must be handled 
sensitively to avoid increasing the levels of conflict that exist between refugees, 
displaced persons and hosts. 
This final chapter will bring together all the crucial components of these discourses 
as presented in the preceding chapters. By extracting cornmon threads from them 
and highlighting important issues, a set of working recommendations will be 
developed for use by implementing agencies when providing shelter to refugees 
and displaced persons in a developed nation tom apart by war. The 
recommendations will be presented as a checklist of questions that can be utilised 
by those working in the field to aid the improved provision of shelter. 
8.1.1 Structure of the Chapter 
The chapter is divided into seven sections. Following the introduction, the next 
three sections reiterate the essence of points from the two central discourses of the 
previous chapters and highlight general areas that need to be addressed in order to 
improve current praxis. The fifth section forms these points into a working set of 
recommendations. These recommendations are presented in the foml of a checklist 
of questions for use by implementing agencies. In this way, it is hoped to facilitate 
the provision of shelter which supports the innate coping mechanisms of refugees 
and displaced persons and endeavours to integrate incoming and host populations. 
The recommendations are not provided as definitive and absolute, but are offered 
as a starting point and an invitation to establish a functional, working structure 
which can be extended and improved as the current paucity of knowledge on this 
subject decreases. To complement this, section six of this chapter outlines further 
issues identified within the work conducted in this study and section seven makes 
proposals for future research that will build upon the findings of this thesis. 
8.2 ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF THE VULNERABILITY AND 
CAP ACITY DISCOURSE 
8.2.1 Decision Making 
Chapter Two reviewed Harrell-Bond's (1986) work which states that dependency 
is increased by relief regimes that usurp the decision making capacity of refugees. 
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In further exploring this concept, Chapter Six adduced findings from the field to 
illustrate the debilitating effects of shelter programmes that remove personal 
control from refugees and displaced persons. It was shown that progranunes that 
do not support innate coping mechanisms of refugees and displaced persons have 
serious negative effects on longer term rehabilitation and reconstruction. This 
finding both reinforces the literature which argues that repressive and authoritarian 
relief policies undermine long term development (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989; 
Anderson, 1993; Cuny, 1983), and expands the discourse to include the negative 
effects that such policies have on post-war reconstruction (Ellis and Barakat, 
1996a; 1996b). 
Chapter Six showed the positive benefits of programmes that allow inhabitants to 
control their everyday lives through depicting the settlements of Cepin, Rokovci 
and Kutina. These projects have promoted the retention of control by the refugees 
and displaced persons through allowing them control of personal space and the 
performance of familiar tasks. 
8.2.1.1 Personal Space 
The detrimental effects of long term accommodation in camps and settlements that 
afford no privacy to the inhabitants were seen in Chapter Six through the 
description of conditions in the Gradevinski Skolski Centar, Prihvatni 1 and 
Gasinci. It was shown that accommodation that promotes the lack of control over 
personal space, is a constant reminder not only of how much the refugees and 
displaced persons have lost, but also how little they have left. Where it may be 
acceptable for families to share cramped accommodation for a month or so in the 
initial emergency phase, it is not acceptable to expect people to live without the 
dignity of privacy for years. Therefore: 
Camps and settlements should be planned and constructed to give 
the maximum privacy and dignity possible to each resident family 
or individual. 
8.2.l.2 Personal Performance ofFamiliar Tasks 
The detrimental effects of removing personal control over daily familiar routines 
and activities were shown in Chapter Six through discussion of actions such as the 
choice and preparation of food. The findings show that removal of control over the 
performance of familiar tasks by authoritarian relief regimes, undermines the 
capacities of refugees and displaced persons and daily reinforces their subordinate 
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status as beneficiaries and burdens. Accommodation that does not allow for the 
personal performance of familiar tasks strips away identities and traditionally 
understood roles. The managers and implementers of shelter projects should 
endeavour to avoid policies that remove personal control from residents. The 
centralised provision of services and facilities should be avoided wherever possible 
as it has severely debilitating effects on refugees and displaced persons. Therefore: 
Agencies should avoid policies that, by advocating centralised 
management, remove control over familiar activities from 
individuals. Policies that promote autonomy and independence of 
the inhabitants should be encouraged. 
8.2.2 Organisational Capacity 
Chapter Six also presented data which reinforced the need for refugees and 
displaced persons to retain organisational capacity (Harrell-Bond, 1986). The 
camp at Kutina was presented as an example of a shelter programme that 
promotes " ... inhabitant participation in decision making" as a positive thing 
(Kristensen, 1994). The residents' committee was seen to be an invaluable forum 
for the representation of the real needs of the refugees and displaced persons. Its 
existence promoted the maintenance of the inhabitants' status as productive social 
beings. Such empowering or participatory projects, that utilise the existing human 
resources within the refugee and displaced persons population, are more 
sustainable in the long term and promote the retention of personal productive 
capacity for post-war reconstruction. Thus: 
Agencies should implement projects that support the 
organisational capacity of refugees and displaced persons and 
allow for their participation in decision making, in order to 
maintain their status as productive social beings and thereby 
facilitate post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction 
8.2.3 Allocation of Cultivable Land 
At a greater level than allocating control over personal space, performance of 
familiar tasks and organisational capacity, is giving refugees and displaced persons 
control over their physical environment. In Chapter Six the benefits of camps that 
give inhabitants access to cultivable land around the area of the shelter were 
discussed using the positive examples of the camps at Kutina and Rokovci and the 
negative example of Gasinci. The findings showed that allocation of cultivable land 
allows for inhabitants to provide for their own needs where the institutionalised 
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system fails to~ provides opportunities for informal income generating activities 
and offers meaningful, productive activity that aids recovery from stress and 
trauma. The findings suggest that new camps and settlements should be planned to 
allow for refugees and displaced persons to engage in cultivation activities. Thus: 
Camps and settlements should be laid out to accommodate the 
establishment of agricultural plots and gardens 
8.2.4 Control over the Built Environment 
The process of incremental adaptation of the built environment allows residents in 
camps and settlements the highest level of control over their lives. Building on 
Rapoport's statement (1969) that perceived stress is greater when perceived
I control is lacking, Chapter Six proposed that giving refugees and displaced 
I persons the chance to adapt their houses could be the ultimate healing process. The findings illustrated that the loss of the home was most keenly felt by those 
inhabitants of environments which were not selected but imposed, did not fulfil 
needs and were impossible to adapt or modify. 
Camps and settlements should be planned to allow for theI incremental growth and adaptation of the shelter units by the inhabitants j 
8.2.5 Tenure 
Chapter Six discussed the issue of tenure in relation to the development literature 
which states that the consolidation and extension of settlements and camps will not 
f take place without the inhabitants possessing tenure of the land (Abrams, 1964; 
Turner, 1976; Zetter & Baker, 1995). The literature suggests that if there is not 
I ownership ofland, residents will not invest their own time and money in improving and extending the house. The findings of the study show that tenure is not a 
necessary requirement for consolidation to occur in the refugee camps andt 
I settlements of Croatia. The cases ofthe camps at Cepin, Rokovci, Kutina, and to a more limited extent, Gaza at Karlovac, were adduced to show that consolidation 
will take place if there is perceived tenure. ~ 
This was shown to be beneficial, for in war, it is unlikely that any host government 
I 
~ 
could be persuaded to allocate tenure of land to incoming refugees - especially 
when the host country is ostensibly still at war with the country of origin of the 
refugees. However, if there is perceived tenure, through investment from the 
I 
f 
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management or agency or local government in the settlement or camp, then this 
will be sufficient to encourage investment from the residents. In Cepin, this took 
the form of commensal relations over supply of materials. Investment in materials 
by the management of the camps gave a feeling of security and created an 
atmosphere within which residents were prepared to invest their own time, labour 
and money in improving and extending the house. Thus: 
Granting a perceived tenure through the visible investment of 
goods or labour is important in facilitating the residents' 
adaptation of housing 
8.2.6 Assessing Capacities and Vulnerabilities Before Acting 
Following the discussion of the need for relief to support, and not supplant, the 
capacities of refugees and displaced persons, it would seem to be an obvious 
statement that relief should only be supplied to fulfil the real needs on the ground. 
Yet, as has been shown within the bulk of this thesis, aid seldom addresses real 
needs. All too often the aid that is received by the population in need is determined 
by the donor countries political objectives and agendas and the list of items they 
hold in-country of which they wish to dispose (Keen, 1994; Weiss & Minear, 
1993; Walker, 1995). Political convenience and the availability of unwanted goods 
should not be the basis for aid provision. 
In order for relief provision to be appropriate to requirements, there is a demand 
for systematic and structured capacities and vulnerabilities assessment, conducted 
within thorough understanding of the situation on the ground. Agencies need to 
familiarise themselves with what the refugees and displaced persons are capable of 
doing for themselves in the presence ofenabling interventions (Kibreab, 1993). 
Relief projects that are driven purely by donors' agendas and not based on the 
abilities of the potential recipients, are inappropriate. These projects will inevitably 
promote refugees and displaced persons as burdens to be cared for rather than 
capable beings, as such projects begin with the a.ssumption that refugees and 
displaced persons only have vulnerabilities rather than capacities. The findings 
presented in Chapter Six show that projects that are designed without 
consideration of the capacities of the recipients, undermine those capacities and 
impose higher levels ofvulnerability upon them. 
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This adversely affects their abilities to return home and reconstruct in the post­
war period. Thus: 
Projects should only be implemented following a thorough 
assessment of the capacities and capabilities of the refugees and 
displaced persons to provide for their own needs within a network 
of supporting and enabling interventions 
I 
8.2.7 Accountability and Transparency 
If projects are to be developed to support the assessed capacities of the refugees 
and displaced persons, then agencies need to become accountable to the recipients 
of aid as well as to the donors. Chapter Three discussed the issue of accountability 
I and showed that, at present, agencies are primarily accountable to the donors rather than the recipients of aid. This attitude results in projects that are 




which are implemented to comply with an obsession with costlbenefit analysis 
were discussed in Chapter Six. It was shown that, the sole emphasis on 
costlbenefit ratios results in projects that have high densities, lack privacy, negate 
personal control and deny the maintenance of recognised and familiar activities by 




and costing is understood, it should not happen to the detriment of the 
humanitarian perspective. The giver should retain responsibility for the suitability 
of the gift for the recipient; if the gift of aid is inappropriate to the needs of the 
i user then it should not be given. Implementing agencies need to constantly remind themselves that they are supplying humanitarian aid and thus must ensure that it 
does nothing to increase or prolong the suffering of those it assumes to assist 
t 	 (Anderson, 1993). Without such accountability to the recipients of aid, relief 
provision will remain inappropriate and detrimental to the long term recovery of 
I 

~ refugees and displaced persons. Therefore: 

Aid agencies 	must become accountable to the recipients of relief, 
as well as to 	the donors of funds in order to provide aid that is
'i 
appropriate and supports the capacities of refugees and displaced 
I 	 persons 
l 
8.2.8 Cultural Sensitivity 
Where possible, agencies should tie into and support existing local organisations 
and agencies that are functional! partnership with such groups who 
~ 
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in the host country. Through working in 
are aware of the situation on the ground, 
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projects increase their replicability and are more likely to be culturally sensitive and 
supportive of innate capacities. The example of the CRC adduced in Chapter Six, 
shows that such partnerships must not be run on the basis of blind trust alone. The 
local organisation may not have the knowledge or experience that will ensure that 
the project will support recipients in a culturally sensitive manner. It was also 
stated that it should be borne in mind that national organisations are just as capable 
of opting for projects designed primarily to satisfY costlbenefit ratios rather than 
humanitarian concerns. Informed and cognisant partnerships between host country 
organisations and international organisations can however, result in projects that 
are more accurately targeted and culturally sensitive. Therefore: 
International organisations and agencies should endeavour to 
partner and support existing national organisations to create 
projects that are culturally sensitive and support innate capacities 
I 
8.2.9 Host Government Strategies for Reconstruction and Development 
Implementing agencies must pay attention to the needs of the host government, as 
well as the refugees and displaced persons, if projects are to be accepted and 
sustained following the departure of the agency. There is a need therefore, for 
agencies to be aware of the relief policies of the host government where they exist. 
Projects that are designed by those who are unaware of the requirements of 
existing governmental policy on the provision of relief aid and assistance may 
I 
antagonise the government and thus be unsustainable. A further possibility, as 
evidenced by the findings presented in Chapter Seven, is that existing 
governmental policy may be discriminatory or biased and will thus need to be 
addressed by the agency or donor. As has been illustrated by the Croatian example, 
compliance with such policies may serve to perpetuate the level of conflict and 
tension. Such was the experience of the GTZ, where their three camps have served 
to condone the governmental policy of segregation and discrimination against 
refugees. Thus: 
I Projects need to be designed in the full knowledge of the host 
government's policies on relief provision and should either 
t support or address the parameters defined therein 
I Chapter Three reviewed the literature which promotes the necessity of making 
relief projects developmental and therefore supportive of longer term requirements t 
(Duffield, 1994a; Barakat, et al.) 1995; Barakat & Hoffman, 1995) To achieve 
t 
1 
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this, agencies should be aware of the host government's reconstruction and 
development policies and endeavour to build relief projects that support them. 
For relief projects that positively affect reconstruction and 
development, agencies should be aware of existing governmental 
plans and endeavour to support them where feasible 
8.2.10 Integrated Action 
The current climate of competition, as discussed in Chapter Three, leads to many 
agencies acting solely within their own field of concerns without acting in support 
of others working in the field. A higher level of co-ordination needs to be in place 
in order to improve current practice; implementing agencies need to operate within 
a structure of integrated action. When the programmes of the many agencies in the 
field are not integrated with each other, the chances of mistakes being duplicated 
and projects undermining each other increase. The formal and informal exchange 
of experiences that can take place under a policy of integrated action can prevent 
the proliferation of programmes that impose greater vulnerability on the recipients. 
For example, the CRC projects in Sasna Greda and Pisarovina, reviewed in 
Chapter Six, may have been improved if agencies in Croatia operated a policy 
whereby they shared the knowledge learnt from both their successes and failures. 
Thus: 
Agencies acting in the field should endeavour to share and 
disseminate their experiences to other agencies in the field in order 
to improve the quality of provision 
Chapter Three outlined the way in which the high level of competition that exists 
within the NGO community results in agencies that are accountable primarily to 
donors rather than recipients. It was stated that such competition does not foster 
the co-ordination and mutual support that are essential if projects are to benefit the 
recipients rather than adversely effect them. The implication is that there needs to 
be some degree of regulation over the activities of agencies within the arena of 
action. Numbers of agencies allowed to act in a country should be controlled, and 
their actions form part of an integrated operation that is constantly monitored in 
order to provide aid that is truly aimed at being of benefit to the recipients rather 
than the agency or the donor. There is a need to establish a structured body that 
can govern and integrate the actions of the humanitarian community on a multi­
agency level. This body would co-ordinate the activities of the humanitarian 
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community acting in every situation, establishing patterns of action prior to any 
agency initiating relief operations in the target country. 
A central governing body should control the number of agencies 
permitted to act within a country; co-ordinate their actions to 
provide integrated, mutually supportive assistance and monitor 
performance to ensure that programmes and projects are 
accurately targeted and support innate capacities that exist in 
country 
Such a methodology of action also requires agencies to be.flexible, not only to 
recognise when their services are of need and when they are not, but also act to fill 
gaps that exist in provision either in location or project terms. Agencies should 
endeavour to be mutually supportive rather than competing for funds and projects 
to the detriment of the recipients. 
In a conflict situation it is also essential that agencies retain a high degree of 
vigilance and flexibility in order to respond to swiftly changing circumstances 
caused by altered allegiances, shifting battle lines and the passage ofwar. Thus: 
Agencies acting in the field must retain a high degree of flexibility 
in order to fulfil the real needs of the refugees and displaced 
persons and address the context of war 
8.3 ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF THE INTEGRATION DISCOURSE 
8.3.1 Physical Integration 
Chapter Seven expanded the discourse on integration, initiated in Chapter Three, 
through the presentation of the findings of the study in Croatia. The results of the 
study showed that the physical integration of camps, collectives and private 
accommodations can facilitate the social and economic integration of incomers 
with hosts. 
It was shown that private accommodation, in which incomers are not 'labelled' 
and isolated in a specifically designated, defined environment, but instead 
integrated with a high degree of 'invisibility' into existing settlements, facilitates 
the integration of incomers with hosts. Where incomers are physically segregated, 
as are the refugees in Gasinci, they are labelled by the wider community as 
'different', which enforces existing underlying ethnic rifts. It was thus shown, that 
physical segregation encourages social segregation which denies refugees access to 
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enabling mechanisms that would facilitate the maintenance of their autonomy. It is 
recommended therefore, that: 
Agencies should encourage the accommodation of refugees and 
displaced persons within the fabric of existing settlements 
wherever possible. 
Where shelter with hosts In existing settlements is not possible and the 
construction of new camps and settlements unavoidable, then agencies should 
ensure that they are constructed in an area where they can interact with the 
existing community. The example of Cepin camp, cited in Chapter Seven, shows 
that by laying out and planning camps and settlements in such a way as to 
encourage the passage of pedestrian and vehicular traffic from the host 
community, the physical interaction of hosts and incomers is facilitated. It was 
shown that such interaction opens opportunities for mutually beneficial economic 
and social activity. Thus: 
Where the construction of settlements and camps is inevitable and 
unavoidable, they should be established within the boundaries of, 
or on the periphery of, existing towns, villages or communities. 
The physical interaction of routes for vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic should be encouraged. 
I 
8.3.2 Discrimination and BiasI Agencies acting in war must endeavour to be impartial and non-partisan. It was 
shown in the development of the integration discourse in Chapter Three, that in aJ 
conflict situation, preferential treatment of one side over another will only serve to 
1 	 inflame the level of tension that exists between opposing factions (Adams & 
Bradbury, 1994; Barakat, et al., 1994). In the Croatian example, where the warI has became one of intense ethnic division, actions which are seen to favour one 
faction over another merely add to existing rifts and perpetuate conflict. As wasf 
stated in the review of the literature, an action that incites further violence and 
1 increases the level of the war can no longer be said to be humanitarian (Anderson, 
l 1993). 
1 
Thus the agencies mentioned in Chapter Seven, (Marhamet and Caritas) who 
primarily target aid at either Muslim or Catholic groups, do nothing to address the 
root causes of the crisis and thus do not prevent the crisis from recurring. Thus: I 
I 
1 
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Agencies must be non-partisan when providing relief in a war 
situation or else risk inflaming and spreading the level of conflict 
The data shows that further tension can be created by agencies that provide only 
for the incomers to the exclusion of the hosts. The camp at Mi6evac, described in 
Chapter Seven, was seen by the Manager to be the "best camp" in Croatia, 
precisely because it had so many amenities that the surrounding villages did not. 
Refugees and displaced persons should be given access to facilities and services, 
however, this should not be done to the exclusion of the hosts, for to do so 
alienates the hosts against the incomers and can lead to segregation and 
marginalisation. The example of Kutina camp was used to show that those camps 
which upgrade the existing host facilities to cater for the incomers, as well as 
providing an improved service for the hosts, facilitate the co-existence of the 
groups without creating further tension. In such cases, all benefit from the actions 
of the agency and the incomers are more likely to be welcomed into the 
community. Integration into existing social structures creates more opportunities 
for refugees and displaced persons to engage their own innate coping mechanisms 
and the level of vulnerability imposed upon them is reduced. Thus: 
Agencies should ensure that their aid provision is of benefit to the 
host community as well as to the incoming refugees and displaced 
persons 
If relief aid is to target the needs of the hosts as well as the incomers, 
implementing agencies must assess the capacities and vulnerabilities of the host 
community as well as the incoming community. Therefore: 
Agencies must assess the capacities and vulnerabilities of the host 
community as well as those of the refugees and displaced persons 
prior to designing and implementing a project. 
8.3.3 Advocacy to Host Government 
Working with and empowering national and local groups, the host community and 
the refugees and the displaced persons themselves, implies that the humanitarian 
community should also work to support and strengthen the existing government, 
so that policies and provision can be supported at the highest level and therefore 
be more sustainable. In war however, such policies of supporting government may 
present problems as it could imply that agencies then support practices which they 
find morally wrong. The findings in Croatia show that there is little evidence that 
Section Two: Lessons for the Field 
.... 

Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations 217 
the government requires operational support or empowerment from incoming aid 
agencies or donors. The uprooting of refugees from hotels in Istria through denial 
of basic services; the determination with which they are pulling and pushing 
displaced persons back home in the Dubrovnik hinterland and the discriminatory 
policies adopted for refugees, all suggest that this is a government that does not 
require any external support or nurturing. 
In the case of Croatia, the strength and mind set of the government requires 
restraint not support: it requires advocacy on the advantages and disadvantages of 
policies and practice. However, advocacy in a war environment can be a fatal 
operation for aid agencies, as unfavourable criticism may result in the expUlsion of 
the agency from the country and then potential to provide further humanitarian 
assistance is lost (Weiss & Minear, 1993). Yet agencies which do not attempt to 
change discriminatory or debilitating government policies, are effectively 
condoning behaviour that will adversely affect the recipient group. Agencies which 
I 
decide not to challenge what they see to be detrimental or debilitating policies, I 
I then have to address whether or not they are still fulfilling their primary humanitarian function (Anderson, 1993). Chapter Seven outlined the differing 
attitudes of the DRC and the GTZ when their projects were implemented - thef 
DRC fought against the government's wishes to allocate places only to displaced{ persons and the GTZ chose to leave the allocation of places to the Croatian 
government, thus effectively condoning policies of discrimination. Ultimately, it is 
I 
1 projects such as the DRC's that may contribute to building peace and healing 
ethnic rifts at the micro level; those of the GTZ merely serve to enforce the 




Agencies should endeavour to advocate change of discriminatory 
i or biased governmental policies 
I 8.3.4 Social and Economic Integration 
I 
Chapter Seven highlighted the way in which the units for the GTZ camps were 
manufactured in Turkey and thus provided employment and economic 
opportunities for Turkish nationals. It was stated that the use of a Croatian 
manufacturer would have been beneficial to the Croatian employment profile. It 
was seen that utilising the human resource base in country is particularly beneficial 
I in war time as, firstly, it provides a visible benefit to the host community thus 
I 
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reducing potential conflict between incomers and hosts and secondly, it invests 
money back into a war damaged economy, thus helping to revitalise and support it. 
In war, where there is a depleted population due to service in the army, migration, 
injury or fatalities, it may not always be possible to invest in, utilise or employ 
members of the host community. However where possible, agencies should 
endeavour to do so. Thus: 
Agencies should utilise the human skills and resources available 
locally and in-country when implementing projects in order to 
invest in the war damaged economy and reduce potential conflict 
between hosts and incomers 
Seeking to purchase materials in-country or locally also aids the process of 
investment in the host country and assists in supporting the economy. Once again, 
in war, it will not always be easy to attain materials due to war damage offactories 
or plants. However, agencies should investigate the possibilities for in country 
supply during needs assessment. Thus: 
Agencies should utilise locally available materials and products 
where possible and identify potential suppliers and sources as part 
of the initial capacity and needs survey 
8.4 COMPONENTS OF RELEVANCE TO THE OVERALL IMPROVEMENT 
OF PERFORMANCE 
I 8.4.1 Monitoring Projects as they Develop 
Chapter Six cited the testimonies of refugees and displaced persons that showed1 
the lack of monitoring and evaluation activities in Croatia. Yet, the condition of 
permanent emergency that endures in war should require not only that projects are t 
evaluated at their completion, but also that continual monitoring takes place during 
their implementation. Monitoring should be conducted to establish the impact, 
relevance and sustainability, as well as efficiency and effectiveness of any project. 
In this way debilitating or detrimental projects can be identified and adjusted 
before long term damage is caused. 
The lessons of both monitoring and evaluation should be publicised and 
disseminated to all those who are providing shelter in the field, for only in this way 
will the detrimental effects of certain shelter policies be understood and 
recognised. Such an activity would support the policy of integrated action 
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proposed under section 8.2.10. Had monitoring policies been in operation in 
Croatia, they may have prevented the construction of the CRC camps at Sasna 
Greda and Pisarovina, which have merely duplicated elements of bad practice from 
existing settlements. Therefore: 
Projects should be monitored in terms of impact, relevance, 
sustainability and efficiency and effectiveness throughout their 
implementation. The lessons from such monitoring processes 
should be disseminated to other agencies conducting shelter 
projects in the field 
8.4.2 Evaluation of Projects on Completion 
In order to improve emergency provision so that it addresses the longer term 
reconstruction and development needs of refugees and host communities, it is 
necessary to evaluate past and current projects using appropriate criteria. This 
was discussed in the methodology section in Chapter Four. 
It is unfortunate that most agencies undertaking evaluation projects on behalf of 
donors, consider only the outcomes, or the finished product. This leads to projects 
being evaluated purely in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness. 
If relief projects are to address long term reconstruction and development issues, 
then they need to be evaluated in terms of more than just efficiency and 
effectiveness. Thus: 
Projects should be evaluated in terms of their impact on the 
target group, their relevance to the target group and their 
ultimate sustainability by the target group as well as their 
efficiency and effectiveness 
If the impact of shelter projects in Croatia had been examined, as it has been in this 
I 
I thesis, the positive and negative effects of the projects would have been visible. 
The negative economic, political, social and cultural effects of the projects both on 
I the refugees and displaced persons and on the hosts at the local, regional and national levels could have been understood. 
\ If the relevance of the projects had been investigated, as it has been in this thesis, it 
would have been possible to determine whether or not the projects were in line\ 
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displaced persons are well placed to provide information as to the success or 
failure of a project to support their capacities and meet their real needs. Their 
opinion should be solicited as a matter of course. Thus: 
Projects should be evaluated and monitored from the perspective 
of the users as well as the providers of aid 
An evaluation of the impact and relevance of shelter projects would have 
highlighted those that were not supporting the capacities of the refugees and 
displaced persons and those that were imposing greater vulnerabilities on the 
inhabitant communities. These issues could then have been addressed and the 
position rectified. 
An evaluation of the sustainability of projects is the highest test of whether or not 
projects are successful, for if the target group lack the means or motivation to 
maintain the project after the implementing agency pulls out, then the project has 
ultimately failed. For instance, a look at the camp of Gasinci, which is segregated 
from the host society; almost completely denies activities such as cultivation or the 
adaptation of housing through its layout and restricts the personal performance of 
familiar tasks through a centralised control system; shows a camp that would not 
be sustainable by the inhabitants should anyone aspect of current support be 
withdrawn. 
For example, should the expenditure available for food be curtailed tomorrow due 
to reduced levels of funding from international donors, it would be impossible for 
the majority of the residents of Gasinci to make up the shortfall for themselves. 
There are no other enabling mechanisms that would make it possible for them to 
survive without help from another source. Therefore, the provision made for 
refugees at Gasinci is not sustainable in the long term, it endures solely through the 
external support and funding of the government and agencies, not through the 
efforts and abilities of the inhabitants. 
8.4.3 Funding 
To implement projects that are supportive of the existing capacities of refugees 
and displaced persons, implementing agencies need to be funded in a flexible 
manner and not be limited by pre-conceived assumptions of needs. This implies the 
need for platform funding, a system of funding that realises the mistake of 
intervening in a relief situation with predetermined objectives. Funds can be more 
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appropriately spent if implementing agencies go into the field with a broad aim, 
that can then be broken down into smaller, more accurately targeted tasks in line 
with the support that is truly required by the recipients. Thus, donors would have 
to come to terms with the idea of funding relief strategies with broad aims rather 
than narrow and specific ones, which can then be broken down into a series of 
smaller projects on site commensurate with real established needs. 
To take the example, cited in Chapter Seven, of the German government who gave 
GTZ the pre-conceived aim of building three new camps to house 8,000 refugees 
and displaced persons, thus totally confining the potential projects to the 
construction of three camps. The money could have been more effectively spent on 
projects that truly supported the capacities of refugees and displaced persons had 
the government specified the aim, broadly, as the relief of suffering of 
communities. GTZ would then have been in a position where they could move into 
Croatia and establish real needs over time. Specific, accurately targeted objectives 
could then have been set within the overall aim in the field. For example, objectives 
to financially support host families or assist in the repair of houses, would have 
been more supportive of the existing, innate capacities of the refugees, displaced 
persons and the hosts. Thus: 
Donors should adopt methods of funding relief activities that are 
more responsive to the situation on the ground and allow for 
projects to be accurately targeted by those familiar with the real 
needs of the recipients 
8.4.4 Education and Training 
Dissemination of information and lessons learnt is important not only for those 
implementing the projects and policies, but also to the wider world. Primarily, 
\ lessons learnt from the implementation of projects; examples of good and bad 
practice and the debilitating effects ofbad practice must be fed back into the donor 
community, as well as disseminated amongst international and local staff of 
implementing agencies. The essential importance of projects that are targeted to 
support the capacities of the recipients must be shown to those who are promoting 
the funding of inappropriate programmes and to those who implement them on the 
ground. 
The author is well aware that philanthropic motives are at the bottom of the list of 
reasons for donors to give aid, however, through continuous demonstration of the 
\ 
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severe negative effects of inappropriate aid it may be possible to improve current 
praxIs. 
Dissemination of the results of independent monitoring and 
evaluation of projects and policies, back into the humanitarian 
community is essential to improve policy and praxis. 
8.4.5 Media 
Chapter Two discussed the power of the international media to inform policy and 
practice of relief aid through the release of information to the public. In the light of 
this ability, there is also a case for attempting to utilise the press in an informed 
and valuable way to improve praxis. The way in which reports are given about the 
suffering and requirements of the survivors of war and crisis are crucial in the 
determination of public response and pressure on governments to act. Thus: 
The media should be encouraged and educated about the benefits 
of depicting refugees and displaced persons as survivors and 
capable beings rather than helpless victims unable to perform 
even the most basic of tasks. 
In war, the manner in which the press reports crises can not only determine what 
help is given, how much and when, but can also determine who receives aid and 
who does not. Unbalanced reporting causes bias and prejudice and can result in the 
uneven distribution of aid and consequent extension of conflict and crisis. Agencies 




Agencies should encourage the equitable reporting of crises where 
possible through giving the media accurate information of real 
needs and difficulties 
It would also seem possible that if donors act and provide aid that is highly visible, 
i 
\ 
as they wish for an advert to show that they are in fact fulfilling their obligation to 
assist, then the opposite should also apply, and the adverse publicity of media 
reports that show the detrimental effects of the aid that has been supplied may also 
t encourage donors to improve their provision. 
I Agencies should endeavour to utilise 




Section Two: Lessons for the Field 
the media to improve 
223 Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.S WORKING RECOM:rvIENDATIONS 
From the above conclusions of the research conducted in the Republic of Croatia, 
it is possible to derive a set of working recommendations that can be used to direct 
the provision of improved shelter in war situations in developed nations by the 
humanitarian community. The following recommendations are presented as a 
working set of issues and questions to be used by implementing agencies in the 
field to set up improved shelter programmes and measure their performance. It is 
not offered as a final definitive document, but as a 'stepping stone' in the move 




Some of the following recommendations may seem naive ill the current 

international political climate, however, they have been written in the full 

knowledge that the provision of relief in war is a highly political issue. It is political 

not only from the point of view of those operating in-country who have to deal 

with the political machinations of the warring factions, but also in tenus of what 

donors are prepared to give and offer to the country at war. The restrictions that 

international political concerns put upon the amount and type of aid that is given 

are understood. However, the author believes that it is not enough to merely 

accept that such pressures exist and not endeavour to change them. Pressure to 

change current policies through understanding of the adverse effects of 

inappropriate provision is essential. This would suggest that not only should 

lessons learnt from past provision be fed back into agencies and NGOs, but also 

that there is a requirement for dissemination of information among the donors. The 

belief that this will change politically and economically based policy decisions may 
t 	 seem to be jejune, but in the light of the long term damage that misdirected and 
inappropriate projects can do to a population already devastated by war, it is 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE SHELTER PROVISION FOR REFUGEES 

AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN WAR TORN DEVELOPED NATIONS: 

a working checklist for implementing agencies 

1.0 VULNERABILITY AND CAPACITY 
IA. Personal Space 
Camps and settlements should be planned and constructed to give 
the maximum privacy and dignity possible to each resident family or 
individual 
i. 	As the best option, is it possible to provide individual / family unit 
shelter? 
ii. 	If this is not possible, can accommodation be provided that gives 
combined family shelter? 
iii. For those in combined family shelter, what provision can be made 
for securing privacy through partitioning, screening, etc.? 
IB. Personal Performance of Familiar Tasks 
I 
! Agencies should avoid policies that, by advocating centralised 
management, remove control over familiar activities from 
individuals. Policies that promote autonomy and independence of 
the inhabitants should he encouraged. 
I 	 i. What are the potentials for providing individual families with personal cooking and washing facilities? 
ii. 	Have policies and programmes been established to respond to the.~ 
established capacities of the target group? 
t 
IC. Organisational Capacity t 
Agencies should implement projects that promote the organisational 
I 
t capacity of refugees and displaced persolls and allow for their 
participation in decision making, to maintain their status as 
productive social beings and thereby facilitate post-warI rehabilitation and reconstmction 
I 
'i i. Have the reCipients been consulted about the planning and 

implementation of the project? 
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ii. 	Are there structures in place that facilitate the involvement of the 
recipients in the decision making processes and establish them as 
competent and capable beings? 
iii. Do the recipients have adequate representation and legitimacy 
within the project? 
ID. Allocation of Cultivable Land 
Camps and settlements should be laid out to accommodate the 
establishment ofagricultural plots and gardens 
i. 	 Is there potential to allocate each family a plot of cultivable land 
immediately surrounding the housing unit? 
ii. Is there potential to allocate allotments within easy access of the 
camp / settlement? 
iii. What are the possibilities for renting and leasing land from local 
landholders for use by incoming groups? 
iv. Can reciprocal arrangements be made between incomers and 
landholders, for example, to lease land in exchange for a portion 
of the crop? 
, 	 IE. Control over the Built Environment 
Camps alld settlements should be planned to allow for the\ incremental growth and adaptation of the shelter units by the 
inhabitants 
I 	 i. How can the design and construction of the core unit facilitate its 
extension and adaptation by the inhabitants? ~ 	 ii. Is it possible to provide inhabitants with some materials to assist inI 	 the extension process? 
[ IF. Tenure 
I 
t Granting a perceived tenure through the visible investment C?f goods 
or labour is important in facilitating the resident's adaptation of 
housing 
t 	 i. Can materials provision be undertaken on a reciprocal basis, i.e., , 
the roofing materials are supplied by management on completion 
ofwalls by the inhabitants? 
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IG. Assessing Capacities and Vulnerabilities Before Acting 
Projects should only be implemented following a thorough 
assessment of the capacities and capabilities of the refilgees and 
displaced persons to provide for their own needs within a network of 
supporting and enabling interventions 
i. 	 What is the root cause of the crisis? 
ii. What is the extent of the requirement for humanitarian action? 
iii. What do the affected communities identify as their primary 
requirements? 
iv. Who are the major players in the field? How many warnng 
factions are there and will they facilitate or obstruct external 
assistance? 
v. 	What skills and resources do individuals, families, communities 
possess that can be utilised in the projects? 
vi. How are the recipients organised - are there existing social 
structures that can be utilised and supported? 
vii. What are the best techniques for eliciting information? How can 
the community participate in the information gathering process? 
1H. Accountability and Transparency 
Aid agencies must become accountable to the recipients ofrelief as 
well as to the donors of funds in order to provide aid that is 
appropriate and supports the capacities ~f refugees and displaced 
persons 
i. 	 Are the agendas and motives for action of the implementing 
agency in the field completely transparent to the recipients and the 
host government? 
ii. Will the plans and policies of the implementing agency be made 
available for scrutiny by the hosts and recipients? 
iii. Will the comments of the recipients and hosts be taken into 
account and acted upon by the implementing agency? 
iv. Is there potential to install an independent monitor to ensure that 
all agencies acting in the field are endeavouring to address the 
needs of the recipients rather than overwhelm them? 
11. Cultural Sensitivity 
International organisations and agencies should endeavour to 
partner and support existing national organisations to create 
projects that are culturally sensitive and support innate capacities 
i. 	 Which indigenous national agencies are acting in the field? 
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ii. 	What are their agendas and motivations for action? 
iii. How experienced are they in the type of provision provided, is 
there potential to learn from their experience and operational 
expertise? 
iv. What is the potential to upgrade and extend their experience? 
lJ. Host Government Strategies for Reconstruction and 
Development 
Projects need to be designed in the full knowledge of the host 
government's policies on relief provision and should either support 
or address the parameters defined therein 
i. 	 Does the host government possess policies that govern relief 
provision? 
ii. 	If so, what do they include? 
iii. Does the proposed project comply with the basis of the policies? 
For relief projects that positively affect reconstruction and 
development, agencies should be aware of existing governmental 
plans and endeavour to support them where feasible 
i. 	 Does the host government possess development / reconstruction 
strategies? 
H. 	Are the strategies up-to-date and viable? 
iii. If so, does the proposed project support these strategies? 
iv. If not, is it possible to advise on alternative more appropriate 
strategies? 
v. 	Are the plans applicable in the proposed area of work or does the 
local municipality possess differing master plans? 
IK. Integrated Action 
Agencies acting in the field should endeavour to share and 
disseminate their experiences to other agencies in the field in order 
to improve the quality ofprovision 
i. 	 Are there structures in place that support the dissemination of 
experiences and findings amongst those working in the field? 
ii. What 	 are the formal and informal opportunities that could 
facilitate the transfer of experience amongst field operatives? 
Section Two: Lessons for the Field 
228 Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations 
A central governing body should control the number of agencies 
permitted to act within a count1y; co-ordinate their actions to 
provide integrated, mutually supportive assistance and monitor 
performance to ensure that programmes and projects are accurately 
targeted and support innate capacities that exist in country 
i. 	 Is there a central co-ordinating body governing the provision of 
humanitarian assistance in the field? 
ii. Has 	a programme of integrated action been established among 
agencies operational within the field? 
Agencies acting in the field must retain a high degree offlexibility in 
order to fUlfil the real needs of the refugees and displaced persons 
and address the context ofwar 
i. 	 Are the aims of the programmes broad enough to allow for 
projects to respond to the situation on the ground? 
ii. 	Is there a structure in place to constantly monitor the changing 
conditions in the field? 
iii. Does the budget allow for flexibility in the programme plan? 
iv. Is there a contingency fund for adjusting the passage of the project 
to fit changing needs? 
2.0 INTEGRATION 
2A. Physical Integration 
Agencies should encourage the accommodation of refugees and 
displaced persons within the fabric of existing settlements wherever 
possible. 
i. 	 What are the possibilities for accommodating individuals and 
families within host families? 
ii. Are there any ways in which hosting of incoming families can be 
encouraged through financial or material incentives? 
iii. Can support for those host families be provided 	on a long term 
basis? 
iv. If there is no potential for accommodation with hosts, are there 
available public buildings that could be used to provide shelter 
without adversely affecting the host community? 
v. 	Where shelter in public buildings will adversely affect the host 
community, are there measures that can be taken to recompense 
them, i.e., through investment in other facilities or services, or 
repair of war damages in the building proposed for use. 
vi. Can the infrastructure of the proposed public building support the 
accommodation of incomers? 
vii. Who owns the rights to the building? 
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Where the construction of settlements and camps is inevitable and 
unavoidable, they should be established within the boundaries oj, or 
on the periphery oj, existing towns, villages or communities. The 
physical interaction of routes for vehicular and pedestrian traffic 
should be encouraged. 
i. 	How can the physical interaction of vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic be encouraged? 
ii. 	What is the urban pattern ofthe existing settlement? 
iii. How can the camp pattern be made to emulate and integrate with 
it? 
2B. Discrimination and Bias 
Agencies must endeavour to be non-partisan when prOViding relief 
in a war situation or else risk inflaming and spreading the level of 
conflict 
i. 	 Is it possible to provide assistance in the region at all or would any 
action merely sustain the conflict? 
ii. 	Are there restrictions on movement that mean certain groups are 
not accessible? 
iii. If so, is it possible to negotiate to access such groups? 
iv. How many different warring factions are there operational within 
the area of action? 
v. 	Is it possible to ascertain the military strategies of these factions 
and thus see possible connections with the provision of external 
assistance? 
vi. Who 	 will conduct negotiations with all parties to ensure the 
equitable distribution of assistance? 
Agencies should ensure that their aid provision is of benefit to the 
host community as well as to the incoming refugees and displaced 
persons 
i. 	What are the requirements ofthe host community? 
ii. What is the extent of the damage to their social, econOmIC, 
physical environment? 
iii. How can the needs of the hosts and the incomers be provided for 
in a sustainable manner, so that the positive effects of the project 
build towards the hosts' post-war reconstruction and future 
development? 
AgenCies must assess the capacities and vulnerabilities oj the host 
communi ty as well as those of the refugees and displaced persons 
prior to designing and implementing a project. 
Section Two: Lessons for the Field 1 
230 Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations 
i. 	 What skills and resources do the hosts possess that can be utilised 
to assist the incomers to the benefit of the hosts? 
ii. 	How can the hosts benefit from co-existence with the incomers? 
2e. Advocacy to Host Government 
Agencies should endeavour to advocate change ofdiscriminatory or 
biased governmental policies 
i. 	Is it realistic to attempt to change the discriminatory policies of 
host governments where they exist, or is it predictable that they 
will respond negatively? 
ii. 	If it is possible, who will be responsible for negotiating with the 
government to change policies? 
iii. Will such negotiations be conducted on behalf of all agencies or 
individually? 
2D. Social and Economic Integration 
Agencies should utilise the human skills and resources available 
locally and in-country when implementing projects in order to invest 
in the war damaged economy and reduce potential conflict between 
hosts and incomers 
i. 	 What skills are available in the host community? 
ii. Is there likely to be difficulty paying such employees, i.e., is the 
local currency stable and are the banks operational? 
iii. Is there legislation controlling the employment of incomers? 
Agencies should utilise locally available materials and products 
where possible and identify potential suppliers and sources as part 
(?f the initial capacity and needs survey 
•. 	 Is there potential to obtain materials either locally, or in-country, 
either immediately of following investment in the productive 
capacity of the country? 
ii. 	Have potential suppliers been identified both locally, in-country 
and in neighbouring countries? 
iii. What arrangements need to be made to purchase such supplies in 
the absence of stable currency or financial institutions? 
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3.0 OVERALL PERFORMANCE 
3A. Monitoring Projects as they Develop 
Projects should be monitored in terms of impact, relevance, 
sustainability and efficiency and effectiveness throughout their 
implementation. The lessons from such monitoring processes should 
be disseminated to other agencies conducting shelter projects in the 
field 
I. 	What are the potential indicators, both qualitative and quantitative, 
determined from the programme objectives, that could be used to 
monitor the project? 
ii. 	What mechanisms exist to adjust the project in accordance with 
the findings of continued monitoring exercises? 
iii. What structures are in place for the dissemination of the 
information learned to others in the field? 
3B. Evaluation of Projects on Completion 
Projects should be evaluated in terms of their impact on the target 
group, their relevance to the target group and their ultimate 
sllstainability by the target group as well as their efficiency and 
effectiveness 
i. 	What are the potential indicators that can be used to evaluate the 
project? 
ii. Do the indicators account for the unexpected as well as the 
predicted outcomes? 
Projects should be evaluated and monitored from the perspective of 
the users as well as the providers ofaid 
i. 	 Are there members of the recipient community who can conduct 
monitoring and evaluation exercises? 
ii. 	Are there organisational structures in place through which 
recipients can represent their views to management, local 
government and the implementing agency? 
iii. Has information concerning the success or failure of the project 1 been gathered from a wide range of sources and not just key 
informants?( 
iv. Has information been gathered using a wide range of techniques 
and methods? 
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3e. Funding 
Donors should adopt methods of funding relief activities that are 
more responsive to the situation on the ground and allow for 
projects to be accurately targeted by those familiar with the real 
needs of the recipients 
i. 	Has the donor funded a project with a broad aim that can be 
divided into working objectives on the ground to suit the 
conditions ofneed? 
ii. Is there adequate funding to allow for the adjustment of projects 
to suit real needs? 
3D. Education and Training 
Dissemination (~f the results of independent monitoring and 
evaluation of projects and policies, back into the humanitarian 
community is essential to improve policy and praxis. 
I. 	Has an independent evaluator been appointed to supervise the 
monitoring and evaluation of projects and organise the 
dissemination of results? 
ii. 	Are there informal structures in place that enable agencies in the 
field to share experiences and lessons learnt? 
lE. Media 
The media should be encouraged and informed about the benefits of 
depicting refugees and displaced persons as survivors and capable 
beings rather than helpless victims unable to perform even the most 
basic oftasks. 
i. 	What structures are in place to transfer accurate data about the 
real needs and capacities of refugees and displaced persons to the 
media? 
Agencies should endeavour to utilise the media to improve current 
praxis 
i. 	Is there provision made to disseminate the results from successful 
projects through the media? 
ii. Is there provision for the negative effects of inappropriate and 
mistargeted programmes to be publicised? 
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8.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In addition to the above set ofworking recommendations, the author feels that this 
thesis has highlighted some more general considerations that need to be addressed 
by the international humanitarian community if the provision of aid in war-tom 
environments is to improve. 
8.6.1 Professionalism 
The aid business is one of the biggest markets in the world. Its expenditure runs to 
millions of dollars per annum and the decisions that it makes affect millions of lives 
all over the world. There are now over fifty million refugees and displaced persons 
throughout the world all of whom are affected in one way or another by relief 
agencies and humanitarian practitioners. In every new crises that occurs, aspects of 
relief provision are mismanaged and mishandled and yet, having made mistakes, 
those same relief agencies are free to move on to yet another crisis without any 
attempt being made to ensure that they have improved their practice or learnt from 
their mistakes. The mistakes that agencies make are costly, not only in financial 
terms, but more importantly, in human terms to those recipients who are adversely 
affected. 
The burgeoning number of wars in the world and the proliferation of new aid 
agencies and NGOs that are springing up to deal with the casualties of these wars, 
mean that now more than ever before, there is a need to regulate the international 
humanitarian community. The author believes that this needs to be done in two 
ways. 
8.6.1.1 Training 
Firstly, humanitarian practitioners need to acquire new skills and training. For 
example, it is not enough that professional architects go to Croatia to design 
refugee shelter schemes. Unless those architects also have a knowledge of the 
potential negative and positive effects of that shelter on the recipient community, 
then the results can still be devastating to the recipients. Humanitarian practitioners 
need not only expertise in their chosen field, but also a professional, post-graduate, 
qualification in the field of relief and reconstruction. While organisations like ICRe 
and Oxfam do maintain a highly professional and experienced staff base, there are 
many thousands of NGOs and agencies that are unprofessional and unqualified to 
provide appropriate assistance. They need training in political and conflict analysis 
and negotiation skills; they require an understanding of the concepts of 
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vulnerability and the ways in which relief links to recovery and long tenn 
reconstruction and development; they need to be aware of their own needs for 
personal survival in an environment of war and understand the processes for 
working with international military forces; they need to understand the nature of 
conflict and the necessity of maintaining a non-partisan approach; they need to 
master analysis techniques and develop methodologies for monitoring and 
evaluation procedures and they need to develop specialist knowledge of the 
country within which they will work. All this is needed in addition to a basic 
understanding of social anthropology, economics, geography and history. 
Within such a qualification, the practitioner should also spend a period of 
apprenticeship in the field with an experienced field worker. Only after this 
apprenticeship is completed and the qualification attained, should they be allowed 
to operate autonomously in the field. Such trained and qualified professional 
practitioners and agencies should then be registered and utilised in future 
emergenCIes. 
8.6. 1.2 Quality Control 
This programme of training for the humanitarian practitioner needs to be 
conducted in addition to the establishment of regulatory mechanisms to control the 
quality of all those agencies operating in the field. Programmes and policies and 
operational strategies need to be monitored and evaluated by independent auditors, 
poor practice needs to identified and the implementor informed. A record of poor 
practice should result in the agency being struck from the register. 
Such measures may seem extreme, but the author firmly believes that unless the 
humanitarian community is made a professional, accountable and responsible body, 
then inappropriate and debilitating relief provision will continue. Humanitarian aid 
has to become truly humanitarian and not remain a product of political 
convenience. 
8.6.2 Responsible Body 
The UNHCR has encountered serious difficulties and caused considerable damage 
in Croatia by operating strictly within its mandated policy of assisting only 
refugees. While their desire to not exceed their remit to help refugees can be 
understood, it does suggest that there is a requirement for a change in the structure 
of UN departments. There is a need for a department that can assist both refugees 
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and displaced persons without discrimination. Cuny (1993), suggested the 
establishment of a United Nations High Commissioner for War Victims which 
would assist those affected by conflict whether they be refugees or displaced 
persons or hosts. The author believes that such a department is now crucial, for 
not only could it contain personnel who are specifically trained to deal with the 
provision of relief in war, but it could also provide a wider degree of protection to 
all those affected by the path of war . 
8.7 FUTURE RESEARCH POTENTIALS 
The working set of recommendations and the suggestions listed above open up a 
number of lines of future research and activity that need to be pursued if current 
praxis is truly to change for the better and to continue to improve. 
8.7.1 Training and Professionalism 
Appropriate and current training of professionals in the field can only be provided 
if there is new and accurate data constantly available that defines good and bad 
practice. This requires a cycle of research studies looking at the effects of policies 
and programmes in action. Not only would such studies be required for each 
country within which the humanitarian community is operational, but also across a 
range of disciplines. This study of Croatia has been conducted from the point of 
view of an architect, and although it has been viewed within the contexts of socio­
cultural, economic and political concerns, there is a need for researchers from 
other disciplines to study such problems. 
Currently there is a prime need for research into operations in the Transcaucasus 
area, for this region is rapidly becoming the central arena for action. As well as 
Chechnya, the tensions between the myriad of ethnic groups in the densely 
populated area of the Fergana valley which lies between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
is very high, and the conflict that has existed in the region since 1993 could easily 
explode again to create thousands of refugees. Additionally, there remains a need 
for research into the shelter policies and provision made in the 'developing' 
nations, where environmental erosion and devastation even further reduce 
potential for the support of iIUlate coping mechanisms. 
8.7.2 Cultural Concerns 
There is a prime need for research into the appropriateness of aid provision to 
Islamic refugees and displaced persons. Over 75 per cent of refugees and displaced 
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persons m the W orId are Islamic and yet 90 per cent of the humanitarian 
community originates in the West (Cuny, 1993). The resulting differences in 
culture and outlook between agencies and recipients, create difficulties in the 
implementation of relief assistance. Attempts to adapt Christian based relief 
principles to Islamic law have so far failed. Islamic traditions and cultures need to 
be understood if relief programmes are to provide appropriate assistance. For 
instance, the tradition of purdah has significant effects on the way relief shelters 
should be provided and yet it is seldom recognised or addressed. There is a need 
for an increased understanding of the failures of the system to meet Islamic needs 
if the system is to be improved. 
8.7.3 Testing the Recommendations 
Having established this working set of recommendations based on the findings of 
the research in Croatia, there is now a need to expand the area of applicability and 
further check the recommendations' veracity in other situations. Discussion of the 
basic concepts contained within the recommendations at the October 1995 
workshop in Luton indicated that those working in the field felt that understanding 
of such issues was important to improve current praxis (see appendix D). There is 
a need to test the code more extensively in the field and adjust and improve upon it 
further. 
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Cepin Naselje Prijatelstva 
Rokovci Blace 
Ivankovo Wagon village 
Dakovacka Satnica Gasinci 
Fig. A.5. Camps Visited 
Location 	 Name 
Zagreb 	 Zaprude 
Hotel International 
Graditelskih Struka 
Velika Gorica Barracks 
Shipping Co~tainers 
Osijek Gradevinski Skolski Centar 
Depadansa Vojarna 
Varaidin Prihvatni Centar 1 
Prihvatni Centar 2 
Spansko Industogradnje 
Tempo 
Fig A.6. Collective Centres Visited 
Location 	 Name 
osijek Kovacec 
Andric 
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ApPENDIX B: PERMISSION LETTERS 
Bl. PERMISSION LETTERS FOR DATA COLLECTION PHASE ONE 
Studij/kl centGr ZQ obnouu I fGZUOJ d.o .0. 

STUDY CENTRE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT - DUBROVNIK, CROATIA 
Dubrovnik, 26. .-pn,. 1994. 
SViMA NA KOJE SE ove MOtE OONOSm 
Predmet: 	 ISTRAZIvAOKl PAOJEKT: swarAJ PROGNANIKA I 
IZBJEGUCA U HRVAlSKOJ 
~8908podo, 
UJepo Vas moIlmo za porno{: gdicl SUE EllIS za wijeme njezlnoga 
stud~ putavanja u HrvatBkoj ad I. koIovoza do 20. rujna 18M.g. 
Gdica SUE ElJJS angallrana Ie u ISl'RAZIvAOcOM CENTRU SVEuauITA 
U lUTONU I nelaz1 .. na sbJdljalcJ::Jln.l putovanju u awhu iIIrIIIl_taog rada 
za prlpremu svoje doIdoreb dlMrtacJje SMJBTAJ IZBJEGUCA I 
PROGNANIKA U HRVAlSKOJ. OVal IIdIdtva!ld proIekt.....tzn.. posJetan 
tzg)egl~ naeelJlma I druglm .,....Im objeIdima, .. ankalhn..... 
prognenllca I Izbfeglica, _ I poe;.tan humanbrnlm ~ kDje 
pom!IItu prognanlke I izbjegllce u HrvetDIcDj. Ovo IfJtrdIvanje it zajednlakl 
pro}ekt sveOOOOA U LUTONU I naiega S'nJDlJSKOGA CENTRA ZA 
OBNOW I RAZVOJ. 
Gdlca EllIS imI brltanaku putDmicu I brltarl8lcB Ie drf.arvIjanka. 
VrIo smo Vam zahvalnl rill VaIoI pomoa gc!IcI Elf. za _me traj8nJa 

njezlnoga lltudijllkoga pu1O¥enja. 

Fig B.l. Croatian version ofpermission letter for data collection phase one 
-
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StudlJ/kl (enta, sa obnouu I ,Ql.uoJ d.o.o. 

STUDY CENTRE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT - DUBROVNIK, CROATIA 
Dubrcvnik, 28 July 19M 
TO AU. WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
Re: 	 RESEARCH PROJECT: SHE.l..TER FOR DISPLACED PERSONS 
AND REFUGEES iN CROAnA 
Gentlemen, 
w. kindly aak your help to .... sue EUJS during her study trip In Croatia 
(August 1 • Septamber 20). 
MIM SUE EUJS Is engaged In mE RESEARCH CENTRE, UNiVERSm' OF 
LUTON and mea. etudy 1rIp on purpoee for prepM'1ItIon of her docknI 
reeearch SHELTER FOR DISPlACED PERSONS AN) REFUGEES IN 
CROATIA. ThIll '.larch project wli be realiled by viINtIng refugeee' 
MttIementa and making .. _ •• willi dlaplaced peqon8 and refugMs. 
• alec by vi8IIng of Internelional humanltartan a-ganlMIIon engaged In 
helping dlltptaced per8OfW; end refugee.. this " ••arch II • joint r.....'Ch 
wntIn d UNIVERSITY OF LlII'ON and our STUDY CENTAI! FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION AMJ DEVELOPMENT. 
M_ EllIS "- • BrItIBh pa••pm, Brldlm reeIdent. 
W... gralleful to your ...lItance.,d help to ... EUJS during her atudy 
trip In CroatIa. 
With beR wIIhe8, 
I 
Fig B.2. English translation o.fpermission letterfor data collection phase one 
I 
~ 
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V\.ADA REPUBUKE HRVIITSKE 

URED ZA PROGNANIKE I IZBJEGLICE 

UI. Republike Austrije 14, 41000 Zagreb. Hrvatska 

Tel: 041·173 699 Fax: 041-171-234 





Ur. broj: 50407 -09-95-179 

rJr Susan J. Ellis 
Predmet: 	Dozvola ulaska u prognanicko/iilijeglicl<e centre na podrucju RU Zagreba. 

RU Osijek i RU Varazdin 

Djelatnid Univerziteta iz Lutina (Engleska). Sue Ellis, odobrava se provedba studijskog rada 
pod nazivom "Studija smjestajnih objekata za prognanike izbjeglice u RH" u 
prognanicko/izbjeglickim centrima koji se nalaze na navedenim podruCjima . 




Hotel "International", Miramarska 24 25. sijecnja 1995. 

f)acki dam graditeljskih struka. 26. sijecnja 1995. 

Av. V. Holjevca 3 

Hotel "Bijela ruZa". Velika Gorka 27. sijecnja 1995. 

"Hidroelektra"-Novo ace. "Micevec" 28. sijecnje 1995. 

"Tempo" Jug 3, Spansko 30. sljeenja 1995. 

"Industrogradnja" Dolina bb. Spansko 30. sijecnja 1995. 

RU OS[JEK (Cepin, Gasinc:i. Rokovci. 





Prihvatnl cenlar I i II veljace 1995. 

\~ 
dr. Tanja Vucelic 
~nlca Odjeia za zdravstvenu zaStitu 
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ApPENDIX C: PHYSICAL OBSERVATIONS 
Cl. PHYSICAL OBSERVATIONS 
• 	 Size of accommodation 
• 	 Sizes of rooms and numbers ofpeople in them/using them. 
• 	 Numbers of people sharing facilities - bathrooms, kitchens, toilets, laundry 
• 	 What activities are carried out in what spaces I How are the spaces used 
• 	 What happens throughout the day 
• 	 Overall size ofbuilding and number of people accommodated in it. 
• 	 State of repair of facilities 
• 	 Communal activities - schooling, healthcare, social services 
• 	 Defensible space - private, semi-private, semi-public, public 
• 	 Graffiti 
• 	 Ethnic segregation 
• 	 State of repair 
• 	 Personalisation of space 
• 	 Numbers of vehicles, white goods, etc .. 
• 	 Differences in coping abilities between agranan and urban communities I 
families 
• 	 Differences in housing and shelter provided between rural and urban areas 
ApPENDIXD 
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ApPENDIX D: REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP: 
TOWARDS IMPROVED SHELTER AND ENVIRONMENT FOR 
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS WITHIN THE POST­
YUGOSLAV COUNTRIES 
9-11th October 1995 
Dl. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this workshop, which was organised by Sue Ellis and Dr Sultan 
Barakat, was to bring together academics specialising in all aspects of shelter for 
refugees and displaced persons with practitioners working in the field and 
manufacturers of shelter systems to discuss current practice of shelter provision in 
the Post-Yugoslav countries and collectively make recommendations for 
improvement. 
In advance of the workshop, twelve papers were prepared which outlined general 
experience and areas of achievement and difficulties. Themes from these papers, 
together with the results of doctorate research being undertaken by Sue Ellis, 
formed the basis of the discussion: 
• 	 Level of shelter provision in a developed, cold climate country 
• 	 Participation in the design, organisation and management of shelter 
• 	 Integration of refugees and displaced persons into the built and social 
environments 
• 	 Shelter provision that is sensitive to the requirements ofage, gender and special 
needs 
• 	 Relief to development continuum 
• 	 Return and resettlement progrannnes 
The forty participants came from nine different countries and spent two days in 
working groups which began by identifYing a range of shelter approaches and the 
contexts which dictated them, the role of refugees and displaced persons in their 
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working seSSIons, the partIcIpants identified opporturutles and bottlenecks m 
making emergency shelter approaches more developmental. 
D2. SHELTER APPROACHES 
Physical approaches to shelter provision were identified from the papers and 
subsequent discussion in the working groups as being: 
Primarily private accommodation, with the vast majority of refugees and 
displaced persons in post-Yugoslav countries accommodated in this manner, i.e., 
sharing houses with host families or renting rooms or flats. Secondly the 
temporary use of existing buildings, which ranges from the occupation of 
abandoned housing to the use of public buildings such as schools, hotels, workers 
barracks and army installations. Thirdly temporary accommodation such as 
camps of prefabricated buildings and tents etc.. Fourthly, repair and 
reconstruction ofvillages and houses. 
During the working groups different support mechanisms for the physical shelter 
were also identified, such as : 
• financial rather than physical support 
• partnerships rather than humanitarian aid 
• introduction of expertise and training to complement finance and housing units 
• investment in and recovery oflocal industries 
• autonomous rebuilding by the refugees and displaced persons themselves 
D3. THE EFFECTS OF THE CONTEXT ON PROVISION 
The working groups then discussed issues and contexts that would affect what 
shelter approach was utilised. It was observed that at the outset of the war in the 
post-Yugoslav countries, agencies and donors found shelter provision difficult as 
they possessed no institutional memory of acting in a developed, cold climate 
country. Standards for space requirements, level of sanitation, cooking 
requirements had to be established quickly. It was also noted that the pre-war 
situation of the post-Yugoslav countries had provided some unique opportunities 
for mass emergency shelter provision, such as utilising the hotels along the Adriatic 
coast. 
-----"-" 
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It was also acknowledged that, as the vast majority of refugees and displaced had 
been accommodated through elasti~ity of resources, where camps and settlements 
had been built from prefabricated units, it was likely to have been directed by 
agencies and donors needs for projects of high visibility in order to raise further 
funds and maintain a high public profile. 
D4. ROLE OF THE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED 
A number of the participants agreed with sentiments that the refugees and 
displaced persons are a political tool and this has marked effects on the policies 
that govern aid and provision. It was mentioned that any shelter provided for 
refugees and displaced must have the appearance of being temporary as host 
populations and governments do not wish to encourage notions of permanency. It 
was also acknowledged that 'participatory' and incrementally upgraded 
programmes of shelter provision in this context are difficult to instigate as they can 
result in tension with the host community. 
It was also proposed that it would be difficult to design, implement and manage a 
participatory programme due to the self-perceived transient nature of the refugees 
and displaced persons and the high levels of trauma experienced. However, it was 
also noted that one effective way of reducing the levels of psychological trauma is 
to encourage refugees and displaced to regain control over their lives and be 
autonomous and participate in the control of their environments. 
D5. IMP ACTS OF SHELTER PROVISION ON THE HOST COMMUNITY 
It was asserted that shelter provision for refugees and displaced persons assists in 
the rebuilding of the local economy. In discussion, it was noted that in the post­
Yugoslavian context, the continuance of war makes it currently very difficult to 
rebuild the economy through shelter provision, (it was shown that in Croatia, less 
than 10 per cent of the 70,000 prefabricated units were provided through local 
markets). However, several examples were presented of shelter provision that is 
attempting to revive and support local construction industries in several regions of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
The level of shelter provided for the refugee and displaced community compared to 
the conditions of the host community was also discussed. It was acknowledged 
that when refugees and displaced are receiving free accommodation as well as 
food, medicines and hygienic items in a country where all are competing for scarce 
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resources there is a consequently high level of tension between the host community 
and the incoming population. 
D6. RELIEF TO DEVELOPMENT 
In the second day of discussion the working groups identified problems with the 
short term, emergency approach of shelter. An unplanned, emergency response to 
shelter has prodigious depredatory effects on long tenn development. It can 
increase levels of dependency and psycho-social trauma among the refugee and 
displaced population. It was suggested that emergency assistance should focus on 
the saving oflivelihoods as well as the saving oflives and that therefore, aid should 
be directed less towards the physical, technical aspects of shelter, and more 
towards the social, psychological, economic and cultural environments that 
combine to produce that shelter. 
To promote relief that focuses on the saving of livelihoods as well as lives and to 
address the idea of a relief to development continuum, the working groups tackled 
ways in which the emergency shelter approaches they had identified could address 
development and thus promote long term independence and autonomy rather than 
producing marginalised and dependent communities. 
The discussions in the working groups, and subsequent presentations led to the 
production of a potential basis for a 'code of conduct' for all those providing 
shelter in a war situation: 
• 	 The approach to shelter provision is more important than the physical object 
provided 
• 	 Use local labour, local material and human resources in all levels of provision 
• 	 Agencies and donors must work to empower the local authorities, local 
communities and the refugees and displaced persons 
• 	 There must be a restructuring of policy at allleve1s that facilitates collaboration 
between international and non-governmental organisations 
• 	 Aid agencies should be accountable to both donors and beneficiaries 
• 	 Legal issues of ownership, building regulations and planning legislation need to 
be addressed swiftly in the emergency period in order to facilitate longer term 
action 
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• 	 There is a need for all actors to be acutely aware of the debilitating affects of 
psychological trauma on refugees and displaced persons and ensure that the 
'relief provided does nothing to increase the level of suffering 
• 	 Relief actions should build and provide a platform of capability from which 
development can proceed 
• 	 Pre-war development plans should be examined in order to decide the direction 
of relief and future development 
• 	 Actors in relief situations are primarily motivated by self-interest and their 
actions are determined by their past operations. Care must be taken therefore, to 
offer assistance appropriate to the identified need and not to a predetermined 
agenda 
• 	 Donors and agencies need to act within open agendas in order to be responsive 
to real and not perceived needs. They need to be flexible so that they can take 
the leads from the local population and not impose their own predetermined 
agendas, thus their actions will support not supplant local efforts 
• 	 There is a lack of commitment from the donors which can inhibit programmes 
that are developmental, for .instance the short term nature offunding 
• 	 There needs to be increased co-ordination between the relief and development 
departments within aid agencies and donor governments 
• 	 It is easier to raise money for humanitarian aid projects that are 
comprehensively covered by the media, therefore there is a necessity to educate 
the media to promote images of refugees and displaced persons as capable 
survivors and resources not victims and burdens. 
• 	 It is hard to find funding for rehabilitation projects or longer term programmes, 
so relief projects should be designed to positively affect long term development 
• 	 Programmes need to be evaluated not purely in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness but also in terms of impact, sustainability and relevance 
• 	 Enable refugees and displaced persons to utilise their enforced free time to 
accrue new skills and so maximise their future opportunities for long term 
solutions 
D7. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SUBMITTED PAPERS 
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Provision for Refugees and Displaced Persons 
CUNNINGHAM, M., (1995) Provision Of Shelter in Bosnia-Hercegovina 
DAVIS, I., (1995) The Level of Shelter Provision in Developed, Cold Climate 
Countries 
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